From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from lists.gentoo.org (pigeon.gentoo.org [208.92.234.80]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by finch.gentoo.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2DF3A139694 for ; Mon, 3 Apr 2017 20:00:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: from pigeon.gentoo.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by pigeon.gentoo.org (Postfix) with SMTP id 8C725E0E06; Mon, 3 Apr 2017 20:00:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: from smtp.gentoo.org (dev.gentoo.org [IPv6:2001:470:ea4a:1:5054:ff:fec7:86e4]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by pigeon.gentoo.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3FA3AE0DE7 for ; Mon, 3 Apr 2017 20:00:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail-io0-f175.google.com (mail-io0-f175.google.com [209.85.223.175]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) (Authenticated sender: djc) by smtp.gentoo.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D65D2340A23 for ; Mon, 3 Apr 2017 20:00:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-io0-f175.google.com with SMTP id l7so82728263ioe.3 for ; Mon, 03 Apr 2017 13:00:38 -0700 (PDT) X-Gm-Message-State: AFeK/H2Hcgfl1OJ6aMKGpimspXp8ZcE8wON1z3klaauFnIuzAoEq9n7raFM15ASAu7Lur1pLqGx+a8ML7ZXIyw== X-Received: by 10.107.201.196 with SMTP id z187mr21203894iof.172.1491249635858; Mon, 03 Apr 2017 13:00:35 -0700 (PDT) Precedence: bulk List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-Id: Gentoo Linux mail X-BeenThere: gentoo-dev@lists.gentoo.org Reply-to: gentoo-dev@lists.gentoo.org MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.107.8.225 with HTTP; Mon, 3 Apr 2017 13:00:15 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <1491239350.1978.1.camel@gentoo.org> References: <1491239350.1978.1.camel@gentoo.org> From: Dirkjan Ochtman Date: Mon, 3 Apr 2017 22:00:15 +0200 X-Gmail-Original-Message-ID: Message-ID: Subject: Re: [gentoo-dev] [RFC] New Manifest hashes and how to enable them To: Gentoo Development Cc: infra , dev-portage@gentoo.org, k_f@gentoo.org, =?UTF-8?Q?Hanno_B=C3=B6ck?= Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Archives-Salt: 4271f99c-f1a1-482b-bf80-2a873cac58a9 X-Archives-Hash: 890721ae4465eed23ad0a779ddd9e6d8 On Mon, Apr 3, 2017 at 7:09 PM, Micha=C5=82 G=C3=B3rny = wrote: > Your thoughts? This seems pretty hasty. First of all, SHA-256 should be safe for all intents and purposes, and for the foreseeable future. This is nothing like Git's usage of SHA-1, which was known to be on the way to brokenville for a long time. I don't think there is a solid reason for deprecating it now. Second, the amount of diversity proposed does not make sense. If asked, I would propose we keep SHA-256 as one of the options and additionally add a SHA3 variant and a BLAKE2 variant as other options. This would provide more than enough diversity. Also totally agreed with Vadim on the obscurity of the GOST algorithms. But, this is the kind of thing where we really should get input from the Security project, so we should get people like Hanno and Kristian involved. Third, I don't much trust the security record of the python libraries mentioned. cryptography is the best Python library for crypto by far, and I think we should use it exclusively for anything Python doesn't provide in the stdlib. The PyCrypto security record is not exactly stellar IIRC, and since pycryptodome is a fork of it, I don't trust it that much, either. But mainly, please, I think we should leave the security-sensitive decisions to people with more security expertise. Cheers, Dirkjan