From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp.gentoo.org (woodpecker.gentoo.org [140.211.166.183]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by finch.gentoo.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 638111581EE for ; Fri, 28 Mar 2025 21:06:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.gentoo.org (bobolink.gentoo.org [140.211.166.189]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits)) (No client certificate requested) (Authenticated sender: relay-lists.gentoo.org@gentoo.org) by smtp.gentoo.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 4DFA8343158 for ; Fri, 28 Mar 2025 21:06:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: from bobolink.gentoo.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bobolink.gentoo.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2C4861104B4; Fri, 28 Mar 2025 21:06:26 +0000 (UTC) Received: from smtp.gentoo.org (dev.gentoo.org [IPv6:2001:470:ea4a:1:5054:ff:fec7:86e4]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by bobolink.gentoo.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 265F61104B4 for ; Fri, 28 Mar 2025 21:06:26 +0000 (UTC) Received: from oystercatcher.gentoo.org (oystercatcher.gentoo.org [148.251.78.52]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.gentoo.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 96FA5342FEB for ; Fri, 28 Mar 2025 21:06:25 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost.localdomain (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by oystercatcher.gentoo.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2C14D283B for ; Fri, 28 Mar 2025 21:06:24 +0000 (UTC) From: "Conrad Kostecki" To: gentoo-commits@lists.gentoo.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Reply-To: gentoo-dev@lists.gentoo.org, "Conrad Kostecki" Message-ID: <1743195960.6fd43364a1f02f9bd38b9f7424553fded4bd7681.conikost@gentoo> Subject: [gentoo-commits] repo/gentoo:master commit in: dev-libs/openssl/files/ X-VCS-Repository: repo/gentoo X-VCS-Files: dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.15-CVE-2024-9143.patch dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.1.7-CVE-2024-9143.patch dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.2.3-CVE-2024-9143.patch dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.3.2-CVE-2024-9143.patch dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.3.2-arm64-clobber.patch X-VCS-Directories: dev-libs/openssl/files/ X-VCS-Committer: conikost X-VCS-Committer-Name: Conrad Kostecki X-VCS-Revision: 6fd43364a1f02f9bd38b9f7424553fded4bd7681 X-VCS-Branch: master Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2025 21:06:24 +0000 (UTC) Precedence: bulk List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-Id: Gentoo Linux mail X-BeenThere: gentoo-commits@lists.gentoo.org X-Auto-Response-Suppress: DR, RN, NRN, OOF, AutoReply X-Archives-Salt: b4d157a6-74de-48a8-a5a2-7fca1730bab2 X-Archives-Hash: 35dddf01dc99d6441d19fe497e605fe9 commit: 6fd43364a1f02f9bd38b9f7424553fded4bd7681 Author: Michael Mair-Keimberger levelnine at> AuthorDate: Fri Mar 28 07:06:47 2025 +0000 Commit: Conrad Kostecki gentoo org> CommitDate: Fri Mar 28 21:06:00 2025 +0000 URL: https://gitweb.gentoo.org/repo/gentoo.git/commit/?id=6fd43364 dev-libs/openssl: remove unused patches Signed-off-by: Michael Mair-Keimberger levelnine.at> Signed-off-by: Conrad Kostecki gentoo.org> .../files/openssl-3.0.15-CVE-2024-9143.patch | 193 --------------------- .../files/openssl-3.1.7-CVE-2024-9143.patch | 192 -------------------- .../files/openssl-3.2.3-CVE-2024-9143.patch | 193 --------------------- .../files/openssl-3.3.2-CVE-2024-9143.patch | 193 --------------------- .../files/openssl-3.3.2-arm64-clobber.patch | 55 ------ 5 files changed, 826 deletions(-) diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.15-CVE-2024-9143.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.15-CVE-2024-9143.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 252a24776ae8..000000000000 --- a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.15-CVE-2024-9143.