* [gentoo-commits] gentoo-x86 commit in gnome-extra/gnome-screensaver/files: gnome-screensaver-CVE-2008-0887.patch
@ 2008-04-02 14:03 Gilles Dartiguelongue (eva)
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Gilles Dartiguelongue (eva) @ 2008-04-02 14:03 UTC (permalink / raw
To: gentoo-commits
eva 08/04/02 14:03:32
Added: gnome-screensaver-CVE-2008-0887.patch
Log:
fix security bug #213940
(Portage version: 2.1.4.4, RepoMan options: --force)
Revision Changes Path
1.1 gnome-extra/gnome-screensaver/files/gnome-screensaver-CVE-2008-0887.patch
file : http://sources.gentoo.org/viewcvs.py/gentoo-x86/gnome-extra/gnome-screensaver/files/gnome-screensaver-CVE-2008-0887.patch?rev=1.1&view=markup
plain: http://sources.gentoo.org/viewcvs.py/gentoo-x86/gnome-extra/gnome-screensaver/files/gnome-screensaver-CVE-2008-0887.patch?rev=1.1&content-type=text/plain
Index: gnome-screensaver-CVE-2008-0887.patch
===================================================================
Index: gnome-screensaver/src/gnome-screensaver-dialog.c
===================================================================
--- gnome-screensaver/src/gnome-screensaver-dialog.c (revision 1398)
+++ gnome-screensaver/src/gnome-screensaver-dialog.c (working copy)
@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@
#include "gs-debug.h"
+#define MAX_FAILURES 5
+
static gboolean verbose = FALSE;
static gboolean show_version = FALSE;
static gboolean enable_logout = FALSE;
@@ -299,8 +301,6 @@ do_auth_check (GSLockPlug *plug)
gs_lock_plug_show_message (plug, _("Authentication failed."));
}
- g_timeout_add (3000, (GSourceFunc)reset_idle_cb, plug);
-
printf ("NOTICE=AUTH FAILED\n");
fflush (stdout);
@@ -325,15 +325,28 @@ response_cb (GSLockPlug *plug,
static gboolean
auth_check_idle (GSLockPlug *plug)
{
- gboolean res;
+ gboolean res;
+ gboolean again;
+ static guint loop_counter = 0;
+ again = TRUE;
res = do_auth_check (plug);
if (res) {
+ again = FALSE;
g_idle_add ((GSourceFunc)quit_response_ok, NULL);
+ } else {
+ loop_counter++;
+
+ if (loop_counter < MAX_FAILURES) {
+ g_timeout_add (3000, (GSourceFunc)reset_idle_cb, plug);
+ } else {
+ again = FALSE;
+ gtk_main_quit ();
+ }
}
- return !res;
+ return again;
}
static void
Index: gnome-screensaver/src/setuid.c
===================================================================
--- gnome-screensaver/src/setuid.c (revision 1398)
+++ gnome-screensaver/src/setuid.c (working copy)
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ uid_gid_string (uid_t uid,
return buf;
}
-static int
+static gboolean
set_ids_by_number (uid_t uid,
gid_t gid,
char **message_ret)
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ set_ids_by_number (uid_t uid,
g_free (reason);
- return 0;
+ return TRUE;
} else {
char *reason = NULL;
@@ -141,9 +141,9 @@ set_ids_by_number (uid_t uid,
g_free (reason);
reason = NULL;
}
-
- return -1;
+ return FALSE;
}
+ return FALSE;
}
@@ -165,12 +165,21 @@ hack_uid (char **nolock_reason,
char **orig_uid,
char **uid_message)
{
- if (nolock_reason)
+ char *reason;
+ gboolean ret;
+
+ ret = TRUE;
+ reason = NULL;
+
+ if (nolock_reason != NULL) {
*nolock_reason = NULL;
- if (orig_uid)
+ }
+ if (orig_uid != NULL) {
*orig_uid = NULL;
- if (uid_message)
+ }
+ if (uid_message != NULL) {
*uid_message = NULL;
+ }
/* Discard privileges, and set the effective user/group ids to the
real user/group ids. That is, give up our "chmod +s" rights.
