* [gentoo-commits] repo/gentoo:master commit in: app-emulation/runc/, app-emulation/runc/files/
@ 2019-02-11 17:45 Manuel Rüger
0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Manuel Rüger @ 2019-02-11 17:45 UTC (permalink / raw
To: gentoo-commits
commit: a1e4f4e2eaaba19d9bf5b30fe799df91b8613a6b
Author: Manuel Rüger <mrueg <AT> gentoo <DOT> org>
AuthorDate: Mon Feb 11 17:43:06 2019 +0000
Commit: Manuel Rüger <mrueg <AT> gentoo <DOT> org>
CommitDate: Mon Feb 11 17:44:14 2019 +0000
URL: https://gitweb.gentoo.org/repo/gentoo.git/commit/?id=a1e4f4e2
app-emulation/runc: Fix security vuln
Package-Manager: Portage-2.3.59, Repoman-2.3.12
Signed-off-by: Manuel Rüger <mrueg <AT> gentoo.org>
app-emulation/runc/files/runc-fix-cve.patch | 334 +++++++++++++++++++++
.../runc/runc-1.0.0_rc6_p20181203-r1.ebuild | 65 ++++
2 files changed, 399 insertions(+)
diff --git a/app-emulation/runc/files/runc-fix-cve.patch b/app-emulation/runc/files/runc-fix-cve.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..fa85cb0444f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app-emulation/runc/files/runc-fix-cve.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@
+From 0a8e4117e7f715d5fbeef398405813ce8e88558b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
+Date: Wed, 9 Jan 2019 13:40:01 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] nsenter: clone /proc/self/exe to avoid exposing host binary
+ to container
+
+There are quite a few circumstances where /proc/self/exe pointing to a
+pretty important container binary is a _bad_ thing, so to avoid this we
+have to make a copy (preferably doing self-clean-up and not being
+writeable).
+
+We require memfd_create(2) -- though there is an O_TMPFILE fallback --
+but we can always extend this to use a scratch MNT_DETACH overlayfs or
+tmpfs. The main downside to this approach is no page-cache sharing for
+the runc binary (which overlayfs would give us) but this is far less
+complicated.
+
+This is only done during nsenter so that it happens transparently to the
+Go code, and any libcontainer users benefit from it. This also makes
+ExtraFiles and --preserve-fds handling trivial (because we don't need to
+worry about it).
+
+Fixes: CVE-2019-5736
+Co-developed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
+Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
+---
+ libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c | 268 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c | 11 ++
+ 2 files changed, 279 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c
+
+diff --git a/libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c b/libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000..c8a42c23f
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (C) 2019 Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
++ * Copyright (C) 2019 SUSE LLC
++ *
++ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
++ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
++ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
++ *
++ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
++ *
++ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
++ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
++ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
++ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
++ * limitations under the License.
++ */
++
++#define _GNU_SOURCE
++#include <unistd.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <stdbool.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <limits.h>
++#include <fcntl.h>
++#include <errno.h>
++
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <sys/stat.h>
++#include <sys/vfs.h>
++#include <sys/mman.h>
++#include <sys/sendfile.h>
++#include <sys/syscall.h>
++
++/* Use our own wrapper for memfd_create. */
++#if !defined(SYS_memfd_create) && defined(__NR_memfd_create)
++# define SYS_memfd_create __NR_memfd_create
++#endif
++#ifdef SYS_memfd_create
++# define HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE
++/* memfd_create(2) flags -- copied from <linux/memfd.h>. */
++# ifndef MFD_CLOEXEC
++# define MFD_CLOEXEC 0x0001U
++# define MFD_ALLOW_SEALING 0x0002U
++# endif
++int memfd_create(const char *name, unsigned int flags)
++{
++ return syscall(SYS_memfd_create, name, flags);
++}
++#endif
++
++/* This comes directly from <linux/fcntl.h>. */
++#ifndef F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE
++# define F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE 1024
++#endif
++#ifndef F_ADD_SEALS
++# define F_ADD_SEALS (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 9)
++# define F_GET_SEALS (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 10)
++#endif
++#ifndef F_SEAL_SEAL
++# define F_SEAL_SEAL 0x0001 /* prevent further seals from being set */
++# define F_SEAL_SHRINK 0x0002 /* prevent file from shrinking */
++# define F_SEAL_GROW 0x0004 /* prevent file from growing */
++# define F_SEAL_WRITE 0x0008 /* prevent writes */
++#endif
++
++#define RUNC_SENDFILE_MAX 0x7FFFF000 /* sendfile(2) is limited to 2GB. */
++#ifdef HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE
++# define RUNC_MEMFD_COMMENT "runc_cloned:/proc/self/exe"
++# define RUNC_MEMFD_SEALS \
++ (F_SEAL_SEAL | F_SEAL_SHRINK | F_SEAL_GROW | F_SEAL_WRITE)
++#endif
++
++static void *must_realloc(void *ptr, size_t size)
++{
++ void *old = ptr;
++ do {
++ ptr = realloc(old, size);
++ } while(!ptr);
++ return ptr;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Verify whether we are currently in a self-cloned program (namely, is
++ * /proc/self/exe a memfd). F_GET_SEALS will only succeed for memfds (or rather
++ * for shmem files), and we want to be sure it's actually sealed.
++ */
++static int is_self_cloned(void)
++{
++ int fd, ret, is_cloned = 0;
++
++ fd = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC);
++ if (fd < 0)
++ return -ENOTRECOVERABLE;
++
++#ifdef HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE
++ ret = fcntl(fd, F_GET_SEALS);
++ is_cloned = (ret == RUNC_MEMFD_SEALS);
++#else
++ struct stat statbuf = {0};
++ ret = fstat(fd, &statbuf);
++ if (ret >= 0)
++ is_cloned = (statbuf.st_nlink == 0);
++#endif
++ close(fd);
++ return is_cloned;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Basic wrapper around mmap(2) that gives you the file length so you can
++ * safely treat it as an ordinary buffer. Only gives you read access.
++ */
++static char *read_file(char *path, size_t *length)
++{
++ int fd;
++ char buf[4096], *copy = NULL;
++
++ if (!length)
++ return NULL;
++
++ fd = open(path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
++ if (fd < 0)
++ return NULL;
++
++ *length = 0;
++ for (;;) {
++ int n;
++
++ n = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
++ if (n < 0)
++ goto error;
++ if (!n)
++ break;
++
++ copy = must_realloc(copy, (*length + n) * sizeof(*copy));
++ memcpy(copy + *length, buf, n);
++ *length += n;
++ }
++ close(fd);
++ return copy;
++
++error:
++ close(fd);
++ free(copy);
++ return NULL;
++}
++
++/*
++ * A poor-man's version of "xargs -0". Basically parses a given block of
++ * NUL-delimited data, within the given length and adds a pointer to each entry
++ * to the array of pointers.
++ */
++static int parse_xargs(char *data, int data_length, char ***output)
++{
++ int num = 0;
++ char *cur = data;
++
++ if (!data || *output != NULL)
++ return -1;
++
++ while (cur < data + data_length) {
++ num++;
++ *output = must_realloc(*output, (num + 1) * sizeof(**output));
++ (*output)[num - 1] = cur;
++ cur += strlen(cur) + 1;
++ }
++ (*output)[num] = NULL;
++ return num;
++}
++
++/*
++ * "Parse" out argv and envp from /proc/self/cmdline and /proc/self/environ.
++ * This is necessary because we are running in a context where we don't have a
++ * main() that we can just get the arguments from.
++ */
++static int fetchve(char ***argv, char ***envp)
++{
++ char *cmdline = NULL, *environ = NULL;
++ size_t cmdline_size, environ_size;
++
++ cmdline = read_file("/proc/self/cmdline", &cmdline_size);
++ if (!cmdline)
++ goto error;
++ environ = read_file("/proc/self/environ", &environ_size);
++ if (!environ)
++ goto error;
++
++ if (parse_xargs(cmdline, cmdline_size, argv) <= 0)
++ goto error;
++ if (parse_xargs(environ, environ_size, envp) <= 0)
++ goto error;
++
++ return 0;
++
++error:
++ free(environ);
++ free(cmdline);
++ return -EINVAL;
++}
++
++static int clone_binary(void)
++{
++ int binfd, memfd;
++ ssize_t sent = 0;
++
++#ifdef HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE
++ memfd = memfd_create(RUNC_MEMFD_COMMENT, MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
++#else
++ memfd = open("/tmp", O_TMPFILE | O_EXCL | O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC, 0711);
++#endif
++ if (memfd < 0)
++ return -ENOTRECOVERABLE;
++
++ binfd = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
++ if (binfd < 0)
++ goto error;
++
++ sent = sendfile(memfd, binfd, NULL, RUNC_SENDFILE_MAX);
++ close(binfd);
++ if (sent < 0)
++ goto error;
++
++#ifdef HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE
++ int err = fcntl(memfd, F_ADD_SEALS, RUNC_MEMFD_SEALS);
++ if (err < 0)
++ goto error;
++#else
++ /* Need to re-open "memfd" as read-only to avoid execve(2) giving -EXTBUSY. */
++ int newfd;
++ char *fdpath = NULL;
++
++ if (asprintf(&fdpath, "/proc/self/fd/%d", memfd) < 0)
++ goto error;
++ newfd = open(fdpath, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
++ free(fdpath);
++ if (newfd < 0)
++ goto error;
++
++ close(memfd);
++ memfd = newfd;
++#endif
++ return memfd;
++
++error:
++ close(memfd);
++ return -EIO;
++}
++
++int ensure_cloned_binary(void)
++{
++ int execfd;
++ char **argv = NULL, **envp = NULL;
++
++ /* Check that we're not self-cloned, and if we are then bail. */
++ int cloned = is_self_cloned();
++ if (cloned > 0 || cloned == -ENOTRECOVERABLE)
++ return cloned;
++
++ if (fetchve(&argv, &envp) < 0)
++ return -EINVAL;
++
++ execfd = clone_binary();
++ if (execfd < 0)
++ return -EIO;
++
++ fexecve(execfd, argv, envp);
++ return -ENOEXEC;
++}
+diff --git a/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c b/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c
+index 28269dfc0..7750af35e 100644
+--- a/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c
++++ b/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c
+@@ -534,6 +534,9 @@ void join_namespaces(char *nslist)
+ free(namespaces);
+ }
+
++/* Defined in cloned_binary.c. */
++extern int ensure_cloned_binary(void);
++
+ void nsexec(void)
+ {
+ int pipenum;
+@@ -549,6 +552,14 @@ void nsexec(void)
+ if (pipenum == -1)
+ return;
+
++ /*
++ * We need to re-exec if we are not in a cloned binary. This is necessary
++ * to ensure that containers won't be able to access the host binary
++ * through /proc/self/exe. See CVE-2019-5736.