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,193 +0,0 @@ -https://bugs.gentoo.org/941643 -https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/72ae83ad214d2eef262461365a1975707f862712 - -From 72ae83ad214d2eef262461365a1975707f862712 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Viktor Dukhovni -Date: Thu, 19 Sep 2024 01:02:40 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH] Harden BN_GF2m_poly2arr against misuse. - -The BN_GF2m_poly2arr() function converts characteristic-2 field -(GF_{2^m}) Galois polynomials from a representation as a BIGNUM bitmask, -to a compact array with just the exponents of the non-zero terms. - -These polynomials are then used in BN_GF2m_mod_arr() to perform modular -reduction. A precondition of calling BN_GF2m_mod_arr() is that the -polynomial must have a non-zero constant term (i.e. the array has `0` as -its final element). - -Internally, callers of BN_GF2m_poly2arr() did not verify that -precondition, and binary EC curve parameters with an invalid polynomial -could lead to out of bounds memory reads and writes in BN_GF2m_mod_arr(). - -The precondition is always true for polynomials that arise from the -standard form of EC parameters for characteristic-two fields (X9.62). -See the "Finite Field Identification" section of: - - https://www.itu.int/ITU-T/formal-language/itu-t/x/x894/2018-cor1/ANSI-X9-62.html - -The OpenSSL GF(2^m) code supports only the trinomial and pentanomial -basis X9.62 forms. - -This commit updates BN_GF2m_poly2arr() to return `0` (failure) when -the constant term is zero (i.e. the input bitmask BIGNUM is not odd). - -Additionally, the return value is made unambiguous when there is not -enough space to also pad the array with a final `-1` sentinel value. -The return value is now always the number of elements (including the -final `-1`) that would be filled when the output array is sufficiently -large. Previously the same count was returned both when the array has -just enough room for the final `-1` and when it had only enough space -for non-sentinel values. - -Finally, BN_GF2m_poly2arr() is updated to reject polynomials whose -degree exceeds `OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS`, this guards against -CPU exhausition attacks via excessively large inputs. - -The above issues do not arise in processing X.509 certificates. These -generally have EC keys from "named curves", and RFC5840 (Section 2.1.1) -disallows explicit EC parameters. The TLS code in OpenSSL enforces this -constraint only after the certificate is decoded, but, even if explicit -parameters are specified, they are in X9.62 form, which cannot represent -problem values as noted above. - -Initially reported as oss-fuzz issue 71623. - -A closely related issue was earlier reported in -. - -Severity: Low, CVE-2024-9143 - -Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell -Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger -Reviewed-by: Paul Dale -Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz -(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25639) - -(cherry picked from commit 8e008cb8b23ec7dc75c45a66eeed09c815b11cd2) ---- a/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c -+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c -@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ - #include "bn_local.h" - - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M -+# include - - /* - * Maximum number of iterations before BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr should -@@ -1140,16 +1141,26 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, - /* - * Convert the bit-string representation of a polynomial ( \sum_{i=0}^n a_i * - * x^i) into an array of integers corresponding to the bits with non-zero -- * coefficient. Array is terminated with -1. Up to max elements of the array -- * will be filled. Return value is total number of array elements that would -- * be filled if array was large enough. -+ * coefficient. The array is intended to be suitable for use with -+ * `BN_GF2m_mod_arr()`, and so the constant term of the polynomial must not be -+ * zero. This translates to a requirement that the input BIGNUM `a` is odd. -+ * -+ * Given sufficient room, the array is terminated with -1. Up to max elements -+ * of the array will be filled. -+ * -+ * The return value is total number of array elements that would be filled if -+ * array was large enough, including the terminating `-1`. It is `0` when `a` -+ * is not odd or the constant term is zero contrary to requirement. -+ * -+ * The return value is also `0` when the leading exponent exceeds -+ * `OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS`, this guards against CPU exhaustion attacks, - */ - int BN_GF2m_poly2arr(const BIGNUM *a, int p[], int max) - { - int i, j, k = 0; - BN_ULONG mask; - -- if (BN_is_zero(a)) -+ if (!BN_is_odd(a)) - return 0; - - for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) { -@@ -1167,12 +1178,13 @@ int BN_GF2m_poly2arr(const BIGNUM *a, int p[], int max) - } - } - -- if (k < max) { -+ if (k > 0 && p[0] > OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS) -+ return 0; -+ -+ if (k < max) - p[k] = -1; -- k++; -- } - -- return k; -+ return k + 1; - } - - /* ---- a/test/ec_internal_test.c -+++ b/test/ec_internal_test.c -@@ -155,6 +155,56 @@ static int field_tests_ecp_mont(void) - } - - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M -+/* Test that decoding of invalid GF2m field parameters fails. */ -+static int ec2m_field_sanity(void) -+{ -+ int ret = 0; -+ BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new(); -+ BIGNUM *p, *a, *b; -+ EC_GROUP *group1 = NULL, *group2 = NULL, *group3 = NULL; -+ -+ TEST_info("Testing GF2m hardening\n"); -+ -+ BN_CTX_start(ctx); -+ p = BN_CTX_get(ctx); -+ a = BN_CTX_get(ctx); -+ if (!TEST_ptr(b = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) -+ || !TEST_true(BN_one(a)) -+ || !TEST_true(BN_one(b))) -+ goto out; -+ -+ /* Even pentanomial value should be rejected */ -+ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 0xf2))) -+ goto out; -+ if (!TEST_ptr_null(group1 = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx))) -+ TEST_error("Zero constant term accepted in GF2m polynomial"); -+ -+ /* Odd hexanomial should also be rejected */ -+ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 0xf3))) -+ goto out; -+ if (!TEST_ptr_null(group2 = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx))) -+ TEST_error("Hexanomial accepted as GF2m polynomial"); -+ -+ /* Excessive polynomial degree should also be rejected */ -+ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 0x71)) -+ || !TEST_true(BN_set_bit(p, OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS + 1))) -+ goto out; -+ if (!TEST_ptr_null(group3 = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx))) -+ TEST_error("GF2m polynomial degree > %d accepted", -+ OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS); -+ -+ ret = group1 == NULL && group2 == NULL && group3 == NULL; -+ -+ out: -+ EC_GROUP_free(group1); -+ EC_GROUP_free(group2); -+ EC_GROUP_free(group3); -+ BN_CTX_end(ctx); -+ BN_CTX_free(ctx); -+ -+ return ret; -+} -+ - /* test EC_GF2m_simple_method directly */ - static int field_tests_ec2_simple(void) - { -@@ -443,6 +493,7 @@ int setup_tests(void) - ADD_TEST(field_tests_ecp_simple); - ADD_TEST(field_tests_ecp_mont); - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M -+ ADD_TEST(ec2m_field_sanity); - ADD_TEST(field_tests_ec2_simple); - #endif - ADD_ALL_TESTS(field_tests_default, crv_len); - diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.1.7-CVE-2024-9143.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.1.7-CVE-2024-9143.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 4f33ef000dca..000000000000 --- a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.1.7-CVE-2024-9143.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,192 +0,0 @@ -https://bugs.gentoo.org/941643 -https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/fdf6723362ca51bd883295efe206cb5b1cfa5154 - -From fdf6723362ca51bd883295efe206cb5b1cfa5154 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Viktor Dukhovni -Date: Thu, 19 Sep 2024 01:02:40 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH] Harden BN_GF2m_poly2arr against misuse. - -The BN_GF2m_poly2arr() function converts characteristic-2 field -(GF_{2^m}) Galois polynomials from a representation as a BIGNUM bitmask, -to a compact array with just the exponents of the non-zero terms. - -These polynomials are then used in BN_GF2m_mod_arr() to perform modular -reduction. A precondition of calling BN_GF2m_mod_arr() is that the -polynomial must have a non-zero constant term (i.e. the array has `0` as -its final element). - -Internally, callers of BN_GF2m_poly2arr() did not verify that -precondition, and binary EC curve parameters with an invalid polynomial -could lead to out of bounds memory reads and writes in BN_GF2m_mod_arr(). - -The precondition is always true for polynomials that arise from the -standard form of EC parameters for characteristic-two fields (X9.62). -See the "Finite Field Identification" section of: - - https://www.itu.int/ITU-T/formal-language/itu-t/x/x894/2018-cor1/ANSI-X9-62.html - -The OpenSSL GF(2^m) code supports only the trinomial and pentanomial -basis X9.62 forms. - -This commit updates BN_GF2m_poly2arr() to return `0` (failure) when -the constant term is zero (i.e. the input bitmask BIGNUM is not odd). - -Additionally, the return value is made unambiguous when there is not -enough space to also pad the array with a final `-1` sentinel value. -The return value is now always the number of elements (including the -final `-1`) that would be filled when the output array is sufficiently -large. Previously the same count was returned both when the array has -just enough room for the final `-1` and when it had only enough space -for non-sentinel values. - -Finally, BN_GF2m_poly2arr() is