From: "Sam James" <sam@gentoo.org>
To: gentoo-commits@lists.gentoo.org
Subject: [gentoo-commits] repo/gentoo:master commit in: dev-libs/openssl/, dev-libs/openssl/files/
Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2023 15:06:12 +0000 (UTC) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1689779153.f78f883629408972dc4300c2e45aa6991ac3a37d.sam@gentoo> (raw)
commit: f78f883629408972dc4300c2e45aa6991ac3a37d
Author: Sam James <sam <AT> gentoo <DOT> org>
AuthorDate: Wed Jul 19 15:04:46 2023 +0000
Commit: Sam James <sam <AT> gentoo <DOT> org>
CommitDate: Wed Jul 19 15:05:53 2023 +0000
URL: https://gitweb.gentoo.org/repo/gentoo.git/commit/?id=f78f8836
dev-libs/openssl: patch CVE-2023-2975, CVE-2023-3446 for 3.1.1
Bug: https://bugs.gentoo.org/910556
Signed-off-by: Sam James <sam <AT> gentoo.org>
.../files/openssl-3.1.1-CVE-2023-2975.patch | 110 ++++++++
.../files/openssl-3.1.1-CVE-2023-3446.patch | 121 +++++++++
dev-libs/openssl/openssl-3.1.1-r2.ebuild | 293 +++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 524 insertions(+)
diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.1.1-CVE-2023-2975.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.1.1-CVE-2023-2975.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5abf60737dbd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.1.1-CVE-2023-2975.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/6a83f0c958811f07e0d11dfc6b5a6a98edfd5bdc
+https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/76214c4a8f3374b786811fdfeda3d98690f8faf4
+
+From 6a83f0c958811f07e0d11dfc6b5a6a98edfd5bdc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Date: Tue, 4 Jul 2023 17:30:35 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Do not ignore empty associated data with AES-SIV mode
+
+The AES-SIV mode allows for multiple associated data items
+authenticated separately with any of these being 0 length.
+
+The provided implementation ignores such empty associated data
+which is incorrect in regards to the RFC 5297 and is also
+a security issue because such empty associated data then become
+unauthenticated if an application expects to authenticate them.
+
+Fixes CVE-2023-2975
+
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21384)
+
+(cherry picked from commit c426c281cfc23ab182f7d7d7a35229e7db1494d9)
+--- a/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c
+@@ -120,14 +120,18 @@ static int siv_cipher(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl,
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
+
+- if (inl == 0) {
+- *outl = 0;
+- return 1;
+- }
++ /* Ignore just empty encryption/decryption call and not AAD. */
++ if (out != NULL) {
++ if (inl == 0) {
++ if (outl != NULL)
++ *outl = 0;
++ return 1;
++ }
+
+- if (outsize < inl) {
+- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+- return 0;
++ if (outsize < inl) {
++ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
++ return 0;
++ }
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->hw->cipher(ctx, out, in, inl) <= 0)
+
+From 76214c4a8f3374b786811fdfeda3d98690f8faf4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Date: Tue, 4 Jul 2023 17:50:37 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Add testcases for empty associated data entries with AES-SIV
+
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21384)
+
+(cherry picked from commit 3993bb0c0c87e3ed0ab4274e4688aa814e164cfc)
+--- a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph_aes_siv.txt
++++ b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph_aes_siv.txt
+@@ -20,6 +20,19 @@ Tag = 85632d07c6e8f37f950acd320a2ecc93
+ Plaintext = 112233445566778899aabbccddee
+ Ciphertext = 40c02b9690c4dc04daef7f6afe5c
+
++Cipher = aes-128-siv
++Key = fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff
++Tag = f1c5fdeac1f15a26779c1501f9fb7588
++Plaintext = 112233445566778899aabbccddee
++Ciphertext = 27e946c669088ab06da58c5c831c
++
++Cipher = aes-128-siv
++Key = fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff
++AAD =
++Tag = d1022f5b3664e5a4dfaf90f85be6f28a
++Plaintext = 112233445566778899aabbccddee
++Ciphertext = b66cff6b8eca0b79f083b39a0901
++
+ Cipher = aes-128-siv
+ Key = 7f7e7d7c7b7a79787776757473727170404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f
+ AAD = 00112233445566778899aabbccddeeffdeaddadadeaddadaffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100
+@@ -29,6 +42,24 @@ Tag = 7bdb6e3b432667eb06f4d14bff2fbd0f
+ Plaintext = 7468697320697320736f6d6520706c61696e7465787420746f20656e6372797074207573696e67205349562d414553
+ Ciphertext = cb900f2fddbe404326601965c889bf17dba77ceb094fa663b7a3f748ba8af829ea64ad544a272e9c485b62a3fd5c0d
