* [gentoo-project] Gentoo Leadership Structure
@ 2008-05-19 23:46 Richard Freeman
2008-05-20 0:32 ` William L. Thomson Jr.
` (2 more replies)
0 siblings, 3 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Richard Freeman @ 2008-05-19 23:46 UTC (permalink / raw
To: gentoo-project
I was thinking a little of some of pros/cons of how Gentoo is organized,
and maybe a few steps would help to improve it a little. I'd consider
this really to just be an item for discussion in terms of longer-term
goals - not something that we should try to institute as a knee-jerk
response to the current GLEP 39 debate.
First - let's talk about what works well currently:
1. Devs are represented democratically.
2. The consensus-based approach tends to ensure that really
objectionable decisions aren't made.
3. The process is pretty informal and "fun" - we don't obsess over
Parliamentary Procedure and Robert's Rules of Order.
4. For the most part anybody can go ahead and just create a project or
initiative or overlay and do whatever they want as long as it doesn't
have a big impact on the distro / portage tree. In a sense the council
can seem a little boring since for many things they aren't actually needed.
5. The day-to-day operations are managed by independent and functional
teams. They tend to get along and stuff gets done without a chain of
command.
So, what do I perceive as some of the issues? Note that I don't think
these reflect on the individuals involve so much as the processes. Note
also that some of these are more of perception issues, but perceptions
matter too.
1. The council can seem a bit aloof during important conversations.
Granted, we don't want knee-jerk reactions, but I think some involvement
would help steady the helm during controversy.
2. It is difficult to set long-term direction with a committee at the
helm.
3. A committee doesn't really have an inspirational role - right now
project leads are likely filling this role.
4. When really big issues come up there are questions of whether the
council should act on its own.
5. There are still open questions regarding the division between the
trustees and the council when it comes to issues other than handling of
assets and technical decisions.
So, how do I propose to help sort these issues out? Well, I was
thinking that we don't need to revolutionize the current process,
because I think the current process largely works. However, I do
propose a few changes:
1. The council should be able to appoint a leader from its own ranks
(and a backup). This role would be like a prime minister in most
parliamentary democracies. They are really just a figurehead/spokesman,
but they are at least a go-to person who can claim to speak for the
council. They can make decisions autonomously, but all binding
decisions must be ratified by the council. They can be appointed and
de-appointed as needed and rotations could also be used (perhaps
rotating somebody in to the backup role first and then onto the lead role).
2. The council would be the leaders of the distro with respect to all
issues that don't involve anything that is legally Gentoo Foundation
property. The Foundation has to operate in compliance with various
laws, and I think it is best to allow them to focus on Foundation issues
so that legalities don't get in the way of issues that don't need to
involve them. That doesn't prevent the Foundation from having an
advocacy role or a voice - but since both the council and the foundation
have a democratic mandate why pick the more formal of the two to resolve
issues in what is a reasonably small body of members? The argument has
been made that the council has technical expertise, while the trustees
have broader expertise - I'm not sure I agree. The expertise of the two
boards differs, but both have a particular focus (technical vs legal) -
neither has a general management focus but perhaps that could change. I
also want to comment that I don't want to see these two bodies in
conflict - neither has the role of being the voice of the "community" in
a way that the other does not. If we get into a mode where we have two
leadership bodies in conflict I think it will be a net loss for Gentoo -
we can't function if we have the Foundation repossessing hardware, and
we can't function if devs start quitting because they feel like they're
being treated as subservient to the "community".
3. Council will meet monthly, but any slacker policies will be at its
own discretion. Accountability to devs will be handled in a different
way that is a bit more flexible. Official decisions and votes must be
made in scheduled meetings, although the public may be excluded for
issues that are personal in nature at its discretion. Meetings must be
clearly announced at least one week in advance on -dev-announce except
in emergencies. No definition here - accountability is handled in the
next item.
