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From: orbea <orbea@riseup.net>
To: gentoo-dev@lists.gentoo.org
Subject: Re: [gentoo-dev] Current unavoidable use of xz utils in Gentoo
Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2024 09:21:13 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240401092113.7018fbec@Akita> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <gt4aog3m6xzoul2sd7ugm3txx77yslnyrc42wwkww3mgkagezl@hvu3dglaqwvn>

On Mon, 1 Apr 2024 12:01:13 -0400
Kenton Groombridge <concord@gentoo.org> wrote:

> On 24/04/01 08:40AM, orbea wrote:
> > On Mon, 1 Apr 2024 11:14:15 -0400
> > Kenton Groombridge <concord@gentoo.org> wrote:
> >   
> > > On 24/03/31 12:13PM, Eddie Chapman wrote:  
> > > > Eli Schwartz wrote:    
> > > > > On 3/29/24 11:07 PM, Eddie Chapman wrote:
> > > > >    
> > > > >> Given what we've learnt in the last 24hrs about xz utilities,
> > > > >> you could forgive a paranoid person for seriously considering
> > > > >> getting rid entirely of them from their systems, especially
> > > > >> since there are suitable alternatives available.  Some might
> > > > >> say that's a bit extreme, xz-utils will get a thorough audit
> > > > >> and it will all be fine. But when a malicious actor has been
> > > > >> a key maintainer of something as complex as a decompression
> > > > >> utility for years, I'm not sure I could ever trust that
> > > > >> codebase again. Maybe a complete rewrite will emerge, but
> > > > >> I'm personally unwilling to continue using xz utils in the
> > > > >> meantime for uncompressing anything on my systems, even if
> > > > >> it is done by an unprivileged process.    
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > It suffices to downgrade to the version of xz before a social
> > > > > engineering attack by a malicious actor to gain
> > > > > maintainership of the xz project.
> > > > >
> > > > > Have you been linked to this yet?
> > > > > https://www.mail-archive.com/xz-devel@tukaani.org/msg00571.html
> > > > >
> > > > > --
> > > > > Eli Schwartz
> > > > >    
> > > > 
> > > > Yes I saw that yesterday. It only increased my level of concern
> > > > about the project ten-fold rather than decreased it,
> > > > particularly because of "he has been helping a lot off-list and
> > > > is practically a co-maintainer already".
> > > > 
> > > >     
> > > 
> > > I think it's important to realize that this could have potentially
> > > happened to any number of various open source projects, not just
> > > xz-utils. Simply ripping it out and replacing it is not enough to
> > > prevent these kinds of issues from happening in the future.
> > > 
> > > There is a major shifting of perspectives as a result of this
> > > unfortunate compromise. Right now there are serious considerations
> > > about banning (or otherwise auditing) binary blobs in some
> > > projects. There are talks about banning the use of older build
> > > systems like autotools in favor of ones more easily readable and
> > > auditable.  
> > 
> > Talk about throwing the baby out with the bathwater...
> >   
> 
> Let's not shoot the messenger here. :)
> 
> I cited this specific example to highlight the shared intent behind
> positive changes to auditing code not just in the program but also its
> build system. I didn't mean to imply that this was a great solution.

Thanks for clarifying that, it wasn't clear to me when I read the
earlier e-mail.

Personally I think the long term solution is to identify critical code
bases that have a low bus factor before the bad actors do and make a
concentrated community effort to help audit and maintain these code
bases.