updated to reject polynomials whose -degree exceeds `OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS`, this guards against -CPU exhausition attacks via excessively large inputs. - -The above issues do not arise in processing X.509 certificates. These -generally have EC keys from "named curves", and RFC5840 (Section 2.1.1) -disallows explicit EC parameters. The TLS code in OpenSSL enforces this -constraint only after the certificate is decoded, but, even if explicit -parameters are specified, they are in X9.62 form, which cannot represent -problem values as noted above. - -Initially reported as oss-fuzz issue 71623. - -A closely related issue was earlier reported in -. - -Severity: Low, CVE-2024-9143 - -Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell -Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger -Reviewed-by: Paul Dale -Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz -(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25639) - -(cherry picked from commit 8e008cb8b23ec7dc75c45a66eeed09c815b11cd2) ---- a/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c -+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c -@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ - #include "bn_local.h" - - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M -+# include - - /* - * Maximum number of iterations before BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr should -@@ -1140,16 +1141,26 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, - /* - * Convert the bit-string representation of a polynomial ( \sum_{i=0}^n a_i * - * x^i) into an array of integers corresponding to the bits with non-zero -- * coefficient. Array is terminated with -1. Up to max elements of the array -- * will be filled. Return value is total number of array elements that would -- * be filled if array was large enough. -+ * coefficient. The array is intended to be suitable for use with -+ * `BN_GF2m_mod_arr()`, and so the constant term of the polynomial must not be -+ * zero. This translates to a requirement that the input BIGNUM `a` is odd. -+ * -+ * Given sufficient room, the array is terminated with -1. Up to max elements -+ * of the array will be filled. -+ * -+ * The return value is total number of array elements that would be filled if -+ * array was large enough, including the terminating `-1`. It is `0` when `a` -+ * is not odd or the constant term is zero contrary to requirement. -+ * -+ * The return value is also `0` when the leading exponent exceeds -+ * `OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS`, this guards against CPU exhaustion attacks, - */ - int BN_GF2m_poly2arr(const BIGNUM *a, int p[], int max) - { - int i, j, k = 0; - BN_ULONG mask; - -- if (BN_is_zero(a)) -+ if (!BN_is_odd(a)) - return 0; - - for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) { -@@ -1167,12 +1178,13 @@ int BN_GF2m_poly2arr(const BIGNUM *a, int p[], int max) - } - } - -- if (k < max) { -+ if (k > 0 && p[0] > OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS) -+ return 0; -+ -+ if (k < max) - p[k] = -1; -- k++; -- } - -- return k; -+ return k + 1; - } - - /* ---- a/test/ec_internal_test.c -+++ b/test/ec_internal_test.c -@@ -155,6 +155,56 @@ static int field_tests_ecp_mont(void) - } - - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M -+/* Test that decoding of invalid GF2m field parameters fails. */ -+static int ec2m_field_sanity(void) -+{ -+ int ret = 0; -+ BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new(); -+ BIGNUM *p, *a, *b; -+ EC_GROUP *group1 = NULL, *group2 = NULL, *group3 = NULL; -+ -+ TEST_info("Testing GF2m hardening\n"); -+ -+ BN_CTX_start(ctx); -+ p = BN_CTX_get(ctx); -+ a = BN_CTX_get(ctx); -+ if (!TEST_ptr(b = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) -+ || !TEST_true(BN_one(a)) -+ || !TEST_true(BN_one(b))) -+ goto out; -+ -+ /* Even pentanomial value should be rejected */ -+ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 0xf2))) -+ goto out; -+ if (!TEST_ptr_null(group1 = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx))) -+ TEST_error("Zero constant term accepted in GF2m polynomial"); -+ -+ /* Odd hexanomial should also be rejected */ -+ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 0xf3))) -+ goto out; -+ if (!TEST_ptr_null(group2 = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx))) -+ TEST_error("Hexanomial accepted as GF2m polynomial"); -+ -+ /* Excessive polynomial degree should also be rejected */ -+ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 0x71)) -+ || !TEST_true(BN_set_bit(p, OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS + 1))) -+ goto out; -+ if (!TEST_ptr_null(group3 = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx))) -+ TEST_error("GF2m polynomial degree > %d accepted", -+ OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS); -+ -+ ret = group1 == NULL && group2 == NULL && group3 == NULL; -+ -+ out: -+ EC_GROUP_free(group1); -+ EC_GROUP_free(group2); -+ EC_GROUP_free(group3); -+ BN_CTX_end(ctx); -+ BN_CTX_free(ctx); -+ -+ return ret; -+} -+ - /* test EC_GF2m_simple_method directly */ - static int field_tests_ec2_simple(void) - { -@@ -443,6 +493,7 @@ int setup_tests(void) - ADD_TEST(field_tests_ecp_simple); - ADD_TEST(field_tests_ecp_mont); - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M -+ ADD_TEST(ec2m_field_sanity); - ADD_TEST(field_tests_ec2_simple); - #endif - ADD_ALL_TESTS(field_tests_default, crv_len); diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.2.3-CVE-2024-9143.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.2.3-CVE-2024-9143.patch deleted file mode 100644 index e84b0f6c353e..000000000000 --- a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.2.3-CVE-2024-9143.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,193 +0,0 @@ -https://bugs.gentoo.org/941643 -https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/bc7e04d7c8d509fb78fc0e285aa948fb0da04700 - -From bc7e04d7c8d509fb78fc0e285aa948fb0da04700 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Viktor Dukhovni -Date: Thu, 19 Sep 2024 01:02:40 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH] Harden BN_GF2m_poly2arr against misuse. - -The BN_GF2m_poly2arr() function converts characteristic-2 field -(GF_{2^m}) Galois polynomials from a representation as a BIGNUM bitmask, -to a compact array with just the exponents of the non-zero terms. - -These polynomials are then used in BN_GF2m_mod_arr() to perform modular -reduction. A precondition of calling BN_GF2m_mod_arr() is that the -polynomial must have a non-zero constant term (i.e. the array has `0` as -its final element). - -Internally, callers of BN_GF2m_poly2arr() did not verify that -precondition, and binary EC curve parameters with an invalid polynomial -could lead to out of bounds memory reads and writes in BN_GF2m_mod_arr(). - -The precondition is always true for polynomials that arise from the -standard form of EC parameters for characteristic-two fields (X9.62). -See the "Finite Field Identification" section of: - - https://www.itu.int/ITU-T/formal-language/itu-t/x/x894/2018-cor1/ANSI-X9-62.html - -The OpenSSL GF(2^m) code supports only the trinomial and pentanomial -basis X9.62 forms. - -This commit updates BN_GF2m_poly2arr() to return `0` (failure) when -the constant term is zero (i.e. the input bitmask BIGNUM is not odd). - -Additionally, the return value is made unambiguous when there is not -enough space to also pad the array with a final `-1` sentinel value. -The return value is now always the number of elements (including the -final `-1`) that would be filled when the output array is sufficiently -large. Previously the same count was returned both when the array has -just enough room for the final `-1` and when it had only enough space -for non-sentinel values. - -Finally, BN_GF2m_poly2arr() is updated to reject polynomials whose -degree exceeds `OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS`, this guards against -CPU exhausition attacks via excessively large inputs. - -The above issues do not arise in processing X.509 certificates. These -generally have EC keys from "named curves", and RFC5840 (Section 2.1.1) -disallows explicit EC parameters. The TLS code in OpenSSL enforces this -constraint only after the certificate is decoded, but, even if explicit -parameters are specified, they are in X9.62 form, which cannot represent -problem values as noted above. - -Initially reported as oss-fuzz issue 71623. - -A closely related issue was earlier reported in -. - -Severity: Low, CVE-2024-9143 - -Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell -Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger -Reviewed-by: Paul Dale -Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz -(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25639) - -(cherry picked from commit 8e008cb8b23ec7dc75c45a66eeed09c815b11cd2) ---- a/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c -+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c -@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ - #include "bn_local.h" - - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M -+# include - - /* - * Maximum number of iterations before BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr should -@@ -1130,16 +1131,26 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, - /* - * Convert