From: Alex Legler <a3li@gentoo.org>
To: gentoo-announce@lists.gentoo.org
Cc: bugtraq@securityfocus.com, full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk,
security-alerts@linuxsecurity.com
Subject: [gentoo-announce] [ GLSA 200909-12 ] HTMLDOC: User-assisted execution of arbitrary code
Date: Sat, 12 Sep 2009 18:28:36 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20090912182836.7c526195@neon> (raw)
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Gentoo Linux Security Advisory GLSA 200909-12
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http://security.gentoo.org/
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Severity: Normal
Title: HTMLDOC: User-assisted execution of arbitrary code
Date: September 12, 2009
Bugs: #278186
ID: 200909-12
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Synopsis
========
Multiple insecure calls to the sscanf() function in HTMLDOC might
result in the execution of arbitrary code.
Background
==========
HTMLDOC is a HTML indexer and HTML to PS and PDF converter.
Affected packages
=================
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Package / Vulnerable / Unaffected
-------------------------------------------------------------------
1 app-text/htmldoc < 1.8.27-r1 >= 1.8.27-r1
Description
===========
ANTHRAX666 reported an insecure call to the sscanf() function in the
set_page_size() function in htmldoc/util.cxx. Nico Golde of the Debian
Security Team found two more insecure calls in the write_type1()
function in htmldoc/ps-pdf.cxx and the htmlLoadFontWidths() function in
htmldoc/htmllib.cxx.
Impact
======
A remote attacker could entice a user to process a specially crafted
HTML file using htmldoc, possibly resulting in the execution of
arbitrary code with the privileges of the user running the application.
NOTE: Additional vectors via specially crafted AFM font metric files do
not cross trust boundaries, as the files can only be modified by
privileged users.
Workaround
==========
There is no known workaround at this time.
Resolution
==========
All HTMLDOC users should upgrade to the latest version:
# emerge --sync
# emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose =app-text/htmldoc-1.8.27-r1
References
==========
[ 1 ] CVE-2009-3050
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2009-3050
Availability
============
This GLSA and any updates to it are available for viewing at
the Gentoo Security Website:
http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-200909-12.xml
Concerns?
=========
Security is a primary focus of Gentoo Linux and ensuring the
confidentiality and security of our users machines is of utmost
importance to us. Any security concerns should be addressed to
security@gentoo.org or alternatively, you may file a bug at
https://bugs.gentoo.org.
License
=======
Copyright 2009 Gentoo Foundation, Inc; referenced text
belongs to its owner(s).
The contents of this document are licensed under the
Creative Commons - Attribution / Share Alike license.
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5
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reply other threads:[~2009-09-12 16:32 UTC|newest]
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