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From: "Mike Pagano" <mpagano@gentoo.org>
To: gentoo-commits@lists.gentoo.org
Subject: [gentoo-commits] proj/linux-patches:master commit in: /
Date: Tue,  4 Jan 2022 12:53:11 +0000 (UTC)	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1641300660.632cc59cc8462f3f01085d1b76cc304488a06394.mpagano@gentoo> (raw)

commit:     632cc59cc8462f3f01085d1b76cc304488a06394
Author:     Mike Pagano <mpagano <AT> gentoo <DOT> org>
AuthorDate: Tue Jan  4 12:51:00 2022 +0000
Commit:     Mike Pagano <mpagano <AT> gentoo <DOT> org>
CommitDate: Tue Jan  4 12:51:00 2022 +0000
URL:        https://gitweb.gentoo.org/proj/linux-patches.git/commit/?id=632cc59c

Update Gentoo Distro patch, thanks to gyakovlev

Signed-off-by: Mike Pagano <mpagano <AT> gentoo.org>

 4567_distro-Gentoo-Kconfig.patch | 251 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 1 file changed, 149 insertions(+), 102 deletions(-)

diff --git a/4567_distro-Gentoo-Kconfig.patch b/4567_distro-Gentoo-Kconfig.patch
index 24b75095..97665869 100644
--- a/4567_distro-Gentoo-Kconfig.patch
+++ b/4567_distro-Gentoo-Kconfig.patch
@@ -1,14 +1,19 @@
---- a/Kconfig	2021-06-04 19:03:33.646823432 -0400
-+++ b/Kconfig	2021-06-04 19:03:40.508892817 -0400
+diff --git a/Kconfig b/Kconfig
+index 745bc773f..e306bacea 100644
+--- a/Kconfig
++++ b/Kconfig
 @@ -30,3 +30,5 @@ source "lib/Kconfig"
  source "lib/Kconfig.debug"
  
  source "Documentation/Kconfig"
 +
 +source "distro/Kconfig"
---- /dev/null	2021-12-21 08:57:43.779324794 -0500
-+++ b/distro/Kconfig	2021-12-21 14:12:07.964572417 -0500
-@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+diff --git a/distro/Kconfig b/distro/Kconfig
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000..94d6e1886
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/distro/Kconfig
+@@ -0,0 +1,295 @@
 +menu "Gentoo Linux"
 +
 +config GENTOO_LINUX
@@ -75,9 +80,8 @@
 +		CGROUPS     (required for FEATURES=cgroup)
 +		IPC_NS      (required for FEATURES=ipc-sandbox)
 +		NET_NS      (required for FEATURES=network-sandbox)
-+		PID_NS		(required for FEATURES=pid-sandbox)
++		PID_NS      (required for FEATURES=pid-sandbox)
 +		SYSVIPC     (required by IPC_NS)
-+   
 +
 +		It is highly recommended that you leave this enabled as these FEATURES
 +		are, or will soon be, enabled by default.
@@ -124,7 +128,7 @@
 +	select BPF_SYSCALL
 +	select CGROUP_BPF
 +	select CGROUPS
-+	select CRYPTO_HMAC 
++	select CRYPTO_HMAC
 +	select CRYPTO_SHA256
 +	select CRYPTO_USER_API_HASH
 +	select DEVPTS_MULTIPLE_INSTANCES
@@ -166,102 +170,104 @@
 +
 +endmenu
 +
-+menuconfig GENTOO_KERNEL_SELF_PROTECTION
-+	bool "Kernel Self Protection Project"
-+	depends on GENTOO_LINUX
-+	help
-+		Recommended Kernel settings based on the suggestions from the Kernel Self Protection Project
-+		See: https://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_Project/Recommended_Settings
-+		Note, there may be additional settings for which the CONFIG_ setting is invisible in menuconfig due 
-+		to unmet dependencies. Search for GENTOO_KERNEL_SELF_PROTECTION_COMMON and search for 
-+		GENTOO_KERNEL_SELF_PROTECTION_{X86_64, ARM64, X86_32, ARM} for dependency information on your 
-+		specific architecture.