the bit-string representation of a polynomial ( \sum_{i=0}^n a_i * - * x^i) into an array of integers corresponding to the bits with non-zero -- * coefficient. Array is terminated with -1. Up to max elements of the array -- * will be filled. Return value is total number of array elements that would -- * be filled if array was large enough. -+ * coefficient. The array is intended to be suitable for use with -+ * `BN_GF2m_mod_arr()`, and so the constant term of the polynomial must not be -+ * zero. This translates to a requirement that the input BIGNUM `a` is odd. -+ * -+ * Given sufficient room, the array is terminated with -1. Up to max elements -+ * of the array will be filled. -+ * -+ * The return value is total number of array elements that would be filled if -+ * array was large enough, including the terminating `-1`. It is `0` when `a` -+ * is not odd or the constant term is zero contrary to requirement. -+ * -+ * The return value is also `0` when the leading exponent exceeds -+ * `OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS`, this guards against CPU exhaustion attacks, - */ - int BN_GF2m_poly2arr(const BIGNUM *a, int p[], int max) - { - int i, j, k = 0; - BN_ULONG mask; - -- if (BN_is_zero(a)) -+ if (!BN_is_odd(a)) - return 0; - - for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) { -@@ -1157,12 +1168,13 @@ int BN_GF2m_poly2arr(const BIGNUM *a, int p[], int max) - } - } - -- if (k < max) { -+ if (k > 0 && p[0] > OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS) -+ return 0; -+ -+ if (k < max) - p[k] = -1; -- k++; -- } - -- return k; -+ return k + 1; - } - - /* ---- a/test/ec_internal_test.c -+++ b/test/ec_internal_test.c -@@ -155,6 +155,56 @@ static int field_tests_ecp_mont(void) - } - - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M -+/* Test that decoding of invalid GF2m field parameters fails. */ -+static int ec2m_field_sanity(void) -+{ -+ int ret = 0; -+ BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new(); -+ BIGNUM *p, *a, *b; -+ EC_GROUP *group1 = NULL, *group2 = NULL, *group3 = NULL; -+ -+ TEST_info("Testing GF2m hardening\n"); -+ -+ BN_CTX_start(ctx); -+ p = BN_CTX_get(ctx); -+ a = BN_CTX_get(ctx); -+ if (!TEST_ptr(b = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) -+ || !TEST_true(BN_one(a)) -+ || !TEST_true(BN_one(b))) -+ goto out; -+ -+ /* Even pentanomial value should be rejected */ -+ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 0xf2))) -+ goto out; -+ if (!TEST_ptr_null(group1 = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx))) -+ TEST_error("Zero constant term accepted in GF2m polynomial"); -+ -+ /* Odd hexanomial should also be rejected */ -+ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 0xf3))) -+ goto out; -+ if (!TEST_ptr_null(group2 = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx))) -+ TEST_error("Hexanomial accepted as GF2m polynomial"); -+ -+ /* Excessive polynomial degree should also be rejected */ -+ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 0x71)) -+ || !TEST_true(BN_set_bit(p, OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS + 1))) -+ goto out; -+ if (!TEST_ptr_null(group3 = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx))) -+ TEST_error("GF2m polynomial degree > %d accepted", -+ OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS); -+ -+ ret = group1 == NULL && group2 == NULL && group3 == NULL; -+ -+ out: -+ EC_GROUP_free(group1); -+ EC_GROUP_free(group2); -+ EC_GROUP_free(group3); -+ BN_CTX_end(ctx); -+ BN_CTX_free(ctx); -+ -+ return ret; -+} -+ - /* test EC_GF2m_simple_method directly */ - static int field_tests_ec2_simple(void) - { -@@ -443,6 +493,7 @@ int setup_tests(void) - ADD_TEST(field_tests_ecp_simple); - ADD_TEST(field_tests_ecp_mont); - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M -+ ADD_TEST(ec2m_field_sanity); - ADD_TEST(field_tests_ec2_simple); - #endif - ADD_ALL_TESTS(field_tests_default, crv_len); - diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.3.2-CVE-2024-9143.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.3.2-CVE-2024-9143.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 5776c78bfbbf..000000000000 --- a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.3.2-CVE-2024-9143.