4. Any developer may follow the following procedure to hold a
referendum on any issue that will be binding on Gentoo (but not the
Foundation):
a. Create a petition containing a clear resolution with voting options
(which must include an option to abstain and an option to decline the
resolution).
b. Collect gpg signatures from developers/staff. The requisite number
of signatures is 10% of the number devs who made commits in the last 30
days. Note that the count of devs making commits is used ONLY to
determine the number of sigs needed - any devs/staff can provide sigs
regardless of their role or level of activity as long as they haven't
been retired/booted.
c. Submit petition to council@g.o. The council will post the petition
on -dev-announce (or -core if the petition so indicates) and allow two
weeks for debate and two weeks for voting.
Note that the referendum process is intended to be rare (maybe the
threshold should be 20% or more). It could be used to impeach council
members, make a decision, etc. The council would be bound to execute
the decision as best they are able. If the council doesn't do a good
job they could be impeached/etc - I think that is the best we can do
since ultimately we're depending on humans to do the right thing, and
the last thing we want is multiple councils with checks and balances and
more debate than action any time we want to do something.
Such a system would handle all of the current controversies fairly well
I think, although I don't think this should be enacted as a reactionary
step. In fact, this is really just food for thought, and perhaps
anything that does get enacted will look quite different.
I almost hesitate to do this, but here are some practical examples of
how this would eliminate perceived ambiguity in some of the current issues:
1. Council tells devrel lead that they can take "emergency" action to
terminate a dev on their own initiative. Devrel lead does so. In the
proposed model there is nothing to question - the Council does indeed
have the power to delegate such matters (assuming it formally voted or
the new lead role took the action with ratification), and anybody acting
with council authority is legit.
2. Council has direct involvement in a dismissal but takes the appeal.
In the proposed model this is also fine - the council is still the
last line of appeal (short of taking an appeal to the -dev mailing list
to stir up support for a petition).
3. A bunch of devs argue the council acted wrongly and want to take
action. Under the new model instead of arguing about missed meetings a
petition is circulated and if enough people care a referendum takes
place. The petition could call for reinstating the devs and putting
them through the normal devrel process, or for new elections to take
place, or whatever. If petition doesn't get sufficient support then it
dies on the vine, and at least everybody can agree that there was due
process. The burden of collecting sigs is on those who want to petition
the distro - so the council isn't stuck dealing with the mess if they
think they can just ignore it and it will go away. On the other hand,
there is no longer a question as to what constitutes sufficient
authority to call for a vote - anybody can inspect a petition and see
that it has the appropriate number of sigs if they care to do so.
4. Council members miss a meeting - do we boot them all? Under the new
model no such action is automatic unless the council imposes those rules
upon itself, and the council writes the rules and can choose to break or
follow them with impunity. However, if devs get fed up with the council
a petition can be circulated.
Of course, any or none of these items could be taken and adopted in
part, and they could be implemented piecemeal as well. I'm really
hesitant regarding referendums - we don't want every other issue
prompting a global vote, and we don't want leaders afraid to take action
lest they have to deal with everybody second-guessing them.
Well, now that I've managed to be more verbose than Duncan (whose posts
I admire even if I do usually skim them), I'll stand back and let
everybody poke holes in this...
--
gentoo-project@lists.gentoo.org mailing list
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: [gentoo-project] Gentoo Leadership Structure
2008-05-19 23:46 [gentoo-project] Gentoo Leadership Structure Richard Freeman
@ 2008-05-20 0:32 ` William L. Thomson Jr.
2008-05-20 1:43 ` Mark Loeser
2008-05-20 5:40 ` Alistair Bush
2008-05-20 10:05 ` Jorge Manuel B. S. Vicetto
2 siblings, 1 reply; 10+ messages in thread
From: William L. Thomson Jr. @ 2008-05-20 0:32 UTC (permalink / raw
To: gentoo-project
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On Mon, 2008-05-19 at 19:46 -0400, Richard Freeman wrote:
> I was thinking a little of some of pros/cons of how Gentoo is organized,
> and maybe a few steps would help to improve it a little. I'd consider
> this really to just be an item for discussion in terms of longer-term
> goals - not something that we should try to institute as a knee-jerk
> response to the current GLEP 39 debate.
