[gentoo-commits] gentoo-x86 commit in net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-5: 0001-NFC-Avoid-misaligned-read-of-an-NDEF-field.patch 0002-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch

[gentoo-commits] gentoo-x86 commit in net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-5: 0001-NFC-Avoid-misaligned-read-of-an-NDEF-field.patch 0002-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch

[Bjarke Istrup Pedersen (gurligebis)]

gurligebis    15/07/14 19:42:57

  Added:               
                        0001-NFC-Avoid-misaligned-read-of-an-NDEF-field.patch
                        0002-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch
  Log:
  Adding security fixes wrt. bug #554860
  
  (Portage version: 2.2.20/cvs/Linux x86_64, signed Manifest commit with key 15AE484C)

Revision  Changes    Path
1.1                  net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-5/0001-NFC-Avoid-misaligned-read-of-an-NDEF-field.patch

file : http://sources.gentoo.org/viewvc.cgi/gentoo-x86/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-5/0001-NFC-Avoid-misaligned-read-of-an-NDEF-field.patch?rev=1.1&view=markup
plain: http://sources.gentoo.org/viewvc.cgi/gentoo-x86/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-5/0001-NFC-Avoid-misaligned-read-of-an-NDEF-field.patch?rev=1.1&content-type=text/plain

Index: 0001-NFC-Avoid-misaligned-read-of-an-NDEF-field.patch
===================================================================
From fc880b11ed70ff9dcf8be48621f75d354cc5094d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 15:33:55 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] NFC: Avoid misaligned read of an NDEF field

The 32-bit version of payload length field may not be 32-bit aligned in
the message buffer, so use WPA_GET_BE32() to read it instead of ntohl().

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
---
 src/wps/ndef.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/src/wps/ndef.c b/src/wps/ndef.c
index 8d1ce1e..5604b0a 100644
--- a/src/wps/ndef.c
+++ b/src/wps/ndef.c
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static int ndef_parse_record(const u8 *data, u32 size,
 	} else {
 		if (size < 6)
 			return -1;
-		record->payload_length = ntohl(*(u32 *)pos);
+		record->payload_length = WPA_GET_BE32(pos);
 		pos += sizeof(u32);
 	}
 
-- 
1.7.9.5




1.1                  net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-5/0002-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch

file : http://sources.gentoo.org/viewvc.cgi/gentoo-x86/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-5/0002-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch?rev=1.1&view=markup
plain: http://sources.gentoo.org/viewvc.cgi/gentoo-x86/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-5/0002-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch?rev=1.1&content-type=text/plain

Index: 0002-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch
===================================================================
From df9079e72760ceb7ebe7fb11538200c516bdd886 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 21:57:28 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] NFC: Fix payload length validation in NDEF record parser

It was possible for the 32-bit record->total_length value to end up
wrapping around due to integer overflow if the longer form of payload
length field is used and record->payload_length gets a value close to
2^32. This could result in ndef_parse_record() accepting a too large
payload length value and the record type filter reading up to about 20
bytes beyond the end of the buffer and potentially killing the process.
This could also result in an attempt to allocate close to 2^32 bytes of
heap memory and if that were to succeed, a buffer read overflow of the
same length which would most likely result in the process termination.
In case of record->total_length ending up getting the value 0, there
would be no buffer read overflow, but record parsing would result in an
infinite loop in ndef_parse_records().

Any of these error cases could potentially be used for denial of service
attacks over NFC by using a malformed NDEF record on an NFC Tag or
sending them during NFC connection handover if the application providing
the NDEF message to hostapd/wpa_supplicant did no validation of the
received records. While such validation is likely done in the NFC stack
that needs to parse the NFC messages before further processing,
hostapd/wpa_supplicant better be prepared for any data being included
here.

Fix this by validating record->payload_length value in a way that
detects integer overflow. (CID 122668)

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
---
 src/wps/ndef.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/src/wps/ndef.c b/src/wps/ndef.c
index 5604b0a..50d018f 100644
--- a/src/wps/ndef.c
+++ b/src/wps/ndef.c
@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ static int ndef_parse_record(const u8 *data, u32 size,
 		if (size < 6)
 			return -1;
 		record->payload_length = WPA_GET_BE32(pos);
+		if (record->payload_length > size - 6)
+			return -1;
 		pos += sizeof(u32);
 	}
 
@@ -68,7 +70,8 @@ static int ndef_parse_record(const u8 *data, u32 size,
 	pos += record->payload_length;
 
 	record->total_length = pos - data;
-	if (record->total_length > size)
+	if (record->total_length > size ||
+	    record->total_length < record->payload_length)
 		return -1;
 	return 0;
 }
-- 
1.9.1