-+		Note 2: Please see the URL above for numeric settings, e.g. CONFIG_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR=65536 
-+		for X86_64
++menu "Kernel Self Protection Project"
++	visible if GENTOO_LINUX
 +
-+if GENTOO_KERNEL_SELF_PROTECTION
-+config GENTOO_KERNEL_SELF_PROTECTION_COMMON
++config GENTOO_KERNEL_SELF_PROTECTION
 +	bool "Enable Kernel Self Protection Project Recommendations"
 +
-+	depends on GENTOO_LINUX && !ACPI_CUSTOM_METHOD && !COMPAT_BRK && !DEVKMEM && !PROC_KCORE && !COMPAT_VDSO && !KEXEC && !HIBERNATION && !LEGACY_PTYS && !X86_X32 && !MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL && GCC_PLUGINS
++	depends on GENTOO_LINUX && EXPERT && !DEVKMEM && !PROC_KCORE && !COMPAT_VDSO && !KEXEC && !HIBERNATION && !LEGACY_PTYS && !MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
 +
 +	select BUG
-+	select STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
-+	select DEBUG_WX
-+	select STACKPROTECTOR
-+	select STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG
-+	select STRICT_DEVMEM if DEVMEM=y
-+	select IO_STRICT_DEVMEM if DEVMEM=y
-+	select SYN_COOKIES
-+	select DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
-+	select DEBUG_NOTIFIERS
++	select STRICT_KERNEL_RWX if ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
++	select DEBUG_FS
++	select DEBUG_WX if ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_WX && MMU
++	select STACKPROTECTOR if HAVE_STACKPROTECTOR
++	select STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG if HAVE_STACKPROTECTOR
++	select STRICT_DEVMEM if DEVMEM=y && (ARCH_HAS_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED || GENERIC_LIB_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED)
++	select IO_STRICT_DEVMEM if STRICT_DEVMEM
++	select SYN_COOKIES if NET && INET
++	select DEBUG_CREDENTIALS if DEBUG_KERNEL
++	select DEBUG_NOTIFIERS if DEBUG_KERNEL
 +	select DEBUG_LIST
-+	select DEBUG_SG
++	select DEBUG_SG if DEBUG_KERNEL
 +	select BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
-+	select SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK
++	select SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK if DEBUG_KERNEL
 +	select SECCOMP if HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP
 +	select SECCOMP_FILTER if HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
-+	select SECURITY_YAMA
-+	select SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM
-+	select SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED
++	select SECURITY if SYSFS && MULTIUSER
++	select SECURITY_YAMA if SECURITY
++	select HARDENED_USERCOPY if HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
++	select SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM if SLAB || SLUB
++	select SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED if SLAB || SLUB
 +	select SHUFFLE_PAGE_ALLOCATOR
-+	select SLUB_DEBUG
++	select SLUB_DEBUG if SLUB && SYSFS
++	select SLUB_DEBUG_ON if SLUB_DEBUG
 +	select PAGE_POISONING
 +	select PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY
 +	select PAGE_POISONING_ZERO
 +	select INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON
 +	select INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON
-+	select REFCOUNT_FULL
-+	select FORTIFY_SOURCE
-+	select SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
++	select FORTIFY_SOURCE if ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE && !CC_IS_CLANG
++	select SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT 
 +	select PANIC_ON_OOPS
-+	select GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY
-+	select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
-+	select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL
-+	select GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT
-+	select GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE
++	select DEBUG_STACKOVERFLOW if DEBUG_KERNEL && HAVE_DEBUG_STACKOVERFLOW
++	select VMAP_STACK if HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK
++	select STRICT_MODULE_RWX if ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX && ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX && MODULES
++	select ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS if CC_HAS_ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS
++	select INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN if CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_PATTERN && !CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO
++	select INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO if CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO
++	select GCC_PLUGINS if HAVE_GCC_PLUGINS && CC_IS_GCC
++	select GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY if GCC_PLUGINS
++	select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK if GCC_PLUGINS
++	select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL if GCC_PLUGINS
++	select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE if GCC_PLUGINS && GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
++	select GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT if GCC_PLUGINS
++	select GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE if GCC_PLUGINS && GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT
++	select GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK if GCC_PLUGINS && HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
 +
 +	help
-+		Search for GENTOO_KERNEL_SELF_PROTECTION_{X86_64, ARM64, X86_32, ARM} for dependency 
-+		information on your specific architecture.  Note 2: Please see the URL above for 
-+		numeric settings, e.g. CONFIG_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR=65536 for X86_64
++		Recommended Kernel settings based on the suggestions from the Kernel Self Protection Project
++		See: https://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_Project/Recommended_Settings
++		Note, there may be additional settings for which the CONFIG_ setting is invisible in menuconfig due
++		to unmet dependencies. Search for GENTOO_KERNEL_SELF_PROTECTION and search for
++		GENTOO_KERNEL_SELF_PROTECTION_{X86_64, ARM64, X86_32, ARM} for dependency information on your
++		specific architecture.
++		Note 2: Please see the URL above for numeric settings, e.g. CONFIG_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR=65536
++		for X86_64
 +
 +config GENTOO_KERNEL_SELF_PROTECTION_X86_64
-+	bool "X86_64 KSPP Settings" if GENTOO_KERNEL_SELF_PROTECTION_COMMON
++	bool "X86_64 KSPP Settings" if GENTOO_KERNEL_SELF_PROTECTION
++
++	depends on X86_64 && GENTOO_KERNEL_SELF_PROTECTION
++	default y if X86_64 && GENTOO_KERNEL_SELF_PROTECTION
 +
-+	depends on !X86_MSR && X86_64 && GENTOO_KERNEL_SELF_PROTECTION
-+	default n
-+	
 +	select RANDOMIZE_BASE
 +	select RANDOMIZE_MEMORY
 +	select RELOCATABLE
 +	select LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE
-+ 	select PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
-+	select GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
-+	select VMAP_STACK
++	select PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 +
 +
 +config GENTOO_KERNEL_SELF_PROTECTION_ARM64
 +	bool "ARM64 KSPP Settings"
 +
-+	depends on ARM64
-+	default n
++	depends on ARM64 && GENTOO_KERNEL_SELF_PROTECTION
++	default y if ARM64 && GENTOO_KERNEL_SELF_PROTECTION
 +
 +	select RANDOMIZE_BASE
 +	select RELOCATABLE
 +	select ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN
 +	select CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
-+	select GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
-+	select VMAP_STACK
 +
 +config GENTOO_KERNEL_SELF_PROTECTION_X86_32
 +	bool "X86_32 KSPP Settings"
 +
-+	depends on !X86_MSR && !MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL && !M486 && X86_32
-+	default n
++	depends on !X86_MSR && !MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL && !M486 && X86_32 && GENTOO_KERNEL_SELF_PROTECTION
++	default y if X86_32 && GENTOO_KERNEL_SELF_PROTECTION
 +
-+	select HIGHMEM64G
-+	select X86_PAE
++	#select HIGHMEM64G
++	#select X86_PAE
 +	select RANDOMIZE_BASE
 +	select RELOCATABLE
 +	select PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
@@ -269,14 +275,25 @@
 +config GENTOO_KERNEL_SELF_PROTECTION_ARM
 +	bool "ARM KSPP Settings"
 +
-+	depends on !OABI_COMPAT && ARM
-+	default n
++	depends on !OABI_COMPAT && ARM && GENTOO_KERNEL_SELF_PROTECTION
++	default y if ARM && GENTOO_KERNEL_SELF_PROTECTION
 +
 +	select VMSPLIT_3G
 +	select STRICT_MEMORY_RWX
 +	select CPU_SW_DOMAIN_PAN
 +
-+endif
++config GENTOO_KERNEL_SELF_PROTECTION_PPC
++	bool "PPC KSPP Settings"
++
++	depends on !SCOM_DEBUGFS && !OPAL_CORE && PPC && GENTOO_KERNEL_SELF_PROTECTION
++	default y if PPC && GENTOO_KERNEL_SELF_PROTECTION
++
++	select PPC_KUEP if PPC_HAVE_KUEP
++	select PPC_KUAP if PPC_HAVE_KUAP
++	select PPC_MEM_KEYS if PPC_BOOK3S_64
++	select PPC_SUBPAGE_PROT if PPC_BOOK3S_64 && PPC_64K_PAGES
++
++endmenu
 +
 +config GENTOO_PRINT_FIRMWARE_INFO
 +	bool "Print firmware information that the kernel attempts to load"
@@ -292,45 +309,46 @@
 +		See the settings that become available for more details and fine-tuning.