++ */
++ if (ensure_cloned_binary() < 0)
++ bail("could not ensure we are a cloned binary");
++
+ /* Parse all of the netlink configuration. */
+ nl_parse(pipenum, &config);
+
diff --git a/app-emulation/runc/runc-1.0.0_rc6_p20181203-r1.ebuild b/app-emulation/runc/runc-1.0.0_rc6_p20181203-r1.ebuild
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..44d7e6ca8b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app-emulation/runc/runc-1.0.0_rc6_p20181203-r1.ebuild
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+# Copyright 1999-2019 Gentoo Authors
+# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
+
+EAPI=6
+EGO_PN="github.com/opencontainers/${PN}"
+
+if [[ ${PV} == *9999 ]]; then
+ inherit golang-build golang-vcs
+else
+ MY_PV="${PV/_/-}"
+ RUNC_COMMIT="96ec2177ae841256168fcf76954f7177af9446eb" # Change this when you update the ebuild
+ SRC_URI="https://${EGO_PN}/archive/${RUNC_COMMIT}.tar.gz -> ${P}.tar.gz"
+ KEYWORDS="~amd64 ~arm ~arm64 ~ppc64"
+ inherit golang-build golang-vcs-snapshot
+fi
+
+DESCRIPTION="runc container cli tools"
+HOMEPAGE="http://runc.io"
+
+LICENSE="Apache-2.0"
+SLOT="0"
+IUSE="+ambient apparmor hardened +kmem +seccomp"
+
+RDEPEND="
+ apparmor? ( sys-libs/libapparmor )
+ seccomp? ( sys-libs/libseccomp )
+ !app-emulation/docker-runc
+"
+
+PATCHES=( "${FILESDIR}/${PN}-fix-cve.patch" )
+
+src_prepare() {
+ pushd src/${EGO_PN}
+ default
+ sed -i -e "/^GIT_BRANCH/d"\
+ -e "/^GIT_BRANCH_CLEAN/d"\
+ -e "/^COMMIT_NO/d"\
+ -e "s/COMMIT :=.*/COMMIT := ${RUNC_COMMIT}/"\
+ Makefile || die
+ popd || die
+}
+
+src_compile() {
+ # Taken from app-emulation/docker-1.7.0-r1
+ export CGO_CFLAGS="-I${ROOT}/usr/include"
+ export CGO_LDFLAGS="$(usex hardened '-fno-PIC ' '')
+ -L${ROOT}/usr/$(get_libdir)"
+
+ # build up optional flags
+ local options=(
+ $(usex ambient 'ambient' '')
+ $(usex apparmor 'apparmor' '')
+ $(usex seccomp 'seccomp' '')
+ $(usex kmem '' 'nokmem')
+ )
+
+ GOPATH="${S}" emake BUILDTAGS="${options[*]}" -C src/${EGO_PN}
+}
+
+src_install() {
+ pushd src/${EGO_PN} || die
+ dobin runc
+ dodoc README.md PRINCIPLES.md
+ popd || die
+}
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* [gentoo-commits] repo/gentoo:master commit in: app-emulation/runc/, app-emulation/runc/files/
@ 2019-07-04 15:34 Manuel Rüger
0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Manuel Rüger @ 2019-07-04 15:34 UTC (permalink / raw
To: gentoo-commits
commit: 7a5c6cc21e5f943c2ed2f7fb1214cbb6d98f00cd
Author: Manuel Rüger <mrueg <AT> gentoo <DOT> org>
AuthorDate: Thu Jul 4 15:33:48 2019 +0000
Commit: Manuel Rüger <mrueg <AT> gentoo <DOT> org>
CommitDate: Thu Jul 4 15:33:48 2019 +0000
URL: https://gitweb.gentoo.org/repo/gentoo.git/commit/?id=7a5c6cc2
app-emulation/runc: Remove old and unmaintained live
Package-Manager: Portage-2.3.68, Repoman-2.3.16
Signed-off-by: Manuel Rüger <mrueg <AT> gentoo.org>
app-emulation/runc/Manifest | 4 -
app-emulation/runc/files/runc-fix-cve.patch | 334 ---------------------
.../runc/runc-1.0.0_rc5_p20180509-r1.ebuild | 62 ----
.../runc/runc-1.0.0_rc6_p20181203-r1.ebuild | 65 ----
app-emulation/runc/runc-1.0.0_rc6_p20190216.ebuild | 63 ----
app-emulation/runc/runc-1.0.0_rc7.ebuild | 63 ----
app-emulation/runc/runc-9999.ebuild | 48 ---
7 files changed, 639 deletions(-)
diff --git a/app-emulation/runc/Manifest b/app-emulation/runc/Manifest
index 287936a5ed5..c96feb04e9c 100644
--- a/app-emulation/runc/Manifest
+++ b/app-emulation/runc/Manifest
@@ -1,5 +1 @@
-DIST runc-1.0.0_rc5_p20180509.tar.gz 1185576 BLAKE2B b56f9c185c061f51a1fd81c19d378b06c71d06c6eddcbc1c946b234814eb469ea4af37bf42ef3889e4d37bc430e69d0a563281b13055f855f1bc15935531fe28 SHA512 9a55bdb8e39830f46cceff48970b7688139927552e3d268b9ef4a6e640ffc3d95164b99c5b05d07d295bedc2ea22daf6062fd520df1548d78b1d481fd928f1e3
-DIST runc-1.0.0_rc6_p20181203.tar.gz 1202869 BLAKE2B 5b5808fc65f3725e5cc22794c5ff6c5eba6016110358b0f60dd3378df2e5b64afb5631e5652f45e9721838dd02745b8c5a88abfcd244de202196ac16bfccd5a7 SHA512 ec3d3fec773f2f9df714b0813efb110e21e328634e0b4ae77f323a892d0327aea5d4b6f9ae2a549aa06fda5b27431f4514fd663c7033dc170ca1a03627931f9d
-DIST runc-1.0.0_rc6_p20190216.tar.gz 1663903 BLAKE2B d6094e85f1d35e1dcc7aed94adffe384f651953568345a9f6edb7ef17b24e25d8572ba84a23326c134c2dae28e1d62d0715a8bd6d949d7ef5cbc4cbc6af2f635 SHA512 e3d61506b44f05dfbad2e07d917c8408edea54c87a472ceb109e2ba2a1685b26f1407c2fe7660d416b60fc2583414af09567bcb8b3c95bc14f725d120373337c
-DIST runc-1.0.0_rc7.tar.gz 1665891 BLAKE2B eea7fa8f37d788d3e4ba97161ba2369cbdd660218f136bfb57430bf4080709707ed2bf10209f6eadaffe281e5222ccf2c085407fb2c4799c81266504750e24da SHA512 3c5cf70985f080afc633b79d7d5a045d1f5300398e2cc91770653a0f4b2dd38ac2b4ed25c199e92bc7399f9a711c28ed3fb6262fc4a8700527b3e45356d6f723
DIST runc-1.0.0_rc8.tar.gz 1665924 BLAKE2B 542cbdefaaa1ef89d2abf8e31ca8116f26cddbfc3fb94dc8c7e94c51750b179ed557bee857ec80ede7280856c66c01c7961a26dc7e6202276baca46c691a3903 SHA512 f213b6a7fa96597d2ba1068f77752bccc0a1d62e0aac02ec8d2a2552dc3c1140fd4e52b2daeb0ac8fc09c48abe4521834450baae01ad4165308813eee7654a2b
diff --git a/app-emulation/runc/files/runc-fix-cve.patch b/app-emulation/runc/files/runc-fix-cve.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index fa85cb0444f..00000000000
--- a/app-emulation/runc/files/runc-fix-cve.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,334 +0,0 @@
-From 0a8e4117e7f715d5fbeef398405813ce8e88558b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
-Date: Wed, 9 Jan 2019 13:40:01 +1100
-Subject: [PATCH] nsenter: clone /proc/self/exe to avoid exposing host binary
- to container
-
-There are quite a few circumstances where /proc/self/exe pointing to a
-pretty important container binary is a _bad_ thing, so to avoid this we
-have to make a copy (preferably doing self-clean-up and not being
-writeable).
