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From: RB <aoz.syn@gmail.com>
To: gentoo-hardened@lists.gentoo.org
Subject: Re: [gentoo-hardened] Updates: a way too simplified security question I am asking anyway
Date: Wed, 20 Aug 2008 16:02:09 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4255c2570808201502u1eeff808y4f8b40c855774cdb@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <200808202353.50243.janklodvan@gmail.com>

> Complexity matter again... Theoretically.. is it possible to enumerate all the
> possible scenarios for a file server? (or, I might have wrote - all of its
> states) Oh, sure, it has finite amount of memory :)

Those firmly on the "Threat modeling" side of the camp say you can.
The key is limiting your system's scope and using a positive
(default-deny) security model.  It's resource-intensive for the
implementer on the front end and inflexible, but can work for some
scenarios.

> I started this as a "flame", but the rest might go out of scope of this list
> and send me to theoretical computer science.

In spite of my CS degree (and probable pursuit of an advanced degree),
I don't esteem academia very highly.  Theory makes for pretty graphs
on thesis papers, but real-world application is the only way anything
will actually be solved.

> Javier Martínez:
> "control the execution of perl an python (between
> others) scripts (in the way of perl blablabla.pl, which does not need
> execution rights). You under this two frameworks you can do it. Can
> you do this under OpenBSD ;)"
>
> Thanks, just you put me on my way, if I really need a reliable system, that I
> can get NOW AND HERE :)

Yes - good, actionable suggestions.  Of course, the threat modeling
crew makes a good argument that anything beyond a MAC (selinux, RSBAC,
etc.) is wasted effort.  That, of course, assumes you've perfectly
succeeded in least-privilege.

  reply	other threads:[~2008-08-20 22:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2008-08-01 15:09 [Fwd: [gentoo-hardened] Tin Hat = hardened Gentoo distro in RAM] Ferris McCormick
2008-08-20 10:37 ` [gentoo-hardened] Tin Hat memory requirements? Jan Klod
2008-08-20 11:14   ` Natanael Copa
2008-08-20 11:54     ` Jan Klod
2008-08-20 15:46       ` Natanael Copa
2008-08-20 16:03         ` Jan Klod
2008-08-21  6:29           ` Natanael Copa
2008-08-20 18:14         ` [gentoo-hardened] Updates: a way too simplified security question I am asking anyway Jan Klod
2008-08-20 18:57           ` Arne Morten Johansen
2008-08-20 19:31           ` RB
2008-08-20 20:53             ` Jan Klod
2008-08-20 22:02               ` RB [this message]
2008-08-20 22:44               ` Javier Martínez
2008-08-20 20:17           ` Javier Martínez
2008-08-20 21:16             ` [gentoo-hardened] aa Daniel Svensson

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