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From: "J. Roeleveld" <joost@antarean.org>
To: gentoo-user@lists.gentoo.org
Subject: Re: [gentoo-user] Demise of Truecrypt - surprised I haven't seen t his discussed here yet?
Date: Mon, 02 Jun 2014 14:52 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2862641.ndOcOWRyVd@andromeda> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <C96E8C03-BDE3-41B4-A0AD-42CE5A8AD009@iki.fi>

On Monday, June 02, 2014 03:23:03 PM Matti Nykyri wrote:
> On Jun 2, 2014, at 16:40, "J. Roeleveld" <joost@antarean.org> wrote:
> > On Monday, June 02, 2014 07:28:53 AM Rich Freeman wrote:
> >> On Mon, Jun 2, 2014 at 6:56 AM, Neil Bothwick <neil@digimed.co.uk> wrote:
> >>> On Mon, 02 Jun 2014 05:27:44 -0500, Dale wrote:
> >>>> The second option does sound what I am looking for.  Basically, if I
> >>>> log
> >>>> out but leave my computer on, leave home, some crook/NSA type breaks in
> >>>> and tries to access something or steals my whole puter, they would just
> >>>> get garbage for data.  That seems to fit the second option best.
> >>> 
> >>> If they steal your computer they will have to power it off, unless you
> >>> are kind enough to leave them a large enough UPS to steal along with it,
> >>> so any encryption will be equally effective.
> >> 
> >> If you're worried about casual thieves then just about any kind of
> >> properly-implemented encryption will stop them.
> >> 
> >> If you're worried about a government official specifically tasked with
> >> retrieving your computer, my understanding is that it is SOP these
> >> days to retrieve your computer without powering it off for just this
> >> reason.  They won't use your UPS to do it.  Typically they remove the
> >> plug just far enough to expose the prongs, slide in a connector that
> >> connects it to a UPS, and then they pull it out the rest of the way
> >> now powered by the UPS.
> >> 
> >> See something like:
> >> http://www.cru-inc.com/products/wiebetech/hotplug_field_kit/
> > 
> > Hmm... Those are nice, but can be easily built yourself with an
> > off-the-shelf UPS.
> > 
> >> Presumably somebody who is determined will also have the means to
> >> retrieve the contents of RAM once they seize your computer.  Besides
> >> directlly accessing the memory bus I think most motherboards are not
> >> designed to be secure against attacks from PCI/firewire/etc.
> > 
> > Hmm... add something to auto-shutdown the computer when a hotplug event
> > occurs on any of the internal ports and remove support for unused ports
> > from the kernel.
> > 
> > I wonder how they'd keep a computer from initiating a shutdown procedure
> > or
> > causing a kernel panic when it looses (wireless) connection to another
> > device that is unlikely to be moved when powered up?
> 
> Well i have a switch in the door of the server room. It opens when you open
> the door. That signals the kernel to wipe all the encryption keys from
> kernel memory. Without the keys there is no access to the disks. After that
> another kernel is executed which wipes the memory of the old kernel. If you
> just pull the plug memory will stay in its state for an unspecified time.

You don't happen to have a howto on how to set that up?

> Swap uses random keys.
> 
> network switches and routers get power only after firewall-server is up and
> running.

networked powersockets?

> There is no easy way to enter the room without wipeing the encryption keys.
> Booting up the server requires that a boot disk is brought to the computer
> to decrypt the boot drive. Grub2 can do this easily. This is to prevent
> some one to tamper eith a boot loader.
> 
> System is not protected against hardware tamperment. The server room is an
> RF-cage.
> 
> I consoder this setup quite secure.

Makes me wonder what it is you are protecting your server from. :)

--
Joost


  parent reply	other threads:[~2014-06-02 12:52 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-06-01 12:31 [gentoo-user] Demise of Truecrypt - surprised I haven't seen t his discussed here yet? Tanstaafl
2014-06-01 17:45 ` Volker Armin Hemmann
2014-06-02  8:22   ` Dale
2014-06-02  8:53     ` Michael Hampicke
2014-06-02  9:20       ` Neil Bothwick
2014-06-02 10:24         ` Michael Hampicke
2014-06-02 11:34         ` Mark David Dumlao
2014-06-02 12:27           ` Neil Bothwick
2014-06-02  9:24     ` Volker Armin Hemmann
2014-06-02  9:34       ` Neil Bothwick
2014-06-02  9:48         ` Dale
2014-06-02 10:06           ` Alan McKinnon
2014-06-02 10:27             ` Dale
2014-06-02 10:56               ` Neil Bothwick
2014-06-02 11:04                 ` Dale
2014-06-02 11:10                   ` Neil Bothwick
2014-06-02 11:33                     ` Dale
2014-06-02 13:23                     ` J. Roeleveld
2014-06-02 11:28                 ` Rich Freeman
2014-06-02 12:06                   ` Dale
2014-06-02 12:28                     ` Michael Hampicke
2014-06-02 12:30                     ` Matti Nykyri
2014-06-02 13:27                     ` Rich Freeman
2014-06-02 13:40                   ` J. Roeleveld
2014-06-02 12:23                     ` Matti Nykyri
2014-06-02 12:36                       ` godzil
2014-06-02 12:58                         ` Matti Nykyri
2014-06-02 13:29                           ` godzil
2014-06-02 14:52                       ` J. Roeleveld [this message]
2014-06-02 13:23                         ` Matti Nykyri
2014-06-02 15:29                           ` J. Roeleveld
2014-06-03 18:53                             ` Matti Nykyri
2014-06-03 21:05                               ` J. Roeleveld
2014-06-03 19:53                                 ` Matti Nykyri
2014-06-03 21:27                                   ` Matti Nykyri
2014-06-02 18:14                         ` Volker Armin Hemmann
2014-06-02 17:14                   ` Volker Armin Hemmann
2014-06-02 19:26                     ` J. Roeleveld
2014-06-02 13:22                 ` J. Roeleveld
2014-06-02 16:54                 ` Volker Armin Hemmann
2014-06-02 10:43             ` Rich Freeman
2014-06-02 10:54             ` Neil Bothwick
2014-06-04 19:59               ` Frank Steinmetzger
2014-06-04 23:24                 ` Neil Bothwick
2014-06-05 16:52                   ` Frank Steinmetzger
2014-06-05 16:57                     ` Rich Freeman
2014-06-02 10:22   ` Tanstaafl
2014-06-02 10:57     ` Volker Armin Hemmann
2014-06-03  7:17 ` Marc Stürmer
2014-06-03 10:00   ` Tanstaafl
2014-06-03 12:02     ` Mick
2014-06-03 19:59     ` Marc Stürmer

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