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From: Joshua Brindle <method@gentoo.org>
To: gentoo-hardened@lists.gentoo.org,
	gentoo-security@lists.gentoo.org,
	Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
Subject: Re: [gentoo-hardened] Systrace resurrection
Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2006 10:01:54 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <444F7D52.6090102@gentoo.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20060426134440.GJ29037@fuse.inversepath.com>

Andrea Barisani wrote:
> <snip>
>
> *sigh*
>
> I thought that this flamewar was dead. Ok, I kindly ask a hardened team
> review of this since I strongly believe this is not an issue, systrace is
> *not* a broken security model and yes it allows *controlled* privilege
> escalation if you configure it that way for removing the setuid but on some
> binaries.
>   
This is no flamewar. The model is broken by my standards. It bypasses 
built-in DAC and capabilities in the kernel making it the single attack 
vector to gain all access on the system. Compare to grsecurity, rsbac, 
selinux which do not bypass kernel access control or escalate privileges.

Further, the "lets ask the user if they want to allow this" is 
inherently flawed. It is a discretionary model, the policy is in no way 
analyzable. I suggest you read these articles:
http://securityblog.org/brindle/2006/03/25/security-anti-pattern-status-quo-encapsulation/
http://securityblog.org/brindle/2006/04/19/security-anti-pattern-path-based-access-control/

> If you have an argument to make please show me the technical details about it
> and let's discuss it.
>
> It's *not* part of hardened atm anyway and it won't be unless the hardened
> team accepts it. It will remain in the portage tree as long as I support it
> unless you show me a clear demonstration of your concerns.
>   
First it will never be accepted by hardened. Second, I believe that 
security critical packages (particularly access control systems) should 
go through hardened. Random developers *should not* be putting access 
control mechanisms in the tree, users will have security expectations 
that they cannot meet.
> BTW even with your concern the ptrace method (which can be entirely tested
> userspace) is still useful for debugging/testing, hence the userspace package
> has no reason for going away.
>   
As long as its clearly marked as a debugging tool and not as a security 
tool.
> CC'ing systrace author btw (not subscribed to this list)

Great.
-- 
gentoo-hardened@gentoo.org mailing list



  reply	other threads:[~2006-04-26 14:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2006-04-26  6:57 [gentoo-hardened] Systrace resurrection Andrea Barisani
2006-04-26 13:38 ` Joshua Brindle
2006-04-26 13:44   ` Andrea Barisani
2006-04-26 14:01     ` Joshua Brindle [this message]
2006-04-26 14:14       ` [gentoo-security] " Andrea Barisani
2006-04-26 14:36       ` pageexec
2006-04-26 14:58         ` Joshua Brindle
2006-04-26 15:19           ` Andrea Barisani
2006-04-26 16:59             ` Joshua Brindle
     [not found]               ` <850f7cbe0604261123l4b64000ag320a26cbe7dbb73e@mail.gmail.com>
2006-04-26 18:54                 ` Joshua Brindle
2006-04-26 23:02                   ` Andrea Barisani
2006-04-26 23:36               ` [gentoo-security] " Andrea Barisani

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