Just to clarify one thing. Allot of my thoughts, some of those of other
board members, etc. Were in place long before the GLEP 39 issue. Any
action the trustees are taking now is by no means a knee-jerk reaction.
If anything it has simply expedited the time line of things that were to
come and be discussed either way.
--
William L. Thomson Jr.
amd64/Java/Trustees
Gentoo Foundation
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: [gentoo-project] Gentoo Leadership Structure
2008-05-20 0:32 ` William L. Thomson Jr.
@ 2008-05-20 1:43 ` Mark Loeser
2008-05-20 2:00 ` William L. Thomson Jr.
0 siblings, 1 reply; 10+ messages in thread
From: Mark Loeser @ 2008-05-20 1:43 UTC (permalink / raw
To: gentoo-project
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"William L. Thomson Jr." <wltjr@gentoo.org> said:
> Just to clarify one thing. Allot of my thoughts, some of those of other
> board members, etc. Were in place long before the GLEP 39 issue. Any
> action the trustees are taking now is by no means a knee-jerk reaction.
> If anything it has simply expedited the time line of things that were to
> come and be discussed either way.
I'm very confused by this statement. What actions are the trustees
taking, and with regards to what?
--
Mark Loeser
email - halcy0n AT gentoo DOT org
email - mark AT halcy0n DOT com
web - http://www.halcy0n.com
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: [gentoo-project] Gentoo Leadership Structure
2008-05-20 1:43 ` Mark Loeser
@ 2008-05-20 2:00 ` William L. Thomson Jr.
0 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: William L. Thomson Jr. @ 2008-05-20 2:00 UTC (permalink / raw
To: gentoo-project
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On Mon, 2008-05-19 at 21:43 -0400, Mark Loeser wrote:
> "William L. Thomson Jr." <wltjr@gentoo.org> said:
> > Just to clarify one thing. Allot of my thoughts, some of those of other
> > board members, etc. Were in place long before the GLEP 39 issue. Any
> > action the trustees are taking now is by no means a knee-jerk reaction.
> > If anything it has simply expedited the time line of things that were to
> > come and be discussed either way.
>
> I'm very confused by this statement. What actions are the trustees
> taking, and with regards to what?
Talking to the council to see how we can help in a nutshell. Maybe take
over things like CoC, etc. Doing something about GLEP 39. Like MAYBE
having some involvement in times like now when there is to be a councile
changeover. There is who to supervise, enact it? Things that are VERY
pre-mature and have yet to be responded to official by a council.
Since there is an outgoing council, and then one incoming. We won't even
get a response till the new council is in place. Which we will then have
to resubmit our inquiry/offer. Some private discussion. Then a public
meeting will be called if council is interested, and things taken from
there. Ideally, but it's one in a series of events now.
Again VERY pre-mature. I am disclosing more now than has even been
brought up between the trustees and council. Just to be open and
transparent as to POSSIBLE ideas, directions, etc that would be
initially discussed in private, then met on in public.
So please do not read anything into anything. Nothing has happened or
will happen without most everyone being very aware and involved. No
action will take place in private.
I apologize for the delay in getting our minutes up. I will see about
getting that up ASAP. Since this was met on in public already wrt to the
trustees.
http://www.gentoo.org/foundation/en/minutes/index.xml
--
William L. Thomson Jr.
amd64/Java/Trustees
Gentoo Foundation
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: [gentoo-project] Gentoo Leadership Structure
2008-05-19 23:46 [gentoo-project] Gentoo Leadership Structure Richard Freeman
2008-05-20 0:32 ` William L. Thomson Jr.
