From: Mike Gilbert <floppym@gentoo.org>
To: Gentoo Dev <gentoo-dev@lists.gentoo.org>
Subject: Re: [gentoo-dev] cdrom.eclass vs KEYWORDS
Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2019 17:13:43 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAJ0EP40P1GvWiLx1RB=QvNG_0JtZNOBKZ5wXJ4RhH2TSmcwQHA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <9ac267ff85238b13b6943f67ab37f21a33898849.camel@gentoo.org>
On Wed, Sep 25, 2019 at 4:14 PM Michał Górny <mgorny@gentoo.org> wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> I'm wondering if we're doing the right things by adding KEYWORDS to
> packages using cdrom.eclass. After all, it's somewhat similar to live
> ebuilds. That is, data is fetched outside regular PM mechanisms (though
> not implicitly through Internet, arguably) and it is not covered by any
> checksums.
>
> This creates a somewhat gaping security hole to anyone using those
> packages. After all, the ebuilds are going to happily install any
> malware you might have on that CD without even thinking twice about it.
> In fact, with construction of many ebuilds it is entirely plausible that
> additional unexpected files may end up being installed.
The eclass seems to be used exclusively by games (with one exception),
which are probably full of unreported security problems anyway.
> To be honest, I don't think this is a problem that could be fixed.
> Technically, we could add some kind of, say, b2sum lists to ebuilds
> and verify installed files against them. However, the way I understand
> we frequently aim to support different releases of the same product,
> that may have wildly differing checksums.
>
> So maybe the most obvious solution would be to remove KEYWORDS from
> ebuilds unconditionally using cdrom.eclass (and their reverse
> dependencies), and mask USE=cdinstall on the rest.
>
> WDYT?
Move them to an overlay.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-09-25 21:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-09-25 20:14 [gentoo-dev] cdrom.eclass vs KEYWORDS Michał Górny
2019-09-25 21:13 ` Mike Gilbert [this message]
2019-09-25 21:30 ` Robin H. Johnson
2019-09-26 4:08 ` Michał Górny
2019-09-25 21:35 ` James Le Cuirot
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