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,193 +0,0 @@ -https://bugs.gentoo.org/941643 -https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/c0d3e4d32d2805f49bec30547f225bc4d092e1f4 - -From c0d3e4d32d2805f49bec30547f225bc4d092e1f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Viktor Dukhovni -Date: Thu, 19 Sep 2024 01:02:40 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH] Harden BN_GF2m_poly2arr against misuse. - -The BN_GF2m_poly2arr() function converts characteristic-2 field -(GF_{2^m}) Galois polynomials from a representation as a BIGNUM bitmask, -to a compact array with just the exponents of the non-zero terms. - -These polynomials are then used in BN_GF2m_mod_arr() to perform modular -reduction. A precondition of calling BN_GF2m_mod_arr() is that the -polynomial must have a non-zero constant term (i.e. the array has `0` as -its final element). - -Internally, callers of BN_GF2m_poly2arr() did not verify that -precondition, and binary EC curve parameters with an invalid polynomial -could lead to out of bounds memory reads and writes in BN_GF2m_mod_arr(). - -The precondition is always true for polynomials that arise from the -standard form of EC parameters for characteristic-two fields (X9.62). -See the "Finite Field Identification" section of: - - https://www.itu.int/ITU-T/formal-language/itu-t/x/x894/2018-cor1/ANSI-X9-62.html - -The OpenSSL GF(2^m) code supports only the trinomial and pentanomial -basis X9.62 forms. - -This commit updates BN_GF2m_poly2arr() to return `0` (failure) when -the constant term is zero (i.e. the input bitmask BIGNUM is not odd). - -Additionally, the return value is made unambiguous when there is not -enough space to also pad the array with a final `-1` sentinel value. -The return value is now always the number of elements (including the -final `-1`) that would be filled when the output array is sufficiently -large. Previously the same count was returned both when the array has -just enough room for the final `-1` and when it had only enough space -for non-sentinel values. - -Finally, BN_GF2m_poly2arr() is updated to reject polynomials whose -degree exceeds `OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS`, this guards against -CPU exhausition attacks via excessively large inputs. - -The above issues do not arise in processing X.509 certificates. These -generally have EC keys from "named curves", and RFC5840 (Section 2.1.1) -disallows explicit EC parameters. The TLS code in OpenSSL enforces this -constraint only after the certificate is decoded, but, even if explicit -parameters are specified, they are in X9.62 form, which cannot represent -problem values as noted above. - -Initially reported as oss-fuzz issue 71623. - -A closely related issue was earlier reported in -. - -Severity: Low, CVE-2024-9143 - -Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell -Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger -Reviewed-by: Paul Dale -Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz -(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25639) - -(cherry picked from commit 8e008cb8b23ec7dc75c45a66eeed09c815b11cd2) ---- a/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c -+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c -@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ - #include "bn_local.h" - - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M -+# include - - /* - * Maximum number of iterations before BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr should -@@ -1130,16 +1131,26 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, - /* - * Convert the bit-string representation of a polynomial ( \sum_{i=0}^n a_i * - * x^i) into an array of integers corresponding to the bits with non-zero -- * coefficient. Array is terminated with -1. Up to max elements of the array -- * will be filled. Return value is total number of array elements that would -- * be filled if array was large enough. -+ * coefficient. The array is intended to be suitable for use with -+ * `BN_GF2m_mod_arr()`, and so the constant term of the polynomial must not be -+ * zero. This translates to a requirement that the input BIGNUM `a` is odd. -+ * -+ * Given sufficient room, the array is terminated with -1. Up to max elements -+ * of the array will be filled. -+ * -+ * The return value is total number of array elements that would be filled if -+ * array was large enough, including the terminating `-1`. It is `0` when `a` -+ * is not odd or the constant term is zero contrary to requirement. -+ * -+ * The return value is also `0` when the leading exponent exceeds -+ * `OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS`, this guards against CPU exhaustion attacks, - */ - int BN_GF2m_poly2arr(const BIGNUM *a, int p[], int max) - { - int i, j, k = 0; - BN_ULONG mask; - -- if (BN_is_zero(a)) -+ if (!BN_is_odd(a)) - return 0; - - for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) { -@@ -1157,12 +1168,13 @@ int BN_GF2m_poly2arr(const BIGNUM *a, int p[], int max) - } - } - -- if (k < max) { -+ if (k > 0 && p[0] > OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS) -+ return 0; -+ -+ if (k < max) - p[k] = -1; -- k++; -- } - -- return k; -+ return k + 1; - } - - /* ---- a/test/ec_internal_test.c -+++ b/test/ec_internal_test.c -@@ -155,6 +155,56 @@ static int field_tests_ecp_mont(void) - } - - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M -+/* Test that decoding of invalid GF2m field parameters fails. */ -+static int ec2m_field_sanity(void) -+{ -+ int ret = 0; -+ BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new(); -+ BIGNUM *p, *a, *b; -+ EC_GROUP *group1 = NULL, *group2 = NULL, *group3 = NULL; -+ -+ TEST_info("Testing GF2m hardening\n"); -+ -+ BN_CTX_start(ctx); -+ p = BN_CTX_get(ctx); -+ a = BN_CTX_get(ctx); -+ if (!TEST_ptr(b = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) -+ || !TEST_true(BN_one(a)) -+ || !TEST_true(BN_one(b))) -+ goto out; -+ -+ /* Even pentanomial value should be rejected */ -+ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 0xf2))) -+ goto out; -+ if (!TEST_ptr_null(group1 = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx))) -+ TEST_error("Zero constant term accepted in GF2m polynomial"); -+ -+ /* Odd hexanomial should also be rejected */ -+ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 0xf3))) -+ goto out; -+ if (!TEST_ptr_null(group2 = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx))) -+ TEST_error("Hexanomial accepted as GF2m polynomial"); -+ -+ /* Excessive polynomial degree should also be rejected */ -+ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 0x71)) -+ || !TEST_true(BN_set_bit(p, OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS + 1))) -+ goto out; -+ if (!TEST_ptr_null(group3 = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx))) -+ TEST_error("GF2m polynomial degree > %d accepted", -+ OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS); -+ -+ ret = group1 == NULL && group2 == NULL && group3 == NULL; -+ -+ out: -+ EC_GROUP_free(group1); -+ EC_GROUP_free(group2); -+ EC_GROUP_free(group3); -+ BN_CTX_end(ctx); -+ BN_CTX_free(ctx); -+ -+ return ret; -+} -+ - /* test EC_GF2m_simple_method directly */ - static int field_tests_ec2_simple(void) - { -@@ -443,6 +493,7 @@ int setup_tests(void) - ADD_TEST(field_tests_ecp_simple); - ADD_TEST(field_tests_ecp_mont); - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M -+ ADD_TEST(ec2m_field_sanity); - ADD_TEST(field_tests_ec2_simple); - #endif - ADD_ALL_TESTS(field_tests_default, crv_len); - diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.3.2-arm64-clobber.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.3.2-arm64-clobber.patch deleted file mode 100644 index d83c5b4fb87f..000000000000 --- a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.3.2-arm64-clobber.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,55 +0,0 @@ -https://gcc.gnu.org/PR118537 -https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/6fxlmnyagkycru3bewa4ympknywnsswlqzvwfft3ifqqiioxlv%40ax53pv7xdrc2 -https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26469 -https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/4f7d8b2724ea7f42cff1e8a0e736ad448def60f5 - -From 4f7d8b2724ea7f42cff1e8a0e736ad448def60f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Julian Andres Klode -Date: Sat, 18 Jan 2025 21:12:45 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] Restore correct registers in aarch64 AES-CTR code - -Commit 1d1ca79fe35dbe5c05faed5a2ef8c4de9c5adc49 introduced -save and restore for the registers, saving them as - - stp d8,d9,[sp, #16] - stp d10,d11,[sp, #32] - stp d12,d13,[sp, #48] - stp d14,d15,[sp, #64] - -But the restore code was inadvertently typoed: - - ldp d8,d9,[sp, #16] - ldp d10,d11,[sp, #32] - ldp d12,d13,[sp, #48] - ldp d15,d16,[sp, #64] - -Restoring [sp, #64] into d15,d16 instead of d14,d15. - -Fixes: #26466 - -CLA: trivial - -Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx -Reviewed-by: Paul Dale -Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz -(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26469) - -(cherry picked from commit 5261f3ca41cda7ad5767e399e9a2dc008bbad5d6) ---- - crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl | 2 +- - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl -index 33a2dd53dae19..dc019b04ccd25 100755 ---- a/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl -+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl -@@ -2493,7 +2493,7 @@ () - ldp d8,d9,[sp, #16] - ldp d10,d11,[sp, #32] - ldp d12,d13,[sp, #48] -- ldp d15,d16,[sp, #64] -+ ldp d14,d15,[sp, #64] - ldr x29,[sp],#80 - ret - .size ${prefix}_ctr32_encrypt_blocks_unroll12_eor3,.-${prefix}_ctr32_encrypt_blocks_unroll12_eor3 -