@ 2008-05-20 5:40 ` Alistair Bush
2008-05-20 10:21 ` Jorge Manuel B. S. Vicetto
2008-05-20 10:05 ` Jorge Manuel B. S. Vicetto
2 siblings, 1 reply; 10+ messages in thread
From: Alistair Bush @ 2008-05-20 5:40 UTC (permalink / raw
To: gentoo-project
Firstly I just want to get my idea's in here.
Basically I like things as they are but would like to strengthen areas
where I perceive the rules to be attackable. Most of these idea's do
come from the system I parliament within my country (NZ) which is a
Constitutional Monachy ( without a formal Constitution ).
Now, all I suggest we do is amend our rules to be this.
1) The Foundation call's the Council elections, Council call's for
Foundation elections.
2) At any time duing a Councils term the Council can ask the Foundation
to call elections for Council, at which time the Foundation _must_ do so.
3) Foundation can dismiss Council and call elections[1]
4) Council can dismiss "Foundation" (or more correctly all its members)
and call elections[1].
5) A Council or Foundation can't be dismissed within the first _insert
time period here_.
[1] elections being within 30 days.
Now it would be my hope that this framework would be more Convention
than a set of rules to be followed. For instance I wouldn't expect the
Foundation members to have to meet and decide whether to accept a
request by Council for new elections. But on the other hand it would
stop any abuses of council ( eg all developers must be blonde with blue
eyes ) and allow council to replace a slacking Foundation.
Also at no point would this stop the development community from
re-electing the Council/Foundation as it stood. If there was a
situation where the Council was dismissed only to be re-elected "with a
strong majority" then you could assume the Foundation should be worried.
I also hope that by keeping this short ppl will agree on principal with
this first, before fleshing out any problem/missing area's.
Alistair
--
gentoo-project@lists.gentoo.org mailing list
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: [gentoo-project] Gentoo Leadership Structure
2008-05-19 23:46 [gentoo-project] Gentoo Leadership Structure Richard Freeman
2008-05-20 0:32 ` William L. Thomson Jr.
2008-05-20 5:40 ` Alistair Bush
@ 2008-05-20 10:05 ` Jorge Manuel B. S. Vicetto
2008-05-20 10:19 ` Donnie Berkholz
2008-05-20 16:37 ` Richard Freeman
2 siblings, 2 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Jorge Manuel B. S. Vicetto @ 2008-05-20 10:05 UTC (permalink / raw
To: gentoo-project
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Hash: SHA1
Richard Freeman wrote:
| I was thinking a little of some of pros/cons of how Gentoo is organized,
| and maybe a few steps would help to improve it a little. I'd consider
| this really to just be an item for discussion in terms of longer-term
| goals - not something that we should try to institute as a knee-jerk
| response to the current GLEP 39 debate.
...
| So, how do I propose to help sort these issues out? Well, I was
| thinking that we don't need to revolutionize the current process,
| because I think the current process largely works. However, I do
| propose a few changes:
|
| 1. The council should be able to appoint a leader from its own ranks
| (and a backup). This role would be like a prime minister in most
| parliamentary democracies. They are really just a figurehead/spokesman,
| but they are at least a go-to person who can claim to speak for the
| council. They can make decisions autonomously, but all binding
| decisions must be ratified by the council. They can be appointed and
| de-appointed as needed and rotations could also be used (perhaps
| rotating somebody in to the backup role first and then onto the lead
role).
|
I don't think our current problem was caused by not having a "council
leader". Also, current policy already states that 2 council members can
make a decision on urgent matters that needs to be ratified by the full
council at their next meeting.
| 2. The council would be the leaders of the distro with respect to all
| issues that don't involve anything that is legally Gentoo Foundation
| property.
You're voicing the view that the Foundation should be nothing more than
a holder for IP and assets. That is not what it was created for, nor
should it be limited to that, imo. Also, you're changing the focus of
the council as it was created as a technical body that would steer the
technical advancement of the distro.
| I also want to comment that I don't want to see these two bodies in
| conflict - neither has the role of being the voice of the "community" in
| a way that the other does not. If we get into a mode where we have two
| leadership bodies in conflict I think it will be a net loss for Gentoo -
| we can't function if we have the Foundation repossessing hardware, and
| we can't function if devs start quitting because they feel like they're
| being treated as subservient to the "community".
