From: glsamaker@gentoo.org
To: gentoo-announce@lists.gentoo.org
Subject: [gentoo-announce] [ GLSA 202310-10 ] libcue: Arbitrary Code Execution
Date: Tue, 10 Oct 2023 06:14:14 -0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <169691845471.7.8369211096550329332@eaa400207d9c> (raw)
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Gentoo Linux Security Advisory GLSA 202310-10
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https://security.gentoo.org/
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Severity: High
Title: libcue: Arbitrary Code Execution
Date: October 10, 2023
Bugs: #915500
ID: 202310-10
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Synopsis
========
A vulnerability has been discovered in libcue which could allow for
arbitrary code execution.
Background
==========
libcue is a CUE Sheet Parser Library.
Affected packages
=================
Package Vulnerable Unaffected
----------------- ------------ ------------
media-libs/libcue < 2.2.1-r1 >= 2.2.1-r1
Description
===========
libcue does not check bounds in a loop and suffers from an integer
overflow flaw which can be exploited to take over the program.
Impact
======
Untrusted CUE sheet files can lead to arbitrary code execution.
app-misc/tracker-miners[cue] uses libcue to index CUE Sheet files in
directories. It is possible that downloading a malicious CUE Sheet file
into a directory indexed by tracker-miners could lead to remote code
execution.
Workaround
==========
There is no known workaround at this time.
Resolution
==========
All libcue users should upgrade to the latest version:
# emerge --sync
# emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose ">=media-libs/libcue-2.2.1-r1"
References
==========
[ 1 ] CVE-2023-43641
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-43641
Availability
============
This GLSA and any updates to it are available for viewing at
the Gentoo Security Website:
https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202310-10
Concerns?
=========
Security is a primary focus of Gentoo Linux and ensuring the
confidentiality and security of our users' machines is of utmost
importance to us. Any security concerns should be addressed to
security@gentoo.org or alternatively, you may file a bug at
https://bugs.gentoo.org.
License
=======
Copyright 2023 Gentoo Foundation, Inc; referenced text
belongs to its owner(s).
The contents of this document are licensed under the
Creative Commons - Attribution / Share Alike license.
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5
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