-
-We require memfd_create(2) -- though there is an O_TMPFILE fallback --
-but we can always extend this to use a scratch MNT_DETACH overlayfs or
-tmpfs. The main downside to this approach is no page-cache sharing for
-the runc binary (which overlayfs would give us) but this is far less
-complicated.
-
-This is only done during nsenter so that it happens transparently to the
-Go code, and any libcontainer users benefit from it. This also makes
-ExtraFiles and --preserve-fds handling trivial (because we don't need to
-worry about it).
-
-Fixes: CVE-2019-5736
-Co-developed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
-Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
----
- libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c | 268 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c | 11 ++
- 2 files changed, 279 insertions(+)
- create mode 100644 libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c
-
-diff --git a/libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c b/libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 000000000..c8a42c23f
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (C) 2019 Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
-+ * Copyright (C) 2019 SUSE LLC
-+ *
-+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
-+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
-+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
-+ *
-+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
-+ *
-+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
-+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
-+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
-+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
-+ * limitations under the License.
-+ */
-+
-+#define _GNU_SOURCE
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <stdbool.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <limits.h>
-+#include <fcntl.h>
-+#include <errno.h>
-+
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <sys/stat.h>
-+#include <sys/vfs.h>
-+#include <sys/mman.h>
-+#include <sys/sendfile.h>
-+#include <sys/syscall.h>
-+
-+/* Use our own wrapper for memfd_create. */
-+#if !defined(SYS_memfd_create) && defined(__NR_memfd_create)
-+# define SYS_memfd_create __NR_memfd_create
-+#endif
-+#ifdef SYS_memfd_create
-+# define HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE
-+/* memfd_create(2) flags -- copied from <linux/memfd.h>. */
-+# ifndef MFD_CLOEXEC
-+# define MFD_CLOEXEC 0x0001U
-+# define MFD_ALLOW_SEALING 0x0002U
-+# endif
-+int memfd_create(const char *name, unsigned int flags)
-+{
-+ return syscall(SYS_memfd_create, name, flags);
-+}
-+#endif
-+
-+/* This comes directly from <linux/fcntl.h>. */
-+#ifndef F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE
-+# define F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE 1024
-+#endif
-+#ifndef F_ADD_SEALS
-+# define F_ADD_SEALS (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 9)
-+# define F_GET_SEALS (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 10)
-+#endif
-+#ifndef F_SEAL_SEAL
-+# define F_SEAL_SEAL 0x0001 /* prevent further seals from being set */
-+# define F_SEAL_SHRINK 0x0002 /* prevent file from shrinking */
-+# define F_SEAL_GROW 0x0004 /* prevent file from growing */
-+# define F_SEAL_WRITE 0x0008 /* prevent writes */
-+#endif
-+
-+#define RUNC_SENDFILE_MAX 0x7FFFF000 /* sendfile(2) is limited to 2GB. */
-+#ifdef HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE
-+# define RUNC_MEMFD_COMMENT "runc_cloned:/proc/self/exe"
-+# define RUNC_MEMFD_SEALS \
-+ (F_SEAL_SEAL | F_SEAL_SHRINK | F_SEAL_GROW | F_SEAL_WRITE)
-+#endif
-+
-+static void *must_realloc(void *ptr, size_t size)
-+{
-+ void *old = ptr;
-+ do {
-+ ptr = realloc(old, size);
-+ } while(!ptr);
-+ return ptr;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Verify whether we are currently in a self-cloned program (namely, is
-+ * /proc/self/exe a memfd). F_GET_SEALS will only succeed for memfds (or rather
-+ * for shmem files), and we want to be sure it's actually sealed.
-+ */
-+static int is_self_cloned(void)
-+{
-+ int fd, ret, is_cloned = 0;
-+
-+ fd = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC);
-+ if (fd < 0)
-+ return -ENOTRECOVERABLE;
-+
-+#ifdef HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE
-+ ret = fcntl(fd, F_GET_SEALS);
-+ is_cloned = (ret == RUNC_MEMFD_SEALS);
-+#else
-+ struct stat statbuf = {0};
-+ ret = fstat(fd, &statbuf);
-+ if (ret >= 0)
-+ is_cloned = (statbuf.st_nlink == 0);
-+#endif
-+ close(fd);
-+ return is_cloned;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Basic wrapper around mmap(2) that gives you the file length so you can
-+ * safely treat it as an ordinary buffer. Only gives you read access.