+
++Cipher = aes-128-siv
++Key = 7f7e7d7c7b7a79787776757473727170404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f
++AAD = 00112233445566778899aabbccddeeffdeaddadadeaddadaffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100
++AAD =
++AAD = 09f911029d74e35bd84156c5635688c0
++Tag = 83ce6593a8fa67eb6fcd2819cedfc011
++Plaintext = 7468697320697320736f6d6520706c61696e7465787420746f20656e6372797074207573696e67205349562d414553
++Ciphertext = 30d937b42f71f71f93fc2d8d702d3eac8dc7651eefcd81120081ff29d626f97f3de17f2969b691c91b69b652bf3a6d
++
++Cipher = aes-128-siv
++Key = 7f7e7d7c7b7a79787776757473727170404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f
++AAD =
++AAD = 00112233445566778899aabbccddeeffdeaddadadeaddadaffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100
++AAD = 09f911029d74e35bd84156c5635688c0
++Tag = 77dd4a44f5a6b41302121ee7f378de25
++Plaintext = 7468697320697320736f6d6520706c61696e7465787420746f20656e6372797074207573696e67205349562d414553
++Ciphertext = 0fcd664c922464c88939d71fad7aefb864e501b0848a07d39201c1067a7288f3dadf0131a823a0bc3d588e8564a5fe
++
+ Cipher = aes-192-siv
+ Key = fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfefffffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0
+ AAD = 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f2021222324252627
+
diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.1.1-CVE-2023-3446.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.1.1-CVE-2023-3446.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..781b0c8f48b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.1.1-CVE-2023-3446.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/fc9867c1e03c22ebf56943be205202e576aabf23
+https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/4791e79b8803924b28c19af4d4036ad85335110d
+
+From fc9867c1e03c22ebf56943be205202e576aabf23 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2023 16:36:35 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix DH_check() excessive time with over sized modulus
+
+The DH_check() function checks numerous aspects of the key or parameters
+that have been supplied. Some of those checks use the supplied modulus
+value even if it is excessively large.
+
+There is already a maximum DH modulus size (10,000 bits) over which
+OpenSSL will not generate or derive keys. DH_check() will however still
+perform various tests for validity on such a large modulus. We introduce a
+new maximum (32,768) over which DH_check() will just fail.
+
+An application that calls DH_check() and supplies a key or parameters
+obtained from an untrusted source could be vulnerable to a Denial of
+Service attack.
+
+The function DH_check() is itself called by a number of other OpenSSL
+functions. An application calling any of those other functions may
+similarly be affected. The other functions affected by this are
+DH_check_ex() and EVP_PKEY_param_check().
+
+CVE-2023-3446
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
+Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21451)
+
+(cherry picked from commit 9e0094e2aa1b3428a12d5095132f133c078d3c3d)
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+@@ -152,6 +152,12 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
+ if (nid != NID_undef)
+ return 1;
+
++ /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
++ if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
++ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
+ if (!DH_check_params(dh, ret))
+ return 0;
+
+--- a/include/openssl/dh.h
++++ b/include/openssl/dh.h
+@@ -92,7 +92,11 @@ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_dh_kdf_ukm(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **ukm);
+ # include <openssl/dherr.h>
+
+ # ifndef OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
+-# define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
++# define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
++# endif
++
++# ifndef OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
++# define OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 32768
+ # endif
+
+ # define OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1024
+
+From 4791e79b8803924b28c19af4d4036ad85335110d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri, 7 Jul 2023 14:39:48 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Add a test for CVE-2023-3446
+
+Confirm that the only errors DH_check() finds with DH parameters with an
+excessively long modulus is that the modulus is too large. We should not
+be performing time consuming checks using that modulus.
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
+Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21451)
+
+(cherry picked from commit ede782b4c8868d1f09c9cd237f82b6f35b7dba8b)
+--- a/test/dhtest.c
++++ b/test/dhtest.c
+@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static int dh_test(void)
+ goto err1;
+
+ /* check fails, because p is way too small */
+- if (!DH_check(dh, &i))
++ if (!TEST_true(DH_check(dh, &i)))
+ goto err2;
+ i ^= DH_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL;
+ if (!TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME)
+@@ -124,6 +124,17 @@ static int dh_test(void)
+ /* We'll have a stale error on the queue from the above test so clear it */
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
++ /* Modulus of size: dh check max modulus bits + 1 */
++ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 1))
++ || !TEST_true(BN_lshift(p, p, OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)))
++ goto err3;
++
++ /*
++ * We expect no checks at all for an excessively large modulus
++ */
++ if (!TEST_false(DH_check(dh, &i)))
++ goto err3;
++
+ /*
+ * II) key generation
+ */
+@@ -138,7 +149,7 @@ static int dh_test(void)
+ goto err3;
+
+ /* ... and check whether it is valid */
+- if (!DH_check(a, &i))
++ if (!TEST_true(DH_check(a, &i)))
+ goto err3;
+ if (!TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME)
+ || !TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME)
+
diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/openssl-3.1.1-r2.ebuild b/dev-libs/openssl/openssl-3.1.1-r2.ebuild
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..cfa017e58411
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dev-libs/openssl/openssl-3.1.1-r2.ebuild
@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+# Copyright 1999-2023 Gentoo Authors
+# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
+
+EAPI=8
+
+VERIFY_SIG_OPENPGP_KEY_PATH="${BROOT}"/usr/share/openpgp-keys/openssl.org.asc
+inherit edo flag-o-matic linux-info toolchain-funcs
+inherit multilib multilib-minimal multiprocessing preserve-libs verify-sig
+
+DESCRIPTION="Robust, full-featured Open Source Toolkit for the Transport Layer Security (TLS)"
+HOMEPAGE="https://www.openssl.org/"
+
+MY_P=${P/_/-}
+
+if [[ ${PV} == 9999 ]] ; then
+ EGIT_REPO_URI="https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git"
+
+ inherit git-r3
+else
+ SRC_URI="
+ mirror://openssl/source/${MY_P}.tar.gz
+ verify-sig? ( mirror://openssl/source/${MY_P}.tar.gz.asc )
+ "
+ KEYWORDS="~alpha ~amd64 ~arm ~arm64 ~hppa ~ia64 ~loong ~m68k ~mips ~ppc ~ppc64 ~riscv ~s390 ~sparc ~x86"
+fi
+
+S="${WORKDIR}"/${MY_P}
+
+LICENSE="Apache-2.0"
+SLOT="0/$(ver_cut 1)" # .so version of libssl/libcrypto
+IUSE="+asm cpu_flags_x86_sse2 fips ktls rfc3779 sctp static-libs test tls-compression vanilla verify-sig weak-ssl-ciphers"
+RESTRICT="!test? ( test )"
+
+COMMON_DEPEND="
+ !<net-misc/openssh-9.2_p1-r3
+ tls-compression? ( >=sys-libs/zlib-1.2.8-r1[static-libs(+)?,${MULTILIB_USEDEP}] )
+"
+BDEPEND="
+ >=dev-lang/perl-5
+ sctp? ( >=net-misc/lksctp-tools-1.0.12 )
+ test? (
+ sys-apps/diffutils
+ sys-devel/bc
+ sys-process/procps
+ )
+ verify-sig? ( >=sec-keys/openpgp-keys-openssl-20230207 )"
+
+DEPEND="${COMMON_DEPEND}"
+RDEPEND="${COMMON_DEPEND}"
+PDEPEND="app-misc/ca-certificates"
+
+MULTILIB_WRAPPED_HEADERS=(
+ /usr/include/openssl/configuration.h
+)
+
+PATCHES=(
+ "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2023-2975.patch
+ "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2023-3446.patch
+)
+
+pkg_setup() {
+ if use ktls ; then
+ if kernel_is -lt 4 18 ; then
+ ewarn "Kernel implementation of TLS (USE=ktls) requires kernel >=4.18!"
+ else
+ CONFIG_CHECK="~TLS ~TLS_DEVICE"
+ ERROR_TLS="You will be unable to offload TLS to kernel because CONFIG_TLS is not set!"
+ ERROR_TLS_DEVICE="You will be unable to offload TLS to kernel because CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE is not set!"
+ use test && CONFIG_CHECK+=" ~CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER"
+
+ linux-info_pkg_setup
+ fi
+ fi
+
+ [[ ${MERGE_TYPE} == binary ]] && return
+
+ # must check in pkg_setup; sysctl doesn't work with userpriv!
+ if use test && use sctp ; then
+ # test_ssl_new will fail with "Ensure SCTP AUTH chunks are enabled in kernel"
+ # if sctp.auth_enable is not enabled.
+ local sctp_auth_status=$(sysctl -n net.sctp.auth_enable 2>/dev/null)
+ if [[ -z "${sctp_auth_status}" ]] || [[ ${sctp_auth_status} != 1 ]] ; then
+ die "FEATURES=test with USE=sctp requires net.sctp.auth_enable=1!"
+ fi
+ fi
+}
+
+src_unpack() {
+ # Can delete this once test fix patch is dropped
+ if use verify-sig ; then
+ # Needed for downloaded patch (which is unsigned, which is fine)
+ verify-sig_verify_detached "${DISTDIR}"/${P}.tar.gz{,.asc}
+ fi
+
+ default
+}
+
+src_prepare() {
+ # Make sure we only ever touch Makefile.org and avoid patching a file
+ # that gets blown away anyways by the Configure script in src_configure
+ rm -f Makefile
+
+ if ! use vanilla ; then
+ PATCHES+=(
+ # Add patches which are Gentoo-specific customisations here
+ )
+ fi
+
+ default
+
+ if use test && use sctp && has network-sandbox ${FEATURES} ; then
+ einfo "Disabling test '80-test_ssl_new.t' which is known to fail with FEATURES=network-sandbox ..."
+ rm test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t || die
+ fi
+
+ # Test fails depending on kernel configuration, bug #699134
+ rm test/recipes/30-test_afalg.t || die
+}
+
+src_configure() {
+ # Keep this in sync with app-misc/c_rehash
+ SSL_CNF_DIR="/etc/ssl"
+
+ # Quiet out unknown driver argument warnings since openssl
+ # doesn't have well-split CFLAGS and we're making it even worse
+ # and 'make depend' uses -Werror for added fun (bug #417795 again)
+ tc-is-clang && append-flags -Qunused-arguments
+
+ # We really, really need to build OpenSSL w/ strict aliasing disabled.
+ # It's filled with violations and it *will* result in miscompiled
+ # code. This has been in the ebuild for > 10 years but even in 2022,
+ # it's still relevant:
+ # - https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/55255
+ # - https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/18225
+ # - https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/18663#issuecomment-1181478057
+ # Don't remove the no strict aliasing bits below!
+ filter-flags -fstrict-aliasing
+ append-flags -fno-strict-aliasing
+ # The OpenSSL developers don't test with LTO right now, it leads to various
+ # warnings/errors (which may or may not be false positives), it's considered
+ # unsupported, and it's not tested in CI: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/18663.
+ filter-lto
+
+ append-flags $(test-flags-CC -Wa,--noexecstack)
+
+ # bug #895308
+ append-atomic-flags
+ # Configure doesn't respect LIBS
+ export LDLIBS="${LIBS}"
+
+ # bug #197996
+ unset APPS
+ # bug #312551
+ unset SCRIPTS
+ # bug #311473
+ unset CROSS_COMPILE
+
+ tc-export AR CC CXX RANLIB RC
+
+ multilib-minimal_src_configure
+}
+
+multilib_src_configure() {
+ use_ssl() { usex $1 "enable-${2:-$1}" "no-${2:-$1}" " ${*:3}" ; }
+
+ local krb5=$(has_version app-crypt/mit-krb5 && echo "MIT" || echo "Heimdal")
+
+ # See if our toolchain supports __uint128_t. If so, it's 64bit
+ # friendly and can use the nicely optimized code paths, bug #460790.
+ #local ec_nistp_64_gcc_128
+ #
+ # Disable it for now though (bug #469976)
+ # Do NOT re-enable without substantial discussion first!
+ #
+ #echo "__uint128_t i;" > "${T}"/128.c
+ #if ${CC} ${CFLAGS} -c "${T}"/128.c -o /dev/null >&/dev/null ; then
+ # ec_nistp_64_gcc_128="enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128"
+ #fi
+
+ local sslout=$(bash "${FILESDIR}/gentoo.config-1.0.4")
+ einfo "Using configuration: ${sslout:-(openssl knows best)}"
+
+ # https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/INSTALL.md#enable-and-disable-features
+ local myeconfargs=(
+ ${sslout}
+
+ $(use cpu_flags_x86_sse2 || echo "no-sse2")
+ enable-camellia
+ enable-ec
+ enable-ec2m
+ enable-sm2
+ enable-srp
+ $(use elibc_musl && echo "no-async")
+ enable-idea
+ enable-mdc2
+ enable-rc5
+ $(use fips && echo "enable-fips")
+ $(use_ssl asm)
+ $(use_ssl ktls)
+ $(use_ssl rfc3779)
+ $(use_ssl sctp)
+ $(use test || echo "no-tests")
+ $(use_ssl tls-compression zlib)
+ $(use_ssl weak-ssl-ciphers)
+
+ --prefix="${EPREFIX}"/usr
+ --openssldir="${EPREFIX}"${SSL_CNF_DIR}
+ --libdir=$(get_libdir)
+
+ shared
+ threads
+ )
+
+ edo perl "${S}/Configure" "${myeconfargs[@]}"
+}
+
+multilib_src_compile() {
+ emake build_sw
+
+ if multilib_is_native_abi; then
+ emake build_docs
+ fi
+}
+
+multilib_src_test() {
+ # VFP = show subtests verbosely and show failed tests verbosely
+ # Normal V=1 would show everything verbosely but this slows things down.
+ emake HARNESS_JOBS="$(makeopts_jobs)" -Onone VFP=1 test
+}
+
+multilib_src_install() {
+ emake DESTDIR="${D}" install_sw
+ if use fips; then
+ emake DESTDIR="${D}" install_fips
+ # Regen this in pkg_preinst, bug 900625
+ rm "${ED}${SSL_CNF_DIR}"/fipsmodule.cnf || die
+ fi
+
+ if multilib_is_native_abi; then
+ emake DESTDIR="${D}" install_ssldirs
+ emake DESTDIR="${D}" DOCDIR='$(INSTALLTOP)'/share/doc/${PF} install_docs
+ fi
+
+ # This is crappy in that the static archives are still built even
+ # when USE=static-libs. But this is due to a failing in the openssl
+ # build system: the static archives are built as PIC all the time.
+ # Only way around this would be to manually configure+compile openssl
+ # twice; once with shared lib support enabled and once without.