I agree that we don't want to have the Council and the Trustees fighting
~ over who "rules" gentoo. However, they have a different membership. The
council is elected by *all* devs. The foundation has a list of members
[1] and a set of rules that currently stipulates that only devs that
have been around for one year and that vote for a foundation election
become members. So we have ex-devs that are foundation members and we
have many current devs that are not members of the foundation. There are
also plans to open membership to the foundation to accept members of the
community, be them users, companies, sponsors, partners or any
interested party.
In that sense, the council would represent the developer "community",
whilst the foundation would represent the "community" at large.
[1] -
http://dev.gentoo.org/~jmbsvicetto/trustees-election/200803-foundation-members
| 3. Council will meet monthly, but any slacker policies will be at its
| own discretion.
I wasn't around the time the council was created, but from the mails
those that were sent, it was a "conscious" choice and option from the
developer community to set those in.
| 4. Any developer may follow the following procedure to hold a
| referendum on any issue that will be binding on Gentoo (but not the
| Foundation):
|
| a. Create a petition containing a clear resolution with voting options
| (which must include an option to abstain and an option to decline the
| resolution).
|
| b. Collect gpg signatures from developers/staff. The requisite number
| of signatures is 10% of the number devs who made commits in the last 30
| days. Note that the count of devs making commits is used ONLY to
| determine the number of sigs needed - any devs/staff can provide sigs
| regardless of their role or level of activity as long as they haven't
| been retired/booted.
If your purpose it to count only active devs for the number of sigs
needed, you need a better method. You're leaving out (or run the chance
of leaving out) all staff from that count. It might be better to
subtract to the total number of devs, the total that shows up in the
slacker script.
| c. Submit petition to council@g.o. The council will post the petition
| on -dev-announce (or -core if the petition so indicates) and allow two
| weeks for debate and two weeks for voting.
|
| Note that the referendum process is intended to be rare (maybe the
| threshold should be 20% or more). It could be used to impeach council
| members, make a decision, etc. The council would be bound to execute
| the decision as best they are able. If the council doesn't do a good
| job they could be impeached/etc - I think that is the best we can do
| since ultimately we're depending on humans to do the right thing, and
| the last thing we want is multiple councils with checks and balances and
| more debate than action any time we want to do something.
Although this process is somewhat lengthy and complex, we might need to
have a provision for it - for extraordinary circumstances.
If we try to institute it, we'll need to review a few clauses, though.
- --
Regards,
Jorge Vicetto (jmbsvicetto) - jmbsvicetto at gentoo dot org
Gentoo- forums / Userrel / SPARC / KDE
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* Re: [gentoo-project] Gentoo Leadership Structure
2008-05-20 10:05 ` Jorge Manuel B. S. Vicetto
@ 2008-05-20 10:19 ` Donnie Berkholz
2008-05-20 16:37 ` Richard Freeman
1 sibling, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Donnie Berkholz @ 2008-05-20 10:19 UTC (permalink / raw
To: Jorge Manuel B. S. Vicetto; +Cc: gentoo-project
On 10:05 Tue 20 May , Jorge Manuel B. S. Vicetto wrote:
> Also, you're changing the focus of the council as it was created as a
> technical body that would steer the technical advancement of the
> distro.
It seems to me that you're changing the focus of the council, since GLEP
39 simply says, "Global issues will be decided by an elected Gentoo
council."