 +
 +endmenu
---- a/security/Kconfig	2021-12-05 18:20:55.655677710 -0500
-+++ b/security/Kconfig	2021-12-05 18:23:42.404251618 -0500
-@@ -167,6 +167,7 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN
- 	bool "Refuse to copy allocations that span multiple pages"
- 	depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY
- 	depends on EXPERT
+diff --git a/drivers/acpi/Kconfig b/drivers/acpi/Kconfig
+index 1da360c51..70963ba91 100644
+--- a/drivers/acpi/Kconfig
++++ b/drivers/acpi/Kconfig
+@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ config ACPI_HED
+ 
+ config ACPI_CUSTOM_METHOD
+ 	tristate "Allow ACPI methods to be inserted/replaced at run time"
+-	depends on DEBUG_FS
++	depends on DEBUG_FS && !GENTOO_KERNEL_SELF_PROTECTION
+ 	help
+ 	  This debug facility allows ACPI AML methods to be inserted and/or
+ 	  replaced without rebooting the system. For details refer to:
+diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
+index 11f8a845f..9f3eff46f 100644
+--- a/init/Kconfig
++++ b/init/Kconfig
+@@ -1879,6 +1879,7 @@ config SLUB_DEBUG
+ config COMPAT_BRK
+ 	bool "Disable heap randomization"
+ 	default y
 +	depends on !GENTOO_KERNEL_SELF_PROTECTION
  	help
- 	  When a multi-page allocation is done without __GFP_COMP,
- 	  hardened usercopy will reject attempts to copy it. There are,
-diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig
-index 9e921fc72..f29bc13fa 100644
---- a/security/selinux/Kconfig
-+++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig
-@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
- config SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
- 	bool "NSA SELinux runtime disable"
- 	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
+ 	  Randomizing heap placement makes heap exploits harder, but it
+ 	  also breaks ancient binaries (including anything libc5 based).
+@@ -1925,7 +1926,9 @@ endchoice
+ 
+ config SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT
+ 	bool "Allow slab caches to be merged"
++	default n if GENTOO_KERNEL_SELF_PROTECTION
+ 	default y
 +	depends on !GENTOO_KERNEL_SELF_PROTECTION
- 	select SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS
- 	default n
  	help
--- 
-2.31.1
-
-From bd3ff0b16792c18c0614c2b95e148943209f460a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Georgy Yakovlev <gyakovlev@gentoo.org>
-Date: Tue, 8 Jun 2021 13:59:57 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] set DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR by default
-
----
- mm/Kconfig | 2 ++
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
-
+ 	  For reduced kernel memory fragmentation, slab caches can be
+ 	  merged when they share the same size and other characteristics.
 diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig
-index 24c045b24..e13fc740c 100644
+index c048dea7e..81a1dfd69 100644
 --- a/mm/Kconfig
 +++ b/mm/Kconfig
-@@ -321,6 +321,8 @@ config KSM
+@@ -305,6 +305,8 @@ config KSM
  config DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
  	int "Low address space to protect from user allocation"
  	depends on MMU
@@ -339,6 +357,35 @@ index 24c045b24..e13fc740c 100644
  	default 4096
  	help
  	  This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
--- 
-2.31.1
-```
+diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
+index 90cbaff86..7b48339e8 100644
+--- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
++++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening
+@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ choice
+ 	default GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL if COMPILE_TEST && GCC_PLUGINS
+ 	default INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN if COMPILE_TEST && CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_PATTERN
+ 	default INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO if CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_PATTERN
++	default GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL if GENTOO_KERNEL_SELF_PROTECTION && GCC_PLUGINS
+ 	default INIT_STACK_NONE
+ 	help
+ 	  This option enables initialization of stack variables at
+@@ -45,6 +46,7 @@ choice
+ 
+ 	config INIT_STACK_NONE
+ 		bool "no automatic stack variable initialization (weakest)"
++		depends on !GENTOO_KERNEL_SELF_PROTECTION
+ 		help
+ 		  Disable automatic stack variable initialization.
+ 		  This leaves the kernel vulnerable to the standard
+diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig
+index 9e921fc72..f29bc13fa 100644
+--- a/security/selinux/Kconfig
++++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig
+@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
+ config SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
+ 	bool "NSA SELinux runtime disable"
+ 	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
++	depends on !GENTOO_KERNEL_SELF_PROTECTION
+ 	select SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS
+ 	default n
+ 	help


             reply	other threads:[~2022-01-04 12:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 62+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-01-04 12:53 Mike Pagano [this message]
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2015-06-20 17:36 [gentoo-commits] proj/linux-patches:4.0 " Mike Pagano
2015-06-23 12:48 ` [gentoo-commits] proj/linux-patches:master " Mike Pagano
2015-06-06 22:03 [gentoo-commits] proj/linux-patches:4.0 " Mike Pagano
2015-06-23 12:48 ` [gentoo-commits] proj/linux-patches:master " Mike Pagano
2015-05-17 19:55 [gentoo-commits] proj/linux-patches:4.0 " Mike Pagano
2015-06-23 12:48 ` [gentoo-commits] proj/linux-patches:master " Mike Pagano
2015-05-14 12:22 [gentoo-commits] proj/linux-patches:4.0 " Mike Pagano
2015-06-23 12:48 ` [gentoo-commits] proj/linux-patches:master " Mike Pagano
2015-05-07 19:37 [gentoo-commits] proj/linux-patches:4.0 " Mike Pagano
2015-06-23 12:48 ` [gentoo-commits] proj/linux-patches:master " Mike Pagano
2015-05-07 19:14 [gentoo-commits] proj/linux-patches:4.0 " Mike Pagano
2015-06-23 12:48 ` [gentoo-commits] proj/linux-patches:master " Mike Pagano
2015-05-03 23:55 [gentoo-commits] proj/linux-patches:4.0 " Mike Pagano
2015-06-23 12:48 ` [gentoo-commits] proj/linux-patches:master " Mike Pagano
2015-04-29 17:33 [gentoo-commits] proj/linux-patches:4.0 " Mike Pagano
2015-06-23 12:48 ` [gentoo-commits] proj/linux-patches:master " Mike Pagano
2015-03-21 20:00 [gentoo-commits] proj/linux-patches:4.0 " Mike Pagano
2015-06-23 12:48 ` [gentoo-commits] proj/linux-patches:master " Mike Pagano
2015-03-18 23:27 [gentoo-commits] proj/linux-patches:4.0 " Mike Pagano
2015-06-23 12:48 ` [gentoo-commits] proj/linux-patches:master " Mike Pagano
2014-10-07  1:43 Anthony G. Basile

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