+ if ! use static-libs ; then
+ rm "${ED}"/usr/$(get_libdir)/lib{crypto,ssl}.a || die
+ fi
+}
+
+multilib_src_install_all() {
+ # openssl installs perl version of c_rehash by default, but
+ # we provide a shell version via app-misc/c_rehash
+ rm "${ED}"/usr/bin/c_rehash || die
+
+ dodoc {AUTHORS,CHANGES,NEWS,README,README-PROVIDERS}.md doc/*.txt doc/${PN}-c-indent.el
+
+ # Create the certs directory
+ keepdir ${SSL_CNF_DIR}/certs
+
+ # bug #254521
+ dodir /etc/sandbox.d
+ echo 'SANDBOX_PREDICT="/dev/crypto"' > "${ED}"/etc/sandbox.d/10openssl
+
+ diropts -m0700
+ keepdir ${SSL_CNF_DIR}/private
+}
+
+pkg_preinst() {
+ if use fips; then
+ # Regen fipsmodule.cnf, bug 900625
+ ebegin "Running openssl fipsinstall"
+ "${ED}/usr/bin/openssl" fipsinstall -quiet \
+ -out "${ED}${SSL_CNF_DIR}/fipsmodule.cnf" \
+ -module "${ED}/usr/$(get_libdir)/ossl-modules/fips.so"
+ eend $?
+ fi
+
+ preserve_old_lib /usr/$(get_libdir)/lib{crypto,ssl}$(get_libname 1) \
+ /usr/$(get_libdir)/lib{crypto,ssl}$(get_libname 1.1)
+}
+
+pkg_postinst() {
+ ebegin "Running 'openssl rehash ${EROOT}${SSL_CNF_DIR}/certs' to rebuild hashes (bug #333069)"
+ openssl rehash "${EROOT}${SSL_CNF_DIR}/certs"
+ eend $?
+
+ preserve_old_lib_notify /usr/$(get_libdir)/lib{crypto,ssl}$(get_libname 1) \
+ /usr/$(get_libdir)/lib{crypto,ssl}$(get_libname 1.1)
+}
next reply other threads:[~2023-07-19 15:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-07-19 15:06 Sam James [this message]
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2024-10-29 2:10 [gentoo-commits] repo/gentoo:master commit in: dev-libs/openssl/, dev-libs/openssl/files/ Sam James
2024-10-29 2:10 Sam James
2024-08-07 2:41 Sam James
2024-08-03 5:08 Sam James
2024-07-19 17:03 Jakov Smolić
2024-04-29 17:07 Sam James
2024-04-15 7:16 Sam James
2024-04-15 7:16 Sam James
2024-02-01 16:46 Sam James
2023-04-20 16:58 Patrick McLean
2023-03-22 23:00 Patrick McLean
2022-12-18 5:00 Andreas K. Hüttel
2022-12-18 2:11 Andreas K. Hüttel
2020-12-22 22:44 Thomas Deutschmann
2020-12-17 16:23 Andreas K. Hüttel
2019-11-25 0:13 Thomas Deutschmann
2019-10-04 15:48 Thomas Deutschmann
2019-10-04 15:48 Thomas Deutschmann
2019-08-23 18:10 Thomas Deutschmann
2019-01-02 21:58 Thomas Deutschmann
2018-12-25 17:24 Lars Wendler
2018-11-20 14:46 Lars Wendler
2018-11-12 18:36 Thomas Deutschmann
2018-06-20 15:38 Lars Wendler
2018-06-12 10:40 Thomas Deutschmann
2017-12-30 19:55 Thomas Deutschmann
2017-12-07 18:53 Thomas Deutschmann
2016-09-22 13:15 Lars Wendler
2016-05-03 14:21 Lars Wendler
2016-02-26 22:46 Doug Goldstein
2016-02-09 13:32 Jason Donenfeld
2016-01-29 6:59 Lars Wendler
2015-12-03 19:58 Mike Frysinger
2015-12-03 18:40 Lars Wendler
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