Thanks,
Donnie
--
gentoo-project@lists.gentoo.org mailing list
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: [gentoo-project] Gentoo Leadership Structure
2008-05-20 5:40 ` Alistair Bush
@ 2008-05-20 10:21 ` Jorge Manuel B. S. Vicetto
2008-05-20 11:57 ` Alistair Bush
0 siblings, 1 reply; 10+ messages in thread
From: Jorge Manuel B. S. Vicetto @ 2008-05-20 10:21 UTC (permalink / raw
To: gentoo-project
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Alistair Bush wrote:
| Firstly I just want to get my idea's in here.
|
| Basically I like things as they are but would like to strengthen areas
| where I perceive the rules to be attackable. Most of these idea's do
| come from the system I parliament within my country (NZ) which is a
| Constitutional Monachy ( without a formal Constitution ).
|
| Now, all I suggest we do is amend our rules to be this.
|
| 1) The Foundation call's the Council elections, Council call's for
| Foundation elections.
| 2) At any time duing a Councils term the Council can ask the Foundation
| to call elections for Council, at which time the Foundation _must_ do so.
| 3) Foundation can dismiss Council and call elections[1]
| 4) Council can dismiss "Foundation" (or more correctly all its members)
| and call elections[1].
| 5) A Council or Foundation can't be dismissed within the first _insert
| time period here_.
|
| [1] elections being within 30 days.
|
| Alistair
The problem with this concept is that the Council and the Trustees
represent different teams and the plan is to have a greater division
between them in the future. It can also promote tensions that could
escalate into a "war" between them with one trying to dismantle the other.
The current policies already state that the council can be "voted out",
although there are no rules on how to do it, and the proposed bylaws,
including their current revision, already allow for a vote of the
foundation members to remove the existing trustees.
If we have clear policies that either body fails to follow, I think
Richard's proposal for the referendum is a better solution to enforce
those policies.
- --
Regards,
Jorge Vicetto (jmbsvicetto) - jmbsvicetto at gentoo dot org
Gentoo- forums / Userrel / SPARC / KDE
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* Re: [gentoo-project] Gentoo Leadership Structure
2008-05-20 10:21 ` Jorge Manuel B. S. Vicetto
@ 2008-05-20 11:57 ` Alistair Bush
0 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Alistair Bush @ 2008-05-20 11:57 UTC (permalink / raw
To: gentoo-project
Jorge Manuel B. S. Vicetto wrote:
>
> The problem with this concept is that the Council and the Trustees
> represent different teams and the plan is to have a greater division
> between them in the future. It can also promote tensions that could
> escalate into a "war" between them with one trying to dismantle the other.
> The current policies already state that the council can be "voted out",
> although there are no rules on how to do it, and the proposed bylaws,
> including their current revision, already allow for a vote of the
> foundation members to remove the existing trustees.
> If we have clear policies that either body fails to follow, I think
> Richard's proposal for the referendum is a better solution to enforce
> those policies.
>
Well this policy is in practice within many countries around the world.
And within a Constitutional monarchy I know of only one example of
something like that ever happening. It is called the Australian
Constitutional Crisis. It is also one of the reasons I added the
minimum period rule, so that in any situation one body could not remove
another continuously. If there is a situation where a "war" breaks out
it will be the development community who decides which group is right.
We might be a bunch of idiots, but I think we have the intelligence to
not get into a cyclical situation where every month we alternate between
having a council or foundation election.
On the whole I don't really have a problem with Richards proposal in
general, but I disagree with somethings in particular.
Firstly I always get the impression that people think the Foundation is
just a holding company for the assets of gentoo. I think it owns Gentoo
and _everything_ that Gentoo does (or is) is of interest to, and the
responsibility of, the Foundation. I note that there have been ppl
complaining about the "closed" decision making of the present Council,
well the Foundation Charter states "Every aspect of Gentoo is and
remains open. Gentoo does not benefit from hiding any of its development
processes (whether it is source code or documentation, decisions or
discussions, coordination or management).". The Foundation has a vested
interest in how the Council performs its function. Why? Because the
council influences whether the foundation meets its Charter. If the
Council is closed, gentoo is closed and the foundation fails to meet one
of its 4 pillars.
