From: Michael 'veremitz' Everitt <gentoo@veremit.xyz>
To: gentoo-dev@lists.gentoo.org
Subject: Re: [gentoo-dev] Vanilla sources
Date: Fri, 3 Jan 2020 22:32:23 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <c467df18-f858-7c72-23b7-c0a56f68a73d@veremit.xyz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c2dbdb38-4a3b-2e35-4a95-2fad4efacdfa@gentoo.org>
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On 03/01/20 14:48, Toralf Förster wrote:
> On 1/3/20 3:46 PM, Rich Freeman wrote:
>> If OpenRC contains a vulnerability wouldn't it make more sense to set
>> this as part of OpenRC,
> Indeed.
>
> Furthermore there's a nifty page https://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_Project/Recommended_Settings
> which yields for me to this /etc/sysctl.d/local.conf :
>
>
> # Restrict potential illegal access via links
> #
> fs.protected_hardlinks = 1
> fs.protected_symlinks = 1
>
> #
> # https://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_Project#CONFIGs
> #
>
> # Try to keep kernel address exposures out of various /proc files (kallsyms, modules, etc).
> kernel.kptr_restrict = 1
>
> # Avoid kernel memory address exposures via dmesg.
> kernel.dmesg_restrict = 1
>
> # Block non-uid-0 profiling (needs distro patch, otherwise this is the same as "= 2")
> kernel.perf_event_paranoid = 3
>
> # Turn off kexec, even if it's built in.
> kernel.kexec_load_disabled = 1
>
> # Avoid non-ancestor ptrace access to running processes and their credentials.
> kernel.yama.ptrace_scope = 1
>
> # Disable User Namespaces, as it opens up a large attack surface to unprivileged users.
> user.max_user_namespaces = 0
>
> # Turn off unprivileged eBPF access.
> kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled = 1
>
> # Turn on BPF JIT hardening, if the JIT is enabled.
> net.core.bpf_jit_harden = 2
>
>
FWIW, there is a move to add further hardening options to the
Gentoo-sources kernel - bug 689154, based on the kernsec recommendations.
Further details of proposals, and inspiration, are in the bug.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-01-03 22:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-12-28 7:09 [gentoo-dev] Keywordreqs and slacking arch teams Michał Górny
2019-12-28 9:27 ` Kent Fredric
2019-12-28 9:35 ` Fabian Groffen
2019-12-28 11:05 ` Kent Fredric
2019-12-28 11:14 ` Michael 'veremitz' Everitt
2019-12-28 11:27 ` Kent Fredric
2019-12-28 11:40 ` James Le Cuirot
2019-12-28 11:44 ` Kent Fredric
2019-12-28 11:32 ` Kent Fredric
2019-12-28 11:35 ` Michael 'veremitz' Everitt
2019-12-28 11:42 ` Kent Fredric
2019-12-28 18:05 ` Alec Warner
2019-12-29 2:19 ` Aaron Bauman
2019-12-29 5:09 ` Kent Fredric
2019-12-30 1:45 ` A Schenck
2020-01-02 20:32 ` Rolf Eike Beer
2020-01-02 23:25 ` Mike Pagano
2020-01-02 23:35 ` Rolf Eike Beer
2020-01-03 0:19 ` Michael 'veremitz' Everitt
2020-01-03 2:40 ` Aaron Bauman
2020-01-03 10:00 ` Rolf Eike Beer
2020-01-04 11:09 ` Rolf Eike Beer
2020-01-04 11:25 ` Michael 'veremitz' Everitt
2020-01-04 13:35 ` Rolf Eike Beer
2020-01-03 14:37 ` [gentoo-dev] Vanilla sources Michael Orlitzky
2020-01-03 14:40 ` Toralf Förster
2020-01-03 14:41 ` Michael Orlitzky
2020-01-03 14:46 ` Rich Freeman
2020-01-03 14:48 ` Toralf Förster
2020-01-03 22:32 ` Michael 'veremitz' Everitt [this message]
2020-01-04 7:38 ` Hanno Böck
2020-01-04 18:39 ` William Hubbs
2020-01-04 18:41 ` Michał Górny
2020-01-07 8:52 ` Hanno Böck
2020-01-03 14:52 ` Michael Orlitzky
2020-01-03 14:55 ` Michael Orlitzky
2020-01-03 16:28 ` Aaron Bauman
2020-01-04 11:01 ` Rich Freeman
2020-01-04 11:42 ` Roy Bamford
2020-01-04 12:54 ` Rich Freeman
2020-01-04 13:08 ` Roy Bamford
2020-01-04 13:43 ` Thomas Deutschmann
2020-01-05 10:34 ` Roy Bamford
2020-01-04 20:13 ` Christopher Head
2020-01-04 20:39 ` Rich Freeman
2020-01-04 13:47 ` Thomas Deutschmann
2020-01-04 18:41 ` William Hubbs
2020-01-04 18:42 ` Michał Górny
2020-01-04 19:13 ` Rolf Eike Beer
2020-01-05 16:41 ` Michael Orlitzky
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