@@ -181,12 +190,18 @@ hack_uid (char **nolock_reason,
uid_t uid = getuid ();
gid_t gid = getgid ();
- if (orig_uid)
+ if (orig_uid != NULL) {
*orig_uid = uid_gid_string (euid, egid);
+ }
+
+ if (uid != euid || gid != egid) {
+ if (! set_ids_by_number (uid, gid, uid_message)) {
+ reason = g_strdup ("unable to discard privileges.");
- if (uid != euid || gid != egid)
- if (set_ids_by_number (uid, gid, uid_message) != 0)
- return FALSE;
+ ret = FALSE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
}
@@ -200,81 +215,16 @@ hack_uid (char **nolock_reason,
and "USING XDM".
*/
if (getuid () == (uid_t) 0) {
- if (nolock_reason)
- *nolock_reason = g_strdup ("running as root");
- return FALSE;
+ reason = g_strdup ("running as root");
+ ret = FALSE;
+ goto out;
}
- /* If we're running as root, switch to a safer user. This is above and
- beyond the fact that we've disabling locking, above -- the theory is
- that running graphics demos as root is just always a stupid thing
- to do, since they have probably never been security reviewed and are
- more likely to be buggy than just about any other kind of program.
- (And that assumes non-malicious code. There are also attacks here.)
-
- *** WARNING: DO NOT DISABLE THIS CODE!
- If you do so, you will open a security hole. See the sections
- of the xscreensaver manual titled "LOCKING AND ROOT LOGINS",
- and "USING XDM".
- */
- if (getuid () == (uid_t) 0) {
- struct passwd *p;
-
- p = getpwnam ("nobody");
- if (! p) p = getpwnam ("noaccess");
- if (! p) p = getpwnam ("daemon");
- if (! p) {
- g_warning ("running as root, and couldn't find a safer uid.");
- return FALSE;
- }
-
- if (set_ids_by_number (p->pw_uid, p->pw_gid, uid_message) != 0)
- return FALSE;
- }
-
-
- /* If there's anything even remotely funny looking about the passwd struct,
- or if we're running as some other user from the list below (a
- non-comprehensive selection of users known to be privileged in some way,
- and not normal end-users) then disable locking. If it was possible,
- switching to "nobody" would be the thing to do, but only root itself has
- the privs to do that.
-
- *** WARNING: DO NOT DISABLE THIS CODE!
- If you do so, you will open a security hole. See the sections
- of the xscreensaver manual titled "LOCKING AND ROOT LOGINS",
- and "USING XDM".
- */
- {
- uid_t uid = getuid (); /* get it again */
- struct passwd *p = getpwuid (uid); /* get it again */
-
- if (!p ||
- uid == (uid_t) 0 ||
- uid == (uid_t) -1 ||
- uid == (uid_t) -2 ||
- p->pw_uid == (uid_t) 0 ||
- p->pw_uid == (uid_t) -1 ||
- p->pw_uid == (uid_t) -2 ||
- !p->pw_name ||
- !*p->pw_name ||
- !strcmp (p->pw_name, "root") ||
- !strcmp (p->pw_name, "nobody") ||
- !strcmp (p->pw_name, "noaccess") ||
- !strcmp (p->pw_name, "operator") ||
- !strcmp (p->pw_name, "daemon") ||
- !strcmp (p->pw_name, "bin") ||
- !strcmp (p->pw_name, "adm") ||
- !strcmp (p->pw_name, "sys") ||
- !strcmp (p->pw_name, "games")) {
- if (nolock_reason)
- *nolock_reason = g_strdup_printf ("running as %s",
- (p && p->pw_name
- && *p->pw_name
- ? p->pw_name : "<unknown>"));
- return FALSE;
- }
+ out:
+ if (nolock_reason != NULL) {
+ *nolock_reason = g_strdup (reason);
}
+ g_free (reason);
- return TRUE;
+ return ret;
}
--
gentoo-commits@lists.gentoo.org mailing list
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
* [gentoo-commits] gentoo-x86 commit in gnome-extra/gnome-screensaver/files: gnome-screensaver-CVE-2008-0887.patch
@ 2008-11-30 12:10 Gilles Dartiguelongue (eva)
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Gilles Dartiguelongue (eva) @ 2008-11-30 12:10 UTC (permalink / raw
To: gentoo-commits
eva 08/11/30 12:10:01
Removed: gnome-screensaver-CVE-2008-0887.patch
Log:
Update xscreensaver test, bug #237897. Clean up old revisions.
(Portage version: 2.2_rc16/cvs/Linux 2.6.24-gentoo-r8-mactel x86_64)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
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