Secondly, I despise situations when groups get to decide there own fate.
If you have to submit a petition you really shouldn't be submitting it
to the organisation/group your submitting it against. Who says the
council doesn't need to just ignore it? What would you do if they did
ignore it? it's their responsibility to submit it too mailing lists and
call a vote. if anyone else does it, then it couldn't be considered
official.
Thirdly, I believe my suggestion can be written more consistently with
less room for interpretation, etc, etc.
When it comes down to it we really are discussing what will hopefully be
the least used rules of the entire distro.
I will attempt to merge Richards idea's with my own.
1) The Foundation call's for Council elections, Council call's for
Foundation elections.
2) At any time during a Councils term the Council can ask the
Foundation to call elections for Council, at which time the Foundation
_must_ do so. (and vice versa for Foundation)
3) Foundation can dismiss Council and call elections. (majority or
absolute vote?)
4) Council can dismiss "Foundation" (or more correctly all its members)
and call elections. ( absolute vote only? )
5) A Council or Foundation can't be dismissed within the first 2 Months
of being elected.
6) The Foundation automatically delegates Development responsibility to
the Council.
7) The Council may appoint Positions and delegate responsibilities. [1]
8) The Council is the arm of Gentoo that defines the direction of Gentoo
from a development perspective as long as it meets the goals of the
Foundation ( Otherwise the Foundation will dismiss them, or possibly
overturn there decisions? )..
9) The Council must meet monthly ( with current attendance rules ).
Rules surrounding extra meetings are at the Councils discretion.
10) Any developer may follow the following procedure to hold a
referendum on any issue that will be binding on Gentoo (but not the
Foundation):
a) Create a petition containing a clear resolution with voting options
(which must include an option to abstain and an option to decline the
resolution).
b) Collect gpg signatures from developers/staff. The requisite number
of signatures is xx% of the number devs who made commits in the last 30
days. Note that the count of devs making commits is used ONLY to
determine the number of sigs needed - any devs/staff can provide sigs
regardless of their role or level of activity as long as they haven't
been retired/booted.
c) Submit petition to Foundation. The council will post the petition
on -dev-announce (or -core if the petition so indicates) and allow two
weeks for debate and two weeks for voting.
[1] This means that the Council could appoint a leader and delegate all
responsibility to them, it could also be used to imply that the Council
appoints the leaders of each Project by accepting automatically the vote
of that projects members. Therefore a leader of a project would have
been delegated responsibility for the project from the Council.
Hopefully this will give ppl something to think about at least.
Alistair
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: [gentoo-project] Gentoo Leadership Structure
2008-05-20 10:05 ` Jorge Manuel B. S. Vicetto
2008-05-20 10:19 ` Donnie Berkholz
@ 2008-05-20 16:37 ` Richard Freeman
1 sibling, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Richard Freeman @ 2008-05-20 16:37 UTC (permalink / raw
To: Jorge Manuel B. S. Vicetto; +Cc: gentoo-project
Jorge Manuel B. S. Vicetto wrote:
>
> I don't think our current problem was caused by not having a "council
> leader". Also, current policy already states that 2 council members can
> make a decision on urgent matters that needs to be ratified by the full
> council at their next meeting.
Some of my suggestions were based on my perception of some of Gentoo's
longer-term issues. I'm not suggesting a solution merely to the current
GLEP 39 debate - but what might be part of a framework for a longer-term
direction for Gentoo.
Many have brought up the idea that Gentoo tends to be a bit rudder-less
- it can't take on bold initiatives that have any chance at all of being
disruptive. It also can't really speak with "one voice" about anything.
A lead role - even if it rotates - would at least give one person a
chance to make some kind of a mark upon the distro, but with checks and
balances.
>
> You're voicing the view that the Foundation should be nothing more than
> a holder for IP and assets. That is not what it was created for, nor
> should it be limited to that, imo. Also, you're changing the focus of
> the council as it was created as a technical body that would steer the
> technical advancement of the distro.
