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From: Tim Sammut <underling@gentoo.org>
To: gentoo-announce@gentoo.org
Subject: [gentoo-announce] [ GLSA 201101-01 ] gif2png: User-assisted execution of arbitrary code
Date: Wed, 05 Jan 2011 09:14:38 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4D24A6FE.9040604@gentoo.org> (raw)

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Gentoo Linux Security Advisory                           GLSA 201101-01
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                                            http://security.gentoo.org/
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  Severity: Normal
     Title: gif2png: User-assisted execution of arbitrary code
      Date: January 05, 2011
      Bugs: #346501
        ID: 201101-01

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Synopsis
========

gif2png contains a stack overflow vulnerability when parsing command
line arguments.

Background
==========

gif2png is a command line program that converts image files from the
Graphics Interchange Format (GIF) format to the Portable Network
Graphics (PNG) format.

Affected packages
=================

    -------------------------------------------------------------------
     Package            /  Vulnerable  /                    Unaffected
    -------------------------------------------------------------------
  1  media-gfx/gif2png     < 2.5.1-r1                      >= 2.5.1-r1

Description
===========

gif2png contains a command line parsing vulnerability that may result
in a stack overflow due to an unexpectedly long input filename.

Impact
======

A remote attacker could entice a user to open a specially crafted
image, possibly resulting in the execution of arbitrary code with the
privileges of the user running the application, or a Denial of Service.
Note that applications relying on gif2png to process images can also
trigger the vulnerability.

Workaround
==========

There is no known workaround at this time.

Resolution
==========

All gif2png users should upgrade to the latest stable version:

    # emerge --sync
    # emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose ">=media-gfx/gif2png-2.5.1-r1"

References
==========

  [ 1 ] CVE-2009-5018
        http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2009-5018

Availability
============

This GLSA and any updates to it are available for viewing at
the Gentoo Security Website:

  http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-201101-01.xml

Concerns?
=========

Security is a primary focus of Gentoo Linux and ensuring the
confidentiality and security of our users machines is of utmost
importance to us. Any security concerns should be addressed to
security@gentoo.org or alternatively, you may file a bug at
https://bugs.gentoo.org.

License
=======

Copyright 2011 Gentoo Foundation, Inc; referenced text
belongs to its owner(s).

The contents of this document are licensed under the
Creative Commons - Attribution / Share Alike license.

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5




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                 reply	other threads:[~2011-01-05 18:12 UTC|newest]

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