From: Raphael Marichez <falco@gentoo.org>
To: gentoo-announce@gentoo.org
Cc: bugtraq@securityfocus.com, full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk,
security-alerts@linuxsecurity.com
Subject: [gentoo-announce] [ GLSA 200703-09 ] Smb4K: Multiple vulnerabilities
Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2007 23:53:37 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20070309225337.GE8086@falco.falcal.net> (raw)
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Gentoo Linux Security Advisory GLSA 200703-09
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http://security.gentoo.org/
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Severity: High
Title: Smb4K: Multiple vulnerabilities
Date: March 09, 2007
Bugs: #156152
ID: 200703-09
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Synopsis
========
Multiple vulnerabilities have been identified in Smb4K.
Background
==========
Smb4K is a SMB/CIFS (Windows) share browser for KDE.
Affected packages
=================
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Package / Vulnerable / Unaffected
-------------------------------------------------------------------
1 net-misc/smb4k < 0.6.10a >= 0.6.10a
Description
===========
Kees Cook of the Ubuntu Security Team has identified multiple
vulnerabilities in Smb4K.
* The writeFile() function of smb4k/core/smb4kfileio.cpp makes
insecure usage of temporary files.
* The writeFile() function also stores the contents of the sudoers
file with incorrect permissions, allowing for the file's contents to
be world-readable.
* The createLockFile() and removeLockFile() functions improperly
handle lock files, possibly allowing for a race condition in file
handling.
* The smb4k_kill utility distributed with Smb4K allows any user in
the sudoers group to kill any process on the system.
* Lastly, there is the potential for multiple stack overflows when
any Smb4K utility is used with the sudo command.
Impact
======
A local attacker could gain unauthorized access to arbitrary files via
numerous attack vectors. In some cases to obtain this unauthorized
access, an attacker would have to be a member of the sudoers list.
Workaround
==========
There is no known workaround at this time.
Resolution
==========
All Smb4K users should upgrade to the latest version:
# emerge --sync
# emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose ">=net-misc/smb4k-0.6.10a"
References
==========
[ 1 ] CVE-2007-0472
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2007-0472
[ 2 ] CVE-2007-0473
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2007-0473
[ 3 ] CVE-2007-0474
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2007-0474
[ 4 ] CVE-2007-0475
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2007-0475
Availability
============
This GLSA and any updates to it are available for viewing at
the Gentoo Security Website:
http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-200703-09.xml
Concerns?
=========
Security is a primary focus of Gentoo Linux and ensuring the
confidentiality and security of our users machines is of utmost
importance to us. Any security concerns should be addressed to
security@gentoo.org or alternatively, you may file a bug at
http://bugs.gentoo.org.
License
=======
Copyright 2007 Gentoo Foundation, Inc; referenced text
belongs to its owner(s).
The contents of this document are licensed under the
Creative Commons - Attribution / Share Alike license.
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5
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