-+ */
-+static char *read_file(char *path, size_t *length)
-+{
-+ int fd;
-+ char buf[4096], *copy = NULL;
-+
-+ if (!length)
-+ return NULL;
-+
-+ fd = open(path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
-+ if (fd < 0)
-+ return NULL;
-+
-+ *length = 0;
-+ for (;;) {
-+ int n;
-+
-+ n = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
-+ if (n < 0)
-+ goto error;
-+ if (!n)
-+ break;
-+
-+ copy = must_realloc(copy, (*length + n) * sizeof(*copy));
-+ memcpy(copy + *length, buf, n);
-+ *length += n;
-+ }
-+ close(fd);
-+ return copy;
-+
-+error:
-+ close(fd);
-+ free(copy);
-+ return NULL;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * A poor-man's version of "xargs -0". Basically parses a given block of
-+ * NUL-delimited data, within the given length and adds a pointer to each entry
-+ * to the array of pointers.
-+ */
-+static int parse_xargs(char *data, int data_length, char ***output)
-+{
-+ int num = 0;
-+ char *cur = data;
-+
-+ if (!data || *output != NULL)
-+ return -1;
-+
-+ while (cur < data + data_length) {
-+ num++;
-+ *output = must_realloc(*output, (num + 1) * sizeof(**output));
-+ (*output)[num - 1] = cur;
-+ cur += strlen(cur) + 1;
-+ }
-+ (*output)[num] = NULL;
-+ return num;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * "Parse" out argv and envp from /proc/self/cmdline and /proc/self/environ.
-+ * This is necessary because we are running in a context where we don't have a
-+ * main() that we can just get the arguments from.
-+ */
-+static int fetchve(char ***argv, char ***envp)
-+{
-+ char *cmdline = NULL, *environ = NULL;
-+ size_t cmdline_size, environ_size;
-+
-+ cmdline = read_file("/proc/self/cmdline", &cmdline_size);
-+ if (!cmdline)
-+ goto error;
-+ environ = read_file("/proc/self/environ", &environ_size);
-+ if (!environ)
-+ goto error;
-+
-+ if (parse_xargs(cmdline, cmdline_size, argv) <= 0)
-+ goto error;
-+ if (parse_xargs(environ, environ_size, envp) <= 0)
-+ goto error;
-+
-+ return 0;
-+
-+error:
-+ free(environ);
-+ free(cmdline);
-+ return -EINVAL;
-+}
-+
-+static int clone_binary(void)
-+{
-+ int binfd, memfd;
-+ ssize_t sent = 0;
-+
-+#ifdef HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE
-+ memfd = memfd_create(RUNC_MEMFD_COMMENT, MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
-+#else
-+ memfd = open("/tmp", O_TMPFILE | O_EXCL | O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC, 0711);
-+#endif
-+ if (memfd < 0)
-+ return -ENOTRECOVERABLE;
-+
-+ binfd = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
-+ if (binfd < 0)
-+ goto error;
-+
-+ sent = sendfile(memfd, binfd, NULL, RUNC_SENDFILE_MAX);
-+ close(binfd);
-+ if (sent < 0)
-+ goto error;
-+
-+#ifdef HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE
-+ int err = fcntl(memfd, F_ADD_SEALS, RUNC_MEMFD_SEALS);
-+ if (err < 0)
-+ goto error;
-+#else
-+ /* Need to re-open "memfd" as read-only to avoid execve(2) giving -EXTBUSY. */
-+ int newfd;
-+ char *fdpath = NULL;
-+
-+ if (asprintf(&fdpath, "/proc/self/fd/%d", memfd) < 0)
-+ goto error;
-+ newfd = open(fdpath, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
-+ free(fdpath);
-+ if (newfd < 0)
-+ goto error;
-+
-+ close(memfd);
-+ memfd = newfd;
-+#endif
-+ return memfd;
-+
-+error:
-+ close(memfd);
-+ return -EIO;
-+}
-+
-+int ensure_cloned_binary(void)
-+{
-+ int execfd;
-+ char **argv = NULL, **envp = NULL;
-+
-+ /* Check that we're not self-cloned, and if we are then bail. */
-+ int cloned = is_self_cloned();
-+ if (cloned > 0 || cloned == -ENOTRECOVERABLE)
-+ return cloned;
-+
-+ if (fetchve(&argv, &envp) < 0)
-+ return -EINVAL;
-+
-+ execfd = clone_binary();
-+ if (execfd < 0)
-+ return -EIO;
-+
-+ fexecve(execfd, argv, envp);
-+ return -ENOEXEC;
-+}
-diff --git a/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c b/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c
-index 28269dfc0..7750af35e 100644
---- a/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c
-+++ b/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c
-@@ -534,6 +534,9 @@ void join_namespaces(char *nslist)
- free(namespaces);
- }
-
-+/* Defined in cloned_binary.c. */
-+extern int ensure_cloned_binary(void);
-+
- void nsexec(void)
- {
- int pipenum;
-@@ -549,6 +552,14 @@ void nsexec(void)
- if (pipenum == -1)
- return;
-
-+ /*
-+ * We need to re-exec if we are not in a cloned binary. This is necessary
-+ * to ensure that containers won't be able to access the host binary
-+ * through /proc/self/exe. See CVE-2019-5736.
