From: Aaron Bauman <bman@gentoo.org>
To: gentoo-announce@lists.gentoo.org
Subject: [gentoo-announce] [ GLSA 202006-05 ] Nokogiri: Command injection
Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2020 21:07:23 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200613010723.GC17996@bubba> (raw)
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Gentoo Linux Security Advisory GLSA 202006-05
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https://security.gentoo.org/
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Severity: Normal
Title: Nokogiri: Command injection
Date: June 13, 2020
Bugs: #691974
ID: 202006-05
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Synopsis
========
Nokogiri has a vulnerability allowing arbitrary execution of code if a
certain function is used.
Background
==========
Nokogiri is an HTML, XML, SAX, and Reader parser.
Affected packages
=================
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Package / Vulnerable / Unaffected
-------------------------------------------------------------------
1 dev-ruby/nokogiri < 1.10.4 >= 1.10.4
Description
===========
A command injection vulnerability in Nokogiri allows commands to be
executed in a subprocess by Ruby's Kernel.open method. Processes are
vulnerable only if the undocumented method
Nokogiri::CSS::Tokenizer#load_file is being passed untrusted user
input.
Impact
======
A remote attacker could possibly execute arbitrary code with the
privileges of the process.
Workaround
==========
Avoid calling the undocumented method
Nokogiri::CSS::Tokenizer#load_file with untrusted user input.
Resolution
==========
All Nokogiri users should upgrade to the latest version:
# emerge --sync
# emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose ">=dev-ruby/nokogiri-1.10.4"
References
==========
[ 1 ] CVE-2019-5477
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-5477
[ 2 ] Upstream bug
https://github.com/sparklemotion/nokogiri/issues/1915
Availability
============
This GLSA and any updates to it are available for viewing at
the Gentoo Security Website:
https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202006-05
Concerns?
=========
Security is a primary focus of Gentoo Linux and ensuring the
confidentiality and security of our users' machines is of utmost
importance to us. Any security concerns should be addressed to
security@gentoo.org or alternatively, you may file a bug at
https://bugs.gentoo.org.
License
=======
Copyright 2020 Gentoo Foundation, Inc; referenced text
belongs to its owner(s).
The contents of this document are licensed under the
Creative Commons - Attribution / Share Alike license.
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5
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