>
That is exactly what I'm advocating, but as long as both bodies
represent the same constituency the division isn't entirely critical.
However, as a legal body the trustees will never be able to act as
effectively as the council - just due to the level of formality. Since
we aren't a 10,000 employee corporation I don't know that we want so
much red tape in day-to-day operations.
> There are
> also plans to open membership to the foundation to accept members of the
> community, be them users, companies, sponsors, partners or any
> interested party.
> In that sense, the council would represent the developer "community",
> whilst the foundation would represent the "community" at large.
>
I do think that this is potentially a very bad idea (and I do stress the
word "potentially" - the devil is in the details). It has nothing to do
with any desire to exclude the "community" - to the contrary I've tried
to be vocal in general about the need to include users in more
activities, and I strongly support the whole user-rel concept.
My concern is that ultimately the devs need to implement any initiatives
that Gentoo takes, so they need to be completely on-board. If some
sponsor can essentially buy Foundation votes it could cause Gentoo to
take a direction that most devs object to - which will just lead to a
fork. It also lowers the barrier to Foundation membership a bit too
much. Right now to be a member you must commit to at least a moderate
amount of volunteer contribution, which weeds out people who are all
about talk with absolutely no action. If ANYBODY could sign up and vote
then you could have a lot of devs frustrated because the people in
charge really don't consider the devs their constituents.
I can't really think of any non-profit organization that operates in
this way. Just about all of them limit legal membership to those who
are heavily committed to the organization, and those who contribute
significantly financially (and I'm not talking $5 per year via paypal).
> | 3. Council will meet monthly, but any slacker policies will be at its
> | own discretion.
>
> I wasn't around the time the council was created, but from the mails
> those that were sent, it was a "conscious" choice and option from the
> developer community to set those in.
I'm not debating that here. I'm suggesting that the devs should make
another "conscious" choice to get rid of this policy in favor of another
system of accountability.
>
> If your purpose it to count only active devs for the number of sigs
> needed, you need a better method. You're leaving out (or run the chance
> of leaving out) all staff from that count. It might be better to
> subtract to the total number of devs, the total that shows up in the
> slacker script.
>
My concern is that if we're not careful we could end up with a count
that reflects devs+staff on paper and not in reality - making it VERY
hard to get the requisite number of sigs. The cvs commit metric is
straightforward to measure and therefore a useful benchmark of the
approximate size of the dev+staff community (as long as the ratio of
dev:staff stays about the same then the number of active devs can be
used to determine the total size regardless of what the ratio is). What
I wanted to avoid is some really complex formula which nobody can work
out in practice, or the need to have monthly purges of the rolls just in
case somebody wants to have a referendum.
> Although this process is somewhat lengthy and complex, we might need to
> have a provision for it - for extraordinary circumstances.
> If we try to institute it, we'll need to review a few clauses, though.
>
Couldn't agree more - this was really meant to simulate discussion
around some possible directions Gentoo could take than to be something
that could simply be enacted as-is or anything like that.
With the Council and Trustees apparently discussing how they can handle
their various roles in these kinds of situations, this could be good
food for thought. I certainly don't expect any of this to be enacted,
but if it influences any decision-making in a positive way then I'll be
happy I could add something constructive...
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2008-05-20 16:38 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2008-05-19 23:46 [gentoo-project] Gentoo Leadership Structure Richard Freeman
2008-05-20 0:32 ` William L. Thomson Jr.
2008-05-20 1:43 ` Mark Loeser
2008-05-20 2:00 ` William L. Thomson Jr.
2008-05-20 5:40 ` Alistair Bush
2008-05-20 10:21 ` Jorge Manuel B. S. Vicetto
2008-05-20 11:57 ` Alistair Bush
2008-05-20 10:05 ` Jorge Manuel B. S. Vicetto
2008-05-20 10:19 ` Donnie Berkholz
2008-05-20 16:37 ` Richard Freeman
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