-+ */
-+ if (ensure_cloned_binary() < 0)
-+ bail("could not ensure we are a cloned binary");
-+
- /* Parse all of the netlink configuration. */
- nl_parse(pipenum, &config);
-
diff --git a/app-emulation/runc/runc-1.0.0_rc5_p20180509-r1.ebuild b/app-emulation/runc/runc-1.0.0_rc5_p20180509-r1.ebuild
deleted file mode 100644
index 992fdf609d6..00000000000
--- a/app-emulation/runc/runc-1.0.0_rc5_p20180509-r1.ebuild
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
-# Copyright 1999-2019 Gentoo Authors
-# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
-
-EAPI=6
-EGO_PN="github.com/opencontainers/${PN}"
-
-if [[ ${PV} == *9999 ]]; then
- inherit golang-build golang-vcs
-else
- MY_PV="${PV/_/-}"
- EGIT_COMMIT="v${MY_PV}"
- RUNC_COMMIT="69663f0bd4b60df09991c08812a60108003fa340" # Change this when you update the ebuild
- SRC_URI="https://${EGO_PN}/archive/${RUNC_COMMIT}.tar.gz -> ${P}.tar.gz"
- KEYWORDS="amd64 ~arm ~arm64 ~ppc64"
- inherit golang-build golang-vcs-snapshot
-fi
-
-DESCRIPTION="runc container cli tools"
-HOMEPAGE="http://runc.io"
-
-LICENSE="Apache-2.0"
-SLOT="0"
-IUSE="+ambient apparmor hardened +seccomp"
-
-RDEPEND="
- apparmor? ( sys-libs/libapparmor )
- seccomp? ( sys-libs/libseccomp )
- !app-emulation/docker-runc
-"
-
-PATCHES=( "${FILESDIR}"/runc-fix-cve.patch )
-
-src_prepare() {
- pushd src/${EGO_PN} || die
- default
- popd || die
-}
-
-src_compile() {
- # Taken from app-emulation/docker-1.7.0-r1
- export CGO_CFLAGS="-I${ROOT}/usr/include"
- export CGO_LDFLAGS="$(usex hardened '-fno-PIC ' '')
- -L${ROOT}/usr/$(get_libdir)"
-
- # build up optional flags
- local options=(
- $(usex ambient 'ambient')
- $(usex apparmor 'apparmor')
- $(usex seccomp 'seccomp')
- )
-
- GOPATH="${S}"\
- emake BUILDTAGS="${options[*]}" \
- COMMIT="${RUNC_COMMIT}" -C src/${EGO_PN}
-}
-
-src_install() {
- pushd src/${EGO_PN} || die
- dobin runc
- dodoc README.md PRINCIPLES.md
- popd || die
-}
diff --git a/app-emulation/runc/runc-1.0.0_rc6_p20181203-r1.ebuild b/app-emulation/runc/runc-1.0.0_rc6_p20181203-r1.ebuild
deleted file mode 100644
index 893c249793a..00000000000
--- a/app-emulation/runc/runc-1.0.0_rc6_p20181203-r1.ebuild
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
-# Copyright 1999-2019 Gentoo Authors
-# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
-
-EAPI=6
-EGO_PN="github.com/opencontainers/${PN}"
-
-if [[ ${PV} == *9999 ]]; then
- inherit golang-build golang-vcs
-else
- MY_PV="${PV/_/-}"
- RUNC_COMMIT="96ec2177ae841256168fcf76954f7177af9446eb" # Change this when you update the ebuild
- SRC_URI="https://${EGO_PN}/archive/${RUNC_COMMIT}.tar.gz -> ${P}.tar.gz"
- KEYWORDS="amd64 ~arm ~arm64 ~ppc64"
- inherit golang-build golang-vcs-snapshot
-fi
-
-DESCRIPTION="runc container cli tools"
-HOMEPAGE="http://runc.io"
-
-LICENSE="Apache-2.0"
-SLOT="0"
-IUSE="+ambient apparmor hardened +kmem +seccomp"
-
-RDEPEND="
- apparmor? ( sys-libs/libapparmor )
- seccomp? ( sys-libs/libseccomp )
- !app-emulation/docker-runc
-"
-
-PATCHES=( "${FILESDIR}/${PN}-fix-cve.patch" )
-
-src_prepare() {
- pushd src/${EGO_PN}
- default
- sed -i -e "/^GIT_BRANCH/d"\
- -e "/^GIT_BRANCH_CLEAN/d"\
- -e "/^COMMIT_NO/d"\
- -e "s/COMMIT :=.*/COMMIT := ${RUNC_COMMIT}/"\
- Makefile || die
- popd || die
-}
-
-src_compile() {
- # Taken from app-emulation/docker-1.7.0-r1
- export CGO_CFLAGS="-I${ROOT}/usr/include"
- export CGO_LDFLAGS="$(usex hardened '-fno-PIC ' '')
- -L${ROOT}/usr/$(get_libdir)"
-
- # build up optional flags
- local options=(
- $(usex ambient 'ambient' '')
- $(usex apparmor 'apparmor' '')
- $(usex seccomp 'seccomp' '')
- $(usex kmem '' 'nokmem')
- )
-
- GOPATH="${S}" emake BUILDTAGS="${options[*]}" -C src/${EGO_PN}
-}
-
-src_install() {
- pushd src/${EGO_PN} || die
- dobin runc
- dodoc README.md PRINCIPLES.md
- popd || die
-}
diff --git a/app-emulation/runc/runc-1.0.0_rc6_p20190216.ebuild b/app-emulation/runc/runc-1.0.0_rc6_p20190216.ebuild
deleted file mode 100644
index d1e688e0dd6..00000000000
--- a/app-emulation/runc/runc-1.0.0_rc6_p20190216.ebuild
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-# Copyright 1999-2019 Gentoo Authors
-# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
-
-EAPI=6
-EGO_PN="github.com/opencontainers/${PN}"
-
-if [[ ${PV} == *9999 ]]; then
- inherit golang-build golang-vcs
-else
- MY_PV="${PV/_/-}"
- RUNC_COMMIT="2b18fe1d885ee5083ef9f0838fee39b62d653e30" # Change this when you update the ebuild
- SRC_URI="https://${EGO_PN}/archive/${RUNC_COMMIT}.tar.gz -> ${P}.tar.gz"
- KEYWORDS="amd64 ~arm ~arm64 ~ppc64"
- inherit golang-build golang-vcs-snapshot
-fi
-
-DESCRIPTION="runc container cli tools"
-HOMEPAGE="http://runc.io"
-
-LICENSE="Apache-2.0"
-SLOT="0"
-IUSE="+ambient apparmor hardened +kmem +seccomp"
-
-RDEPEND="
- apparmor? ( sys-libs/libapparmor )
- seccomp? ( sys-libs/libseccomp )
- !app-emulation/docker-runc
-"
-
-src_prepare() {
- pushd src/${EGO_PN}
- default
- sed -i -e "/^GIT_BRANCH/d"\
- -e "/^GIT_BRANCH_CLEAN/d"\
- -e "/^COMMIT_NO/d"\
- -e "s/COMMIT :=.*/COMMIT := ${RUNC_COMMIT}/"\
- Makefile || die
- popd || die
-}
-
-src_compile() {
- # Taken from app-emulation/docker-1.7.0-r1
- export CGO_CFLAGS="-I${ROOT}/usr/include"
- export CGO_LDFLAGS="$(usex hardened '-fno-PIC ' '')
- -L${ROOT}/usr/$(get_libdir)"
-
- # build up optional flags
- local options=(
- $(usex ambient 'ambient' '')
- $(usex apparmor 'apparmor' '')
- $(usex seccomp 'seccomp' '')
- $(usex kmem '' 'nokmem')
- )
-
- GOPATH="${S}" emake BUILDTAGS="${options[*]}" -C src/${EGO_PN}
-}
-
-src_install() {
- pushd src/${EGO_PN} || die
- dobin runc
- dodoc README.md PRINCIPLES.md
- popd || die
-}
diff --git a/app-emulation/runc/runc-1.0.0_rc7.ebuild b/app-emulation/runc/runc-1.0.0_rc7.ebuild
deleted file mode 100644
index 9a9686fa4af..00000000000
--- a/app-emulation/runc/runc-1.0.0_rc7.ebuild
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-# Copyright 1999-2019 Gentoo Authors
-# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
-
-EAPI=6
-EGO_PN="github.com/opencontainers/${PN}"
-
-if [[ ${PV} == *9999 ]]; then
- inherit golang-build golang-vcs
-else
- MY_PV="${PV/_/-}"
- RUNC_COMMIT="69ae5da6afdcaaf38285a10b36f362e41cb298d6" # Change this when you update the ebuild
- SRC_URI="https://${EGO_PN}/archive/${RUNC_COMMIT}.tar.gz -> ${P}.tar.gz"
- KEYWORDS="amd64 ~arm ~arm64 ~ppc64"
- inherit golang-build golang-vcs-snapshot
-fi
-
-DESCRIPTION="runc container cli tools"
-HOMEPAGE="http://runc.io"
-
-LICENSE="Apache-2.0"
-SLOT="0"
-IUSE="+ambient apparmor hardened +kmem +seccomp"
-
-RDEPEND="
- apparmor? ( sys-libs/libapparmor )
- seccomp? ( sys-libs/libseccomp )
- !app-emulation/docker-runc
-"
-
-src_prepare() {
- pushd src/${EGO_PN}
- default
- sed -i -e "/^GIT_BRANCH/d"\
- -e "/^GIT_BRANCH_CLEAN/d"\
- -e "/^COMMIT_NO/d"\
- -e "s/COMMIT :=.*/COMMIT := ${RUNC_COMMIT}/"\
- Makefile || die
- popd || die
-}
-
-src_compile() {
- # Taken from app-emulation/docker-1.7.0-r1
- export CGO_CFLAGS="-I${ROOT}/usr/include"
- export CGO_LDFLAGS="$(usex hardened '-fno-PIC ' '')
- -L${ROOT}/usr/$(get_libdir)"
-
- # build up optional flags
- local options=(
- $(usex ambient 'ambient' '')
- $(usex apparmor 'apparmor' '')
- $(usex seccomp 'seccomp' '')
- $(usex kmem '' 'nokmem')
- )
-
- GOPATH="${S}" emake BUILDTAGS="${options[*]}" -C src/${EGO_PN}
-}
-
-src_install() {
- pushd src/${EGO_PN} || die
- dobin runc
- dodoc README.md PRINCIPLES.md
- popd || die
-}
diff --git a/app-emulation/runc/runc-9999.ebuild b/app-emulation/runc/runc-9999.ebuild
deleted file mode 100644
index 8973c749125..00000000000
--- a/app-emulation/runc/runc-9999.ebuild
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-# Copyright 1999-2017 Gentoo Foundation
-# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
-
-EAPI=6
-
-inherit eutils multilib
-
-DESCRIPTION="runc container cli tools"
-HOMEPAGE="http://runc.io"
-
-GITHUB_URI="github.com/opencontainers/runc"
-
-if [[ ${PV} == *9999* ]]; then
- EGIT_REPO_URI="git://${GITHUB_URI}.git"
- inherit git-r3
-else
- SRC_URI="https://${GITHUB_URI}/archive/v${PV}.tar.gz -> ${P}.tar.gz"
- KEYWORDS="~amd64 ~ppc64"
-fi
-
-LICENSE="Apache-2.0"
-SLOT="0"
-IUSE="+seccomp"
-
-DEPEND=">=dev-lang/go-1.4:="
-RDEPEND="seccomp? ( sys-libs/libseccomp )
- !app-emulation/docker-runc"
-
-src_compile() {
- # Taken from app-emulation/docker-1.7.0-r1
- export CGO_CFLAGS="-I${ROOT}/usr/include"
- export CGO_LDFLAGS="-L${ROOT}/usr/$(get_libdir)"
-
- # Setup GOPATH so things build
- rm -rf .gopath
- mkdir -p .gopath/src/"$(dirname "${GITHUB_URI}")"
- ln -sf ../../../.. .gopath/src/"${GITHUB_URI}"
- export GOPATH="${PWD}/.gopath:${PWD}/vendor"
-
- # build up optional flags
- local options=( $(usex seccomp "seccomp") )
-
- emake BUILDTAGS="${options[@]}"
-}
-
-src_install() {
- dobin runc
-}
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* [gentoo-commits] repo/gentoo:master commit in: app-emulation/runc/, app-emulation/runc/files/
@ 2021-12-14 8:41 Georgy Yakovlev
0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Georgy Yakovlev @ 2021-12-14 8:41 UTC (permalink / raw
To: gentoo-commits
commit: 49df66c342189a9408855b6ab29403b459ebb39d
Author: Georgy Yakovlev <gyakovlev <AT> gentoo <DOT> org>
AuthorDate: Tue Dec 14 08:39:33 2021 +0000
Commit: Georgy Yakovlev <gyakovlev <AT> gentoo <DOT> org>
CommitDate: Tue Dec 14 08:41:10 2021 +0000
URL: https://gitweb.gentoo.org/repo/gentoo.git/commit/?id=49df66c3
app-emulation/runc: revbump for CVE-2021-43784
since we pin dep of runc to exact version in stack, adding 1.0.3
will require revbumping the rest.
