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From: Aaron Bauman <bman@gentoo.org>
To: gentoo-announce@lists.gentoo.org
Subject: [gentoo-announce] [ GLSA 201606-13 ] sudo: Unauthorized privilege escalation in sudoedit
Date: Sun, 26 Jun 2016 22:49:36 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4db9183f-3b87-fe40-2459-2f7d6c1b0f78@gentoo.org> (raw)


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Gentoo Linux Security Advisory                           GLSA 201606-13
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                                           https://security.gentoo.org/
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 Severity: Normal
    Title: sudo: Unauthorized privilege escalation in sudoedit
     Date: June 26, 2016
     Bugs: #564774
       ID: 201606-13

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Synopsis
========

sudo is vulnerable to an escalation of privileges via a symlink attack.

Background
==========

sudo (su "do") allows a system administrator to delegate authority to
give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or
all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of
the commands and their arguments.

Affected packages
=================

    -------------------------------------------------------------------
     Package              /     Vulnerable     /            Unaffected
    -------------------------------------------------------------------
  1  app-admin/sudo             < 1.8.15-r1              >= 1.8.15-r1 

Description
===========

sudoedit in sudo is vulnerable to the escalation of privileges by local
users via a symlink attack.  This can be exploited by a file whose full
path is defined using multiple wildcards in /etc/sudoers, as
demonstrated by "/home/*/*/file.txt.

Impact
======

Local users are able to gain unauthorized privileges on the system.

Workaround
==========

There is no known work around at this time.

Resolution
==========

All sudo users should upgrade to the latest version:

  # emerge --sync
  # emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose ">=app-admin/sudo-1.8.15-r1"

References
==========

[ 1 ] CVE-2015-5602
      http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2015-5602

Availability
============

This GLSA and any updates to it are available for viewing at
the Gentoo Security Website:

 https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201606-13

Concerns?
=========

Security is a primary focus of Gentoo Linux and ensuring the
confidentiality and security of our users' machines is of utmost
importance to us. Any security concerns should be addressed to
security@gentoo.org or alternatively, you may file a bug at
https://bugs.gentoo.org.

License
=======

Copyright 2016 Gentoo Foundation, Inc; referenced text
belongs to its owner(s).

The contents of this document are licensed under the
Creative Commons - Attribution / Share Alike license.

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5


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                 reply	other threads:[~2016-06-26 13:52 UTC|newest]

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