> 
> > Its fully possible to write autotools build systems which are simple
> > and easy to audit. Depending on what blob does it may be far from
> > trivial or advisable to get rid of it.
> > 
> > This attack as already has been clearly stated is social, not
> > technical. If xz-utils used meson or cmake instead it would of not
> > changed the situation.
> >   
> > > Ultimately what is happening is a reflection on how we audit
> > > critical system components and contributions made to them. Change
> > > is not going to happen over night.
> > > 
> > > We saw a similar shift with OpenSSL's heartbleed, which
> > > ultimately led to positive changes in code quality and improving
> > > their vulnerability reporting process.
> > > 
> > > There is some good to come of this event, but it's important to
> > > recognize what went wrong and how open source can improve as a
> > > whole. 
> > 
> >   
> 



  reply	other threads:[~2024-04-01 16:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 63+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-03-30  3:07 [gentoo-dev] Current unavoidable use of xz utils in Gentoo Eddie Chapman
2024-03-30  3:43 ` orbea
2024-03-30  7:06   ` Dale
2024-03-30 10:47     ` [gentoo-dev] " Duncan
2024-03-30 11:32     ` [gentoo-dev] " Rich Freeman
2024-03-30 14:57       ` Eddie Chapman
2024-03-30 15:02         ` Michał Górny
2024-03-30 15:17           ` Eddie Chapman
2024-03-30 15:29             ` Michał Górny
2024-03-30 15:59               ` Eddie Chapman
2024-03-30 16:07             ` Dale
2024-03-30 17:13             ` Re[2]: " Stefan Schmiedl
2024-03-30 17:36               ` Eddie Chapman
2024-03-31  1:41                 ` Thomas Gall
2024-03-30 23:49             ` Eddie Chapman
2024-03-31  1:36             ` Eli Schwartz
2024-03-30 15:23           ` orbea
2024-03-30 15:14         ` Rich Freeman
2024-03-30 17:19           ` Eddie Chapman
2024-03-31  1:25 ` Sam James
2024-03-31  1:33 ` Eli Schwartz
2024-03-31 11:13   ` Eddie Chapman
2024-03-31 11:59     ` Matt Jolly
2024-04-01  7:57       ` Eddie Chapman
2024-04-01 14:50         ` Eli Schwartz
2024-04-02  8:43           ` Eddie Chapman
2024-04-02 19:46             ` Eli Schwartz
2024-04-02 20:19               ` Eddie Chapman
2024-04-01 14:55         ` Michał Górny
2024-04-02  9:02           ` Eddie Chapman
2024-04-01 15:14     ` Kenton Groombridge
2024-04-01 15:40       ` orbea
2024-04-01 16:01         ` Kenton Groombridge
2024-04-01 16:21           ` orbea [this message]
2024-04-01 18:51             ` Kévin GASPARD DE RENEFORT
2024-04-01 20:07               ` James Le Cuirot
2024-04-02  6:32                 ` Joonas Niilola
2024-03-31 11:32   ` stefan11111
2024-04-01 14:56 ` Azamat Hackimov
2024-04-02 19:32   ` Eddie Chapman
2024-04-03 11:47     ` [gentoo-dev] " Duncan
2024-04-03 12:14       ` Sam James
2024-04-03 15:30         ` [gentoo-dev] " Eddie Chapman
2024-04-03 16:40           ` Michael Orlitzky
2024-04-04  3:20             ` [gentoo-dev] " Duncan
2024-04-04  3:49           ` [gentoo-dev] " Eli Schwartz
2024-04-04  8:32             ` Sam James
2024-04-04  8:34               ` Kévin GASPARD DE RENEFORT
2024-04-04 14:38               ` Eddie Chapman
2024-04-04 14:24             ` Eddie Chapman
2024-04-06 11:57               ` Eddie Chapman
2024-04-06 12:15                 ` Ulrich Mueller
2024-04-06 12:34                 ` Roy Bamford
2024-04-06 14:04                 ` Fabian Groffen
2024-04-07  6:44                   ` Eddie Chapman
2024-04-06 16:15                 ` Sam James
2024-04-07 11:24                   ` Eddie Chapman
2024-04-11  5:21                 ` Joonas Niilola
2024-04-12  7:18                   ` [gentoo-dev] " Duncan
2024-04-13  7:10                   ` [gentoo-dev] " Eddie Chapman
2024-04-03 12:22       ` [gentoo-dev] " Kévin GASPARD DE RENEFORT
2024-04-03 12:26         ` Kévin GASPARD DE RENEFORT
2024-04-04  1:41         ` Duncan

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