So let's just revbump stable ebuild with a patch from upstream
release branch.
Bug: https://bugs.gentoo.org/828471
Signed-off-by: Georgy Yakovlev <gyakovlev <AT> gentoo.org>
app-emulation/runc/files/CVE-2021-43784.patch | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++++
.../{runc-1.0.2.ebuild => runc-1.0.2-r1.ebuild} | 2 +
2 files changed, 88 insertions(+)
diff --git a/app-emulation/runc/files/CVE-2021-43784.patch b/app-emulation/runc/files/CVE-2021-43784.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ab3886ee9ba7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app-emulation/runc/files/CVE-2021-43784.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+From b8dbe46687c2a96efa9252b69d3fc1ce33bdc416 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
+Date: Thu, 18 Nov 2021 16:12:59 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] runc init: avoid netlink message length overflows
+
+When writing netlink messages, it is possible to have a byte array
+larger than UINT16_MAX which would result in the length field
+overflowing and allowing user-controlled data to be parsed as control
+characters (such as creating custom mount points, changing which set of
+namespaces to allow, and so on).
+
+Co-authored-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
+---
+ libcontainer/container_linux.go | 20 +++++++++++++++++++-
+ libcontainer/message_linux.go | 9 +++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/libcontainer/container_linux.go b/libcontainer/container_linux.go
+index 6ce1854f68..1484703b0c 100644
+--- a/libcontainer/container_linux.go
++++ b/libcontainer/container_linux.go
+@@ -2028,16 +2028,34 @@ func encodeIDMapping(idMap []configs.IDMap) ([]byte, error) {
+ return data.Bytes(), nil
+ }
+
++// netlinkError is an error wrapper type for use by custom netlink message
++// types. Panics with errors are wrapped in netlinkError so that the recover
++// in bootstrapData can distinguish intentional panics.
++type netlinkError struct{ error }
++
+ // bootstrapData encodes the necessary data in netlink binary format
+ // as a io.Reader.
+ // Consumer can write the data to a bootstrap program
+ // such as one that uses nsenter package to bootstrap the container's
+ // init process correctly, i.e. with correct namespaces, uid/gid
+ // mapping etc.
+-func (c *linuxContainer) bootstrapData(cloneFlags uintptr, nsMaps map[configs.NamespaceType]string) (io.Reader, error) {
++func (c *linuxContainer) bootstrapData(cloneFlags uintptr, nsMaps map[configs.NamespaceType]string) (_ io.Reader, Err error) {
+ // create the netlink message
+ r := nl.NewNetlinkRequest(int(InitMsg), 0)
+
++ // Our custom messages cannot bubble up an error using returns, instead
++ // they will panic with the specific error type, netlinkError. In that
++ // case, recover from the panic and return that as an error.
++ defer func() {
++ if r := recover(); r != nil {
++ if e, ok := r.(netlinkError); ok {
++ Err = e.error
++ } else {
++ panic(r)
++ }
++ }
++ }()
++
+ // write cloneFlags
+ r.AddData(&Int32msg{
+ Type: CloneFlagsAttr,
+diff --git a/libcontainer/message_linux.go b/libcontainer/message_linux.go
+index 1d4f5033aa..e4107ce39f 100644
+--- a/libcontainer/message_linux.go
++++ b/libcontainer/message_linux.go
+@@ -3,6 +3,9 @@
+ package libcontainer
+
+ import (
++ "fmt"
++ "math"
++
+ "github.com/vishvananda/netlink/nl"
+ "golang.org/x/sys/unix"
+ )
+@@ -54,6 +57,12 @@ type Bytemsg struct {
+
+ func (msg *Bytemsg) Serialize() []byte {
+ l := msg.Len()
++ if l > math.MaxUint16 {
++ // We cannot return nil nor an error here, so we panic with
++ // a specific type instead, which is handled via recover in
++ // bootstrapData.
++ panic(netlinkError{fmt.Errorf("netlink: cannot serialize bytemsg of length %d (larger than UINT16_MAX)", l)})
++ }
+ buf := make([]byte, (l+unix.NLA_ALIGNTO-1) & ^(unix.NLA_ALIGNTO-1))
+ native := nl.NativeEndian()
+ native.PutUint16(buf[0:2], uint16(l))
diff --git a/app-emulation/runc/runc-1.0.2.ebuild b/app-emulation/runc/runc-1.0.2-r1.ebuild
similarity index 97%
rename from app-emulation/runc/runc-1.0.2.ebuild
rename to app-emulation/runc/runc-1.0.2-r1.ebuild
index d61c2be1edd1..3cd57d43c12e 100644
--- a/app-emulation/runc/runc-1.0.2.ebuild
+++ b/app-emulation/runc/runc-1.0.2-r1.ebuild
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ BDEPEND="
test? ( "${RDEPEND}" )
"
+PATCHES=( "${FILESDIR}/CVE-2021-43784.patch" )
+
# tests need busybox binary, and portage namespace
# sandboxing disabled: mount-sandbox pid-sandbox ipc-sandbox
# majority of tests pass
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
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2019-02-11 17:45 [gentoo-commits] repo/gentoo:master commit in: app-emulation/runc/, app-emulation/runc/files/ Manuel Rüger
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2019-07-04 15:34 Manuel Rüger
2021-12-14 8:41 Georgy Yakovlev
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