From: Aaron Bauman <bman@gentoo.org>
To: gentoo-announce@lists.gentoo.org
Subject: [gentoo-announce] [ GLSA 201709-17 ] CVS: Command injection
Date: Sun, 24 Sep 2017 11:44:27 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2617373.8bPJE4n2Vs@localhost.localdomain> (raw)
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2592 bytes --]
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Gentoo Linux Security Advisory GLSA 201709-17
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
https://security.gentoo.org/
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Severity: Normal
Title: CVS: Command injection
Date: September 24, 2017
Bugs: #627498
ID: 201709-17
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Synopsis
========
A command injection vulnerability in CVS may allow remote attackers to
execute arbitrary code.
Background
==========
CVS (Concurrent Versions System) is an open-source network-transparent
version control system. It contains both a client utility and a server.
Affected packages
=================
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Package / Vulnerable / Unaffected
-------------------------------------------------------------------
1 dev-vcs/cvs < 1.12.12-r12 >= 1.12.12-r12
Description
===========
It was discovered that when CVS is configured to use SSH for remote
repositories it allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code
through a repository URL with a specially crafted hostname.
Impact
======
A remote attacker, by enticing a user to clone a specially crafted
repository, could possibly execute arbitrary code with the privileges
of the process.
Workaround
==========
There is no known workaround at this time.
Resolution
==========
All CVS users should upgrade to the latest version:
# emerge --sync
# emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose ">=dev-vcs/cvs-1.12.12-r12"
References
==========
[ 1 ] CVE-2017-12836
https://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2017-12836
Availability
============
This GLSA and any updates to it are available for viewing at
the Gentoo Security Website:
https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-17
Concerns?
=========
Security is a primary focus of Gentoo Linux and ensuring the
confidentiality and security of our users' machines is of utmost
importance to us. Any security concerns should be addressed to
security@gentoo.org or alternatively, you may file a bug at
https://bugs.gentoo.org.
License
=======
Copyright 2017 Gentoo Foundation, Inc; referenced text
belongs to its owner(s).
The contents of this document are licensed under the
Creative Commons - Attribution / Share Alike license.
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5
[-- Attachment #2: This is a digitally signed message part. --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 488 bytes --]
reply other threads:[~2017-09-24 15:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: [no followups] expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=2617373.8bPJE4n2Vs@localhost.localdomain \
--to=bman@gentoo.org \
--cc=gentoo-announce@lists.gentoo.org \
--cc=security@gentoo.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox