[gentoo-commits] proj/hardened-refpolicy:master commit in: policy/modules/system/, policy/modules/kernel/

["Sven Vermeulen" <swift@gentoo.org>]

commit:     a7acfa6001b742d245b462b31fe8581625d4a431
Author:     Elia Pinto <gitter.spiros <AT> gmail <DOT> com>
AuthorDate: Fri Jun  6 08:04:25 2014 +0000
Commit:     Sven Vermeulen <swift <AT> gentoo <DOT> org>
CommitDate: Tue Jun 10 18:14:33 2014 +0000
URL:        http://git.overlays.gentoo.org/gitweb/?p=proj/hardened-refpolicy.git;a=commit;h=a7acfa60

Fix misspelling

Fix misspelling using  http://github.com/lyda/misspell-check

Signed-off-by: Elia Pinto <gitter.spiros <AT> gmail.com>

---
 policy/modules/kernel/files.te      |  2 +-
 policy/modules/kernel/storage.if    | 14 +++++++-------
 policy/modules/system/miscfiles.if  |  2 +-
 policy/modules/system/udev.te       |  2 +-
 policy/modules/system/userdomain.if |  4 ++--
 5 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/files.te b/policy/modules/kernel/files.te
index cdc1801..852bd46 100644
--- a/policy/modules/kernel/files.te
+++ b/policy/modules/kernel/files.te
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ typealias etc_t alias snmpd_etc_t;
 #
 type etc_runtime_t;
 files_type(etc_runtime_t)
-#Temporarily in policy until FC5 dissappears
+#Temporarily in policy until FC5 disappears
 typealias etc_runtime_t alias firstboot_rw_t;
 
 #

diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/storage.if b/policy/modules/kernel/storage.if
index 64c4cd0..5c1be6b 100644
--- a/policy/modules/kernel/storage.if
+++ b/policy/modules/kernel/storage.if
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ interface(`storage_dontaudit_setattr_fixed_disk_dev',`
 ########################################
 ## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to directly read from a fixed disk.
-##	This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the
+##	This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the
 ##	SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and
 ##	should only be used by trusted domains.
 ## </summary>
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ interface(`storage_dontaudit_read_fixed_disk',`
 ########################################
 ## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to directly write to a fixed disk.
-##	This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the
+##	This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the
 ##	SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and
 ##	should only be used by trusted domains.
 ## </summary>
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ interface(`storage_dontaudit_write_fixed_disk',`
 ########################################
 ## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to directly read and write to a fixed disk.
-##	This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the
+##	This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the
 ##	SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and
 ##	should only be used by trusted domains.
 ## </summary>
@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ interface(`storage_setattr_scsi_generic_dev',`
 ## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to directly read, in a
 ##	generic fashion, from any SCSI device.
-##	This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the
+##	This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the
 ##	SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and
 ##	should only be used by trusted domains.
 ## </summary>
@@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ interface(`storage_read_scsi_generic',`
 ## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to directly write, in a
 ##	generic fashion, from any SCSI device.
-##	This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the
+##	This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the
 ##	SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and
 ##	should only be used by trusted domains.
 ## </summary>
@@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ interface(`storage_dontaudit_setattr_removable_dev',`
 ## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to directly read from
 ##	a removable device.
-##	This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the
+##	This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the
 ##	SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and
 ##	should only be used by trusted domains.
 ## </summary>
@@ -679,7 +679,7 @@ interface(`storage_dontaudit_raw_read_removable_device',`
 ## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to directly write to
 ##	a removable device.
-##	This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the
+##	This is extremely dangerous as it can bypass the
 ##	SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and
 ##	should only be used by trusted domains.
 ## </summary>

diff --git a/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.if b/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.if
index 8b9072c..d9220f7 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.if
+++ b/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.if
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-## <summary>Miscelaneous files.</summary>
+## <summary>Miscellaneous files.</summary>
 
 ########################################
 ## <summary>

diff --git a/policy/modules/system/udev.te b/policy/modules/system/udev.te
index 78652da..95de10c 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/udev.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/udev.te
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian',`
 
 ifdef(`distro_gentoo',`
 	# during boot, init scripts use /dev/.rcsysinit
-	# existance to determine if we are in early booting
+	# existence to determine if we are in early booting
 	init_getattr_script_status_files(udev_t)
 ')
 

diff --git a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
index 3cec4f1..7ad8e5b 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
+++ b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
@@ -1548,7 +1548,7 @@ interface(`userdom_search_user_home_dirs',`
 ## <desc>
 ##	<p>
 ##	Do not audit attempts to search user home directories.
-##	This will supress SELinux denial messages when the specified
+##	This will suppress SELinux denial messages when the specified
 ##	domain is denied the permission to search these directories.
 ##	</p>
 ## </desc>
@@ -3227,7 +3227,7 @@ interface(`userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds',`
 ## <desc>
 ##	<p>
 ##	Do not audit attempts to inherit the file descriptors
-##	from unprivileged user domains. This will supress
+##	from unprivileged user domains. This will suppress
 ##	SELinux denial messages when the specified domain is denied
 ##	the permission to inherit